People v. District Court, City and County of Denver

• Decision Date: 20 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97SA337,97SA337
• Citation: 953 P.2d 184
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 327 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; and one of the Judges thereof, Honorable Morris Ben Hoffman, Respondents.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 184

953 P.2d 184

98 CJ C.A.R. 327

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; and one of the Judges thereof, Honorable Morris Ben Hoffman Respondents.

No. 97SA337.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Jan. 20, 1998.

A. William Ritter, Jr., District Attorney, Second Judicial District, Henry R. Reeve, Deputy District Attorney, Denver, for Petitioner.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Richard L. Davis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Defendant Edward Finley.

Justice MULLARKEY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People filed this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21 seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus and prohibition compelling the respondent, the Denver District Court, (the respondent court), to proceed with a jury trial in People v. Edward Finley, No. 97CR202. We issued a rule to show cause why the respondent court's August 19, 1997 order requiring a bench trial should not be vacated. We now hold that the respondent court erred as a matter of law when it ordered a bench trial over the People's objection. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute.

I.

The charges at issue in this case stemmed from a car chase involving Denver police officers and a vehicle in which Finley was traveling as a passenger. According to the prosecution, the police officers, who observed Finley stretching his hands across the roof of the vehicle, believed Finley was attempting to shoot at a nearby car traveling in the same direction. After the police finally stopped the vehicle, Finley attempted to walk away. The police apprehended him and subsequently found a fully loaded 12-gauge shotgun with a short barrel under the passenger's seat.

On November 7, 1996, the People charged Finley with possession of a weapon by a prior offender pursuant to section 18-12-108, 6 C.R.S. (1997) (the POWPO statute), by information filed in the respondent court. ¹ The information alleged that Finley had two prior convictions: a 1992 felony menacing conviction, see § 18-3-206, 6 C.R.S. (1997), and a 1993 POWPO conviction. Because Finley had two prior convictions, the People also included an habitual offender charge in the information. See § 16-13-101, 6 C.R.S. (1997). Finley entered a plea of not guilty to the charges in the information.

Prior to trial, Finley moved to waive his right to a jury trial pursuant to section 18-1-406(2), 6 C.R.S. (1997), and to proceed with a bench trial. Finley argued that if the trial proceeded in front of the jury, the jury would hear evidence of his prior felony menacing conviction and his prior POWPO conviction, as those convictions related to the prior felony conviction element in the POWPO charge. Because the 1992 felony menacing conviction was similar to the POWPO charge here and the 1993 POWPO conviction was identical, Finley asserted that the evidence of those prior convictions would unduly prejudice him in the eyes of the jury when it considered the current charges and, consequently, might subject him to an unfair proceeding.

In opposing Finley's motion for a bench trial, the People attempted to exercise their right to refuse a defendant's request to waive a jury trial pursuant to section 16-10-101, 6 C.R.S. (1997). The People argued that Finley's due process argument would arise in any similar situation where the underlying prior felony to the POWPO charge was a prior POWPO conviction or violent offense.

The respondent court, relying on our decision in People v. District Court, 843 P.2d 6 (Colo.1992), ruled in the defendant's favor. Agreeing with Finley that requiring him to proceed in front of a jury would violate his due process rights, the respondent court granted Finley's request for a bench trial.

II.

Our resolution of this case requires us to interpret section 16-10-101, 6 C.R.S. (1997), ² which gives the People the right to refuse to consent to a jury trial waiver in all cases in which a defendant has the right to request a jury trial. In People v. District Court, 843 P.2d at 7-12, we construed section 16-10-101 and section 18-1-406(2), 6 C.R.S. (1997), ³ which grants a defendant the right to waive a jury trial. In harmonizing sections 16-10-101 and 18-1-406(2), we explained that the People may refuse to consent to the defendant's request to waive a jury trial, so long as that refusal comports with a defendant's due process rights as provided in the United States and Colorado Constitutions. See People v. District Court, 843 P.2d at 11. We stated:

[W]e cannot uphold the unqualified prosecution consent requirement where an accused may be subjected to an unfair proceeding before a biased jury. In such cases, the accused's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by due process would be violated.... Thus, where the prosecution objects to defendant's waiver of trial by jury, and a defendant contends that trial by jury would result in a due process violation, the decision as to waiver then rests with the trial court. It is incumbent upon a defendant, in seeking waiver, to raise due process concerns in the trial court. The trial court must subsequently determine whether a jury trial would be fair and impartial in accord with the accused's right to due process of law.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).

A.

In seeking relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the People assert that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. We have exercised our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to determine whether a trial court exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion when we have found that an appellate remedy would be inadequate. See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329, 1330 n. 1 (Colo.1997). We have also explained that original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is appropriate "when appeal would not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 838 (Colo.1991). A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction when it acts contrary to statute, even though the trial court retains general jurisdiction over a case. See Bustamante v. District Court, 138 Colo. 97, 107, 329 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1958) ("[A] writ of prohibition is proper, not only in cases where the lower tribunal has no legal authority to act at all, but also in cases wherein such inferior tribunal, although having general jurisdiction over a particular class of cases, has exceeded such jurisdiction in the particular case. Therefore, prohibition may issue to prevent a court from ... proceeding against the express prohibition of a statute ....") (omission in original) (citation omitted), overruled in part on different grounds, County Court v. Ruth, 194 Colo. 352, 575 P.2d 1 (1978). See also People v. Fullerton, 186 Colo. 97, 99-101, 525 P.2d 1166, 1167-68 (1974) (holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered a bifurcated jury trial in a POWPO case based on the defendant's assertion that informing the jury of the defendant's prior criminal record would unduly influence the jury).

Our exercise of original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is appropriate in this case. First, a successful post-trial appeal by the People would be inadequate because principles of double jeopardy would preclude retrying Finley before a jury. See Barela v. People, 826 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Colo.1992) (explaining that jeopardy attaches in a trial to the court when the first witness is sworn). See also People v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163, 166 (Colo.1990) (exercising jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 and explaining that "the defendant could not be retried even though the prosecution appealed the sanction order as a question of law because jeopardy would have attached"). Second, we conclude that the respondent court erred as a matter of law when it interpreted section 16-10-101 and People v. District Court to require a bench trial, over the People's objection, because the respondent court determined that a jury trial would violate Finley's due process rights to an impartial jury. ⁴ While the respondent court certainly maintains its general jurisdiction over the case, the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a bench trial as a result of its erroneous interpretation of law.

B.

As an initial matter, we do not view Finley's due process argument here as one that is limited to the specific facts of this case. The defendant presented no evidence of prejudice other than the elements of the charges as pled. We see no difference between the argument made here and an argument raised by any other defendant facing the same charges who was previously convicted of a POWPO or a violent felony. This conclusion is underscored by the respondent court's final ruling in the pre-trial proceeding where it stated:

The Court: I think that the harm is marginalized a bit if we're talking about a stipulation that just said--or an instruction that just said Mr. Finley had been convicted of two prior felonies that qualify as felony convictions under this statute, without saying they are menacing and possession of a weapon. But I don't think that solves the problem. The problem is that the jury is given--given information from which they might conclude that Mr. Finley is a bad person because he suffered two felony convictions.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, a proper view of the inquiry here is whether, in a POWPO trial, due process is violated as a consequence of admitting evidence of a prior POWPO or other violent offense conviction in and of itself. We therefore proceed in our analysis by considering, as a general proposition, whether a defendant charged with a POWPO and who has a prior felony conviction for violating the POWPO statute or for some other violent offense can be tried in front of a jury without offending due process.

C.

We begin by noting our prior decisions considering the nature of a defendant's right to waive a jury trial. After reviewing the history of a defendant's right to waive a jury trial, we explained in People v. Davis, 794 P.2d...