People v. Dobranski

• Decision Date: 11 July 1985
• Citation: 112 A.D.2d 541,491 N.Y.S.2d 478
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bernard J. DOBRANSKI, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 478

491 N.Y.S.2d 478

112 A.D.2d 541

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Bernard J. DOBRANSKI, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

July 11, 1985.

Timothy C. Eckel, Elmira, for appellant.

James T. Hayden, Chemung County Dist. Atty., Elmira, for respondent.

Before CASEY, J.P., and WEISS, MIKOLL, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

LEVINE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County, rendered July 11, 1980, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the third degree.

During the early morning hours of December 30, 1979, defendant broke into the display window of a department store in the City of Elmira and stole a shirt. At least three persons witnessed this incident. Among them was Patrick Allen, who called the police and described defendant. Defendant was apprehended and brought back to the store when Allen identified him as the perpetrator of the break-in. Also witnesses to this incident were Cynthia Backer and Mary Bryon, who saw defendant's actions from their car which was stopped at a traffic sign. They then drove to the police station where they were told to wait as the police had apprehended a suspect and were bringing him in. While waiting, both women glanced out the window and saw defendant getting out of a police car.

Defendant was read his Miranda warnings at about 3:00 A.M., after which he gave a statement that he was not involved in the break-in. He was again questioned at approximately 9:20 A.M., at which time he reiterated his innocence. He was then arraigned. Following Huntley and Wade hearings, County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to the police as well as the potential identification testimony of the witnesses. He subsequently pleaded guilty to the crime of burglary in the third degree.

On this appeal, defendant argues that his statements to the police should have been suppressed because (1) he was intoxicated when he made the first statement, and (2) the statement he gave at 9:20 A.M., some eight hours after his arrest, was given after an unreasonable and unnecessary delay in his arraignment. We cannot agree. In regard to the intoxication argument, it is well established that "self-induced intoxication alone will not render a confession inadmissible" (People v. Durante, 48 A.D.2d 962, 963, 369 N.Y.S.2d 560). There must also be a showing that defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to comprehend the meaning of his words (id.). No such showing was made here. Of the two arresting officers, one testified that defendant appeared to be intoxicated at the time he was apprehended, while the other opined that while defendant had apparently been drinking, he was not intoxicated. Neither officer testified that defendant was so inebriated as to be incapable of understanding what he was saying. At most, the officers' testimony presented a question of credibility, the resolution of which was properly within the province of the hearing court and which should not be disturbed on review (see People v. Knuckles, 51 A.D.2d 835, 380 N.Y.S.2d 94; People v. Durante, supra ).

Defendant's second argument, namely, that the delay in his arraignment required the suppression of his statement made at 9:20 A.M., is also meritless. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a delay in arraignment is but one factor to be considered on the issue of involuntariness (People v. Hopkins, 58 N.Y.2d 1079, 1081, 462 N.Y.S.2d 639, 449 N.E.2d 419). Here, no further showing has been made that the statement was involuntary. There is no evidence either that defendant's will was overborne by the delay or that...