People v. El Dorado County

• Decision Date: 08 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. S116870.,S116870.
• Citation: 36 Cal.4th 971,32 Cal.Rptr.3d 109,116 P.3d 567
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPT. OF CONSERVATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EL DORADO COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents; Loring Brunius, Real Party in Interest and Respondent; California Mining Association et al., Interveners and Respondents.

32 Cal.Rptr.3d 109

36 Cal.4th 971

116 P.3d 567

The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPT. OF CONSERVATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EL DORADO COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents;

Loring Brunius, Real Party in Interest and Respondent;

California Mining Association et al., Interveners and Respondents.

No. S116870.

Supreme Court of California.

August 8, 2005.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank and Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, and Richard M. Thalhammer, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Robert Cooper and Robert Cooper for Paramount NE as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Louis B. Green, County Counsel, Edward L. Knapp, Chief Assistant County Counsel; The Diepenbrock Law Firm, Mark D. Harrison, Gene K. Cheever, Michael V. Brady, Jeffrey K. Dorso, Andrea A. Matarazzo and Michael E. Vinding, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

Bingham McCutchen, Peter N. Morrisette; Ebbin Moser + Skaggs and David E. Moser, San Francisco, for Interveners and Respondents.

Becker & Runkle and David C. Becker, Cameron Park, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Robin L. Rivett, Sacramento, and Emma T. Suárez Pawlicki, Folsom, for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents, Interveners and Respondents and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning; McDonough, Holland & Allen and John R. Briggs, Sacramento, for California State Association of Counties and Regional Council for Rural Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents, Interveners and Respondents and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Hatch & Parent and Lisabeth D. Rothman, Los Angeles, for California Building Industry Association, Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation and Home Builders Association of Northern California as Amici Curiae.

WERDEGAR, J.

Does the Director of the Department of Conservation (Director) have standing to file a petition for a writ of mandate challenging reclamation plans and financial assurances for surface mining operations approved by defendant El Dorado County (County) under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 (SMARA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 2710 et seq.)?¹ We conclude he has.

Background²

SMARA, enacted in 1975 (Stats.1975, ch. 1131, § 11, p. 2793), requires that California surface miners provide reclamation plans for their mining operations and financial assurances to implement those plans. (§ 2770, subd. (a).) A reclamation plan under SMARA is a written plan specifying how mined land will be treated so as to minimize the environmental impacts of mining and render a mined site usable in the future for alternative purposes. (See § 2733.) Financial assurances are a mine operator's pledges of funds sufficient to perform reclamation in accordance with an approved reclamation plan. (§ 2773.1, subd. (a)(1).) SMARA prohibits the continuation past stated dates of any surface mining operation not covered by a reclamation plan and financial assurances that have been approved by the "lead agency" responsible for that operation. (§ 2770, subd. (d).)

Respondent and real party in interest Loring Brunius operates two surface mines, Weber Creek Quarry and Diamond Quarry, in respondent County. County, as designated lead agency, was primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with SMARA in its jurisdiction. (§ 2774.1, subd. (f).) The Director is vested with control of the Department of Conservation (Department) (see § 601) and also is assigned various responsibilities under SMARA (see, e.g., §§ 2774, 2774.1, 2796, 2796.5), as will be explained.

Both the Director and the State Mining and Geology Board (Board) (see § 660 et seq.) in the mid-1990's sought to enforce SMARA against Brunius, who at the time was operating both of his quarries without approved reclamation plans or financial assurances. In June 1995, the Director obtained a stipulated judgment requiring Brunius to pay $70,000 in administrative penalties subject to reduction if Brunius complied with SMARA by certain dates. When Brunius failed timely to comply, the Director ordered him to cease all mining activity at Weber Creek Quarry and Diamond Quarry. Brunius, however, having subsequently submitted reclamation plans and financial assurances, obtained a preliminary injunction against operation of the Director's order, in light of Brunius's pending applications for County's approval of his plans and assurances. The Board, for its part, finding that County had, in violation of SMARA, allowed Weber Creek Quarry to operate since 1982 without an approved reclamation plan and since 1994 without approved financial assurances, commenced SMARA's prescribed procedures for assuming lead agency powers in the County. (§ 2774.4.)

As part of the review process of Brunius's reclamation plans and financial assurances, the Director submitted extensive comments as to their inadequacy. In July 1997, County's Planning Commission nevertheless approved the plans and assurances, as well as a mitigated negative declaration under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (§ 21000 et seq.; see also Cal.Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq., especially id., § 15070), for both Weber Creek Quarry and Diamond Quarry. The Director appealed these approvals to County's Board of Supervisors, which adopted the mitigated negative declarations and approved the plans and assurances.

Our question arises out of the Director's filing, in September 1997, two petitions for writs of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against County and Brunius, seeking to vacate County's approvals as in violation of both SMARA and CEQA. The Director alleged that Brunius's reclamation plans did not meet SMARA's specifications and that his financial assurances were inadequate. The Director also alleged that County had violated CEQA in approving the mitigated negative declarations for Brunius's operations.

The Director's two petitions subsequently were consolidated. In March 1998, the Director filed amended petitions, adding allegations that County had (1) erroneously concluded Brunius possessed a vested right to operate Weber Creek Quarry without a permit, and (2) allowed Brunius unlawfully to expand operations at Diamond Quarry.

The California Mining Association, the Construction Materials Association of California, and the Southern California Rock Products Association (Interveners), all trade associations, were granted leave to intervene. County, Brunius, and Interveners each demurred on the ground the Director lacked standing. The trial court overruled the demurrers, and the Court of Appeal denied Interveners' and County's petitions for writs of mandate or other relief from the trial court's ruling.

In answering the Director's petitions, County and Brunius alleged the Director's lack of standing as an affirmative defense; the Interveners' complaint also alleged the Director's lack of standing. The trial court granted County summary adjudication on the Director's claim in the Weber Creek Quarry writ that County erred in finding the Weber Creek Quarry was a "vested use," exempt from various SMARA and permitting requirements. The trial court then granted County and Brunius's motion to dismiss the CEQA claims for the Director's failure timely to request a hearing (§ 21167.4). Finally, the trial court dismissed the Director's remaining SMARA claims on the ground the Director lacked standing to maintain them. The trial court awarded attorney fees to County, Brunius, and the Interveners under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

A divided Court of Appeal affirmed on standing grounds the dismissal of the Director's SMARA and CEQA claims, but reversed the trial court's attorney fees award. The Department, Brunius, and County each filed a petition for review. We granted all three petitions.³

Discussion

We are concerned here not with the merits of the underlying dispute, but only with the procedural question whether the Director has standing to petition for a writ of mandate. Answering this question requires us to examine the Director's role, generally, as the executive officer of a state department and, more specifically, within SMARA.

A. Statutory Background

The majority in the Court of Appeal below accurately detailed the relevant statutory background:

"Within the Resources Agency is the Department of Conservation (the Department). The head of the Department is an executive officer appointed by the Governor, known as the Director. (§ 601.) The Department's work is divided into at least four divisions: mines and geology; oil, gas, and geothermal resources; land conservation; and recycling. (§ 607.)

"Also in the Department is the nine-member State Mining and Geology Board. (§ 660.) . . . The Board represents the state's interests in the development, utilization, and conservation of mineral resources in California and the reclamation of mined lands, and in federal matters pertaining to mining. The Board also determines, establishes, and maintains an adequate surface mining and reclamation policy. (§ 672.) Although the Director is the head of the Department, he does not control the Board; the Director has no power to amend or repeal any order, ruling, or directive of the Board. (§ 671.) [¶] . . . [¶] "The Legislature [in adopting SMARA] intended to create and maintain an effective surface mining and reclamation policy to prevent or minimize adverse environmental effects, reclaim mined lands to a usable condition which is ad[a]ptable to alternative uses, and encourage the production and conservation of minerals while giving consideration to values relating to recreation, watershed, wildlife, range and forage, and aesthetic enjoyment. (§ 2712.)

"At the heart of SMARA is the requirement that every surface mining operation have a permit, a...