People v. Dotson
| Decision Date | 09 November 1982 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 20308 |
| Citation | 186 Cal.Rptr. 905,137 Cal.App.3d 288 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ricky R. DOTSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, George L. Schraer, Deputy Public Defender, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Gloria F. DeHart, Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
*
Ricky R. Dotson appeals from a judgment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187) accompanied by special circumstances. 1
On the morning of December 15, 1978, W.E. Krueger had breakfast with his wife Eliza. Mrs. Krueger, 81 years old, was confined to a wheelchair. Mr. Krueger left as usual for work and locked the door. Shortly thereafter, appellant Dotson and one Dennis Thomas broke into the Krueger house; a friend had informed appellant that there was some money in the Krueger Eliza Krueger was sitting in a wheelchair when the two entered; she wrote frantically upon a tablet and started screaming. The two men then took her out of the chair (appellant holding her feet) and put her in the hall. Thomas tied her hands with a cord and hit her repeatedly. Afterwards, the two ransacked the house in search of valuables.
house, and appellant was particularly looking for that and for diamonds.
While Thomas was beating the victim, appellant was "watching out" to see if someone was coming. Appellant got some of the victim's blood on his clothing; he later threw the stained clothing away so that no evidence would be found. He also used a glove which he found in the house to try to wipe away his fingerprints.
Mr. Krueger returned to his house at about 6:45 p.m. and found his wife dead in the hall. There was a rope around her neck, and both her hands and feet were bound. The autopsy surgeon testified that the victim's ankles had been tied with two neckties and that her hands had been bound behind her back with webbed belting. Her attacker beat her about her head and neck and broke four ribs before strangling her to death with hands and with a cloth ligature dropped around her neck and tied in a granny knot.
Appellant and Dennis Thomas both left their fingerprints at the crime scene.
Appellant argues that under Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to conduct that portion of jury voir dire dealing with death individually and in sequestration. In Hovey, the Supreme Court held that "in future capital cases that portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror which deals with issues which involve death-qualifying the jury should be done individually and in sequestration." (Id., at p. 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.) The court explained that its decision was based on its supervisory authority over California criminal procedure, in order to minimize potentially prejudicial effects. (Id.)
Appellant now asks us to accord retroactivity to the Hovey rule; that we cannot do, as the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the rule will only apply to future capital cases. (Id., at p. 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.)
Appellant next argues that the findings of special circumstances on the murder count must be stricken since the special circumstances were not put before the magistrate at a preliminary examination. He argues that a violation of due process occurs when special circumstances are not charged in the complaint, as a defendant is denied his right to a preliminary factual determination of the sufficiency of the evidence of special circumstances.
In Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor may file "an information against the defendant which may charge the defendant with either the offense or offenses named in the order of commitment or any offense or offenses shown by the evidence taken before the magistrate to have been committed." (Pen.Code, § 739.) At the same time, the court recognized that "a literal construction of section 739 would bring it into conflict with the constitutional mandate which 'protects a person from prosecution in the absence of a prior determination by either a magistrate or a grand jury that such action is justified.' " (Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d 660, 664, 483 P.2d 1241.) "Accordingly, the rule has developed that an information which charges the commission of an offense not named in the commitment order will not be upheld unless (1) the evidence before the magistrate shows that such offense was committed ... and (2) that the offense 'arose out of the transaction which was the basis for the commitment' on a related offense." (Id., at pp. 664-665, 483 P.2d 1241.) The Jones standards are met by the present case.
Appellant claims that a finding of special circumstances may be returned only against the person who actually causes the victim's death, and that to the extent that a broader rule is authorized by statute, that statute must be declared unconstitutional. His specific contention is that the statute governing special circumstances (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (b)) violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 17), and denies equal protection (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, § 7).
At the outset, we must determine whether appellant, who was not sentenced to the death penalty, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the special circumstances statute. "[O]ne will not be heard to attack a statute on grounds that are not shown to be applicable to himself and ... a court will not consider every conceivable situation which might arise under the language of the statute and will not consider the question of constitutionality with reference to hypothetical situations." (In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 313, 14 Cal.Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305; Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 103, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595.) In the present case, while appellant may at one time have faced the death penalty, he was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. Accordingly, his challenge here is restricted to the propriety of the latter sentence; as to that challenge appellant does have standing.
Appellant argues that someone who does not personally cause the death of the victim should not be subjected to the enhanced penalties imposed by virtue of the law of special circumstances. His argument goes to the constitutionality of penalizing an accomplice or one who aids and abets, equally with the actual perpetrator of the crime. The question then is whether it is permissible to punish an accomplice the same as the actor when that punishment is severe.
Under California law, "[t]he distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated...." (Pen.Code, § 971.) The statute "expresses a legislative intent to abolish the distinctions made at common law as to the various types of participants in the commission of a crime and to make all of them subject to the same procedural and substantive limitations." (Bompensiero v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 178, 186, 281 P.2d 250.) Numerous cases have upheld the convictions of those who aided and abetted the perpetrator of various crimes. Thus, in People v. Le Grant (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 148, 172 P.2d Punishment is cruel and unusual when it is "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, 105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921.) The Legislature has determined that the same culpability attaches to both the actor and those who aid and abet his acts. Specifically with respect to the present offense, the degree of danger presented to society by one who assists another to commit murder, makes it clear that the sentence is not disproportionate.
554, the owner of...
To continue reading
Request your trial