People v. Dowell

• Docket Number: A165160
• Decision Date: 05 October 2023
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TAUZHANAE NASHA DOWELL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TAUZHANAE NASHA DOWELL, Defendant and Appellant.

A165160

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division

October 5, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Napa County Super. Ct. No. 19CR003202)

MARKMAN, J. ^[*]

Prosecutors offered defendant Tauzhanae Dowell a "package-deal" plea bargain with her codefendant, Brandon Barrett. Barrett was also allegedly Dowell's boyfriend and her pimp. The law recognizes a serious risk that package-deal plea bargains can be coercive. (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277 286-287 (Ibarra), disapproved on another ground in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175-1178.) A trial court is supposed to mitigate that potential risk when taking a package-deal plea from a defendant by asking the defendant questions that tend to reveal whether her plea is really voluntary. (Id. at p. 288.) The duty of inquiry established by the California Supreme Court in Ibarra concerning package-deal pleas "is prophylactic in character, and not constitutionally compelled." (Id. at p. 290, fn. 6.)

The trial court failed to conduct the inquiry established by Ibarra. In exchange for a seven-year sentence Dowell ultimately pleaded no contest to pandering a minor (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd (b)(1)),^[1] false personation (§ 529), and identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). The court did not ask Dowell any questions concerning the package-deal nature of the plea.

Dowell asks that we reverse the judgment and remand the case so the trial court can investigate the voluntariness of her plea. Citing section 1016.7, Dowell further argues that the trial court's inquiry was flawed because it did not ask the prosecutor questions to confirm that, during plea negotiations, prosecutors had considered Dowell's youth and the human trafficking she experienced.

Under California law, the trial court should have done more to review Dowell's package-deal plea before accepting it as voluntary. But we cannot reverse the judgment because Dowell does not even suggest she wants to withdraw her plea, let alone present evidence to the trial court that her plea was not voluntary. Dowell also does not identify an error concerning compliance with the newly enacted section 1016.7. We therefore affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Testimony adduced during Dowell's preliminary hearing provides the factual context for this appeal. Dowell had a relationship with Barrett for several years, perhaps since high school. They were in a girlfriend-boyfriend and also a prostitute-pimp relationship. Dowell was the most favored among the prostitutes in a group Barrett pimped who were called "the Bundles."

A. Dowell and Barrett Interact with the Minor Victim

In 2018, Dowell and Barrett used social media to contact a minor from Georgia, who had been working as a prostitute and had a child of her own (the minor). They encouraged the minor to come to California to work with the Bundles, promising to help her reunite with her child and to treat and pay her well. They bought her bus tickets, and Dowell communicated with her about the itinerary.

The minor traveled to Oakland in January 2019. No one was there to meet her. She learned that law enforcement had recently raided a house where the Bundles operated. Police arrested Barrett during this raid. The minor decided to return to Georgia.

Dowell and the minor continued to communicate, and in February or March of 2019, the minor returned to California to work as a prostitute. Dowell picked the minor up in Oakland and took her to a house in Sacramento, where the Bundles were now operating. The minor worked there as a prostitute for "a couple of weeks," giving the money she earned to Dowell. Then, Barrett arrived. The minor described Barrett as angry because Dowell did not give him as much money as he wanted her to make while he was incarcerated. During this period, Barrett hit and choked the minor. Dowell also hit her.

The minor left the house in Sacramento and made her way back to Oakland, where she continued to engage in prostitution on her own. Law enforcement caught the minor in a prostitution sting and placed her in a foster home. She contacted Dowell, who took her away from the home while posing as her sister. The minor then briefly worked for Dowell as a prostitute, with Dowell acting as her pimp.

The minor returned to Georgia. A few months later, she contacted a Napa County detective who was investigating the Bundles trafficking operation to talk about her experience.

B. The Charges and Package-Deal Plea Agreement

Prosecutors charged Dowell and Barrett by consolidated information with numerous felonies and misdemeanors. Dowell was charged with pandering the minor (§ 266i, subd. (b)(1)); human trafficking of the minor, including by force (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1) &(2)); a second count of human trafficking of the minor (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)); giving false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)); driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)); false personation (§ 529); and identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)).^[2] The first human trafficking count alone carried a maximum sentence of life in prison. Both Dowell and Barrett also faced potential federal prosecution.

Attorneys separately represented Dowell and Barrett throughout the proceedings. Plea negotiations were underway by mid-2020. Dowell and Barrett both accepted a package-deal plea agreement in early January 2022. Dowell stipulated to the factual basis for her plea, including the aggravating factors, and agreed to a six-year sentence for pandering-the upper term- plus two eight-month terms for false personation and identity theft. She agreed to register as a sex offender under section 290. The court dismissed the remaining counts against her.

The trial court sentenced Dowell in accordance with her plea in March 2022. She later timely filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which the trial court granted.

DISCUSSION

I. Dowell's Plea

Dowell argues the trial court failed to inquire whether her packagedeal plea, with her alleged boyfriend and pimp, was voluntary, as required by Ibarra. She asks us to remand the matter to the trial court "to hold a hearing to investigate" this issue.

A. Package-Deal Pleas and the Ibarra Inquiry

Due process demands that a defendant must knowingly and voluntarily waive her constitutional rights before entering a guilty plea. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243-244 &fn. 5.) The trial court must make a record confirming that the waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. (Ibid.) Under many circumstances, a defendant will initial and sign a waiver form and the trial court may simply confirm on the record that the defendant read and understood the contents of the form and wishes to enter the guilty plea. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 285-286.)

Package-deal pleas are "not intrinsically coercive," but they raise concerns regarding the possibility of coercion beyond those present in a typical plea negotiation. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 283-284.) The Supreme Court explained the dilemma in Ibarra: "In the normal bargain, a defendant must choose between pleading guilty and receiving a lesser sentence, or taking his chances at a trial (in which he may be convicted and receive a greater sentence). The prosecutor seeks to avoid the time and expense of trial. These are proper considerations by both parties that do not amount to such coercion as to unduly force a defendant to plead guilty. [Citations.] [¶] 'Package-deal' plea bargains, however, may approach the line of unreasonableness. Extraneous factors not related to the case or the prosecutor's business may be brought into play. For example, a defendant may fear that his wife will be prosecuted and convicted if he does not plead guilty; or, a defendant may fear . . . that his codefendant will attack him if he does not plead guilty. Because such considerations do not bear any direct relation to whether the defendant himself is guilty, special scrutiny must be employed to ensure a voluntary plea. '[P]lea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused . . . might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea . . . .'" (Ibarra, at p. 287, quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 364, fn. 8.)

Given such imperatives, when accepting a plea, the trial court must determine whether it was offered in a package-deal requiring pleas by all codefendants and, if so, inquire into possible coercion before accepting it. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287.) The court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether, in fact, a plea has been unduly coerced or is instead freely and voluntarily given. (Id. at p. 288.)

The Ibarra court identifies four sets of factors that form the basis for the trial court's inquiry. "First, the court must determine whether the inducement for the plea is proper. The court should be satisfied that the prosecution has not misrepresented facts to the defendant, and that the substance of the inducement is within the proper scope of the prosecutor's business. [Citation.] The prosecutor must also have a reasonable and good faith case against the third parties to whom leniency is promised." (Id. at pp. 288-289, fn. omitted.)

"Second, the factual basis for the guilty plea must be considered." (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289.) A plea that is "not supported by the evidence" or that is "disproportionate to the accused's culpability" would tend to indicate that a plea is not voluntary. (Ibid.)

"Third the nature and degree of coerciveness should be carefully examined. Psychological pressures sufficient to...