People v. Drayton

• Decision Date: 04 May 1976
• Citation: 39 N.Y.2d 580,385 N.Y.S.2d 1
• Parties: , 350 N.E.2d 377 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur DRAYTON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 1

385 N.Y.S.2d 1

39 N.Y.2d 580, 350 N.E.2d 377

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Arthur DRAYTON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 4, 1976.

Nathan Schwartz, Brooklyn, for appellant.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Franklin L. Carroll, III, Brooklyn, of Counsel), for respondent.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Jules E. Orenstein, Mineola, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), intervenor pro se.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

Presented for our determination is a constitutional challenge to CPL 720.20 (subd. 1) which sets forth the procedures for youthful offender treatment. Appellant claims that the statutory provisions are violative of the equal protection guarantees of the United States and New York State Constitutions because otherwise eligible youths charged with felonies in a 'superior court' are afforded youthful offender treatment only at the discretion of the court while those charged with lesser crimes in a 'local criminal court' are mandatorily entitled to such treatment.

Defendant, who was just short of 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was indicted by a Grand Jury for the crimes of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree, both class D felonies. Following plea negotiatio defendant entered a plea of guilty in Supreme Court, Kings County, to the crime of assault in the third degree, a class A misdemeanor. The court, in accepting the plea, found that the defendant was an 'eligible youth' as defined in CPL 720.10. ¹ Exercising the discretion conferred upon it pursuant to CPL 720.20 (subd. 1, par. (a)), however, the court denied the defendant youthful offender treatment on the basis of a highly unfavorable probation report, revealing prior encounters with the law, and ultimately sentenced him to a one-year period of incarceration (see Penal Law, §§ 60.01, 60.02). Defendant's plaint, therefore, is that if he had been convicted of assault in the third degree in a 'local criminal court', adjudication as a youthful offender would have been mandatory. We agree with the Appellate Division, 47 A.D.2d 952, 367 N.Y.S.2d 506 that this difference in treatment is not invidiously discriminatory and does not constitute a violation of defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.

The statute under attack (CPL 720.20, subd. 1) articulates the following distinction between youths convicted in 'local criminal courts' and those convicted in 'superior courts':

'1. Upon conviction of an eligible youth, the court must order a pre-sentence investigation of the defendant. After receipt of a written report of the investigation and at the time of pronouncing sentence the court must determine whether or not the eligible youth is a youthful offender. Such determination shall be in accordance with the following criteria:

'(a) If in the opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years, the court may, in its discretion, find the eligible youth is a youthful offender; and

'(b) Where the conviction is had in a local criminal court and the eligible youth had not prior to commencement of trial or entry of a plea of guilty been convicted of a crime or found a youthful offender, the court must find he is a youthful offender.'

Prior to embarking upon a discussion of defendant's equal protection claim, it is both instructive and important to note that the Criminal Procedure Law shifted the determination of youthful offender status from the prepleading stage to the postconviction stage thus eliminating the proliferation of unnecessary and futile probation reports in the substantial percentage of cases which did not result in convictions; and, in many instances, the statute provides for speedier dispositions (see Denzer, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 11A, CPL art. 720, pp. 315--316). Under the prior statute (Code Crim.Pro., § 913--g, subds. 3, 4), regardless of the charge, final determination of youthful offender status always remained within the discretion of the court which was entitled to consider the probation report as well as any other facts presented which might reveal the defendant's prior behavior (see Pitler, New York Criminal Practice, § 7.40, p. 372). Under the current formula in the Criminal Procedure Law, no step is taken until after conviction when, in the superior court, the Judge makes a determination on the basis of a presentence report and investigation as to whether a youth should be afforded youthful offender treatment. Thus, in a superior court the function of the Judge is similar to that which existed under the Code of Criminal Procedure except that the decision concerning youthful offender treatment is made at a different stage in the criminal process. In a local criminal court, however, the presentence report will have no relevance for youthful offender determination since youthful offender treatment is mandated.

The youthful offender provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law emanate from a legislative desire not to stigmatize youths between the ages of 16 and 19 with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts which, although crimes, may not have been the serious deeds of hardened criminals. There is no constitutional right to youthful offender status and such treatment is entirely a gratuitous creature of the Legislature subject to such conditions as the Legislature may impose without violating constitutional guarantees. The classification is therefore cloaked with a presumption of validity which may be overcome only 'if no grounds can be conceived to justify (it)' (McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L.Ed.2d 739).

Turning now to the substance of defendant's contention, we observe initially that the challenge to the statute must be viewed through the lens of the rational basis test since the classification does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental interest (see Alevy v. Downstate Med. Center of State of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 332, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87, 348 N.E.2d 537, 542; Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 59--61, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 16--18, 340 N.E.2d 444, 455--457). As traditionally formulated, this test requires that a governmental classification be based on some conceivable and valid State interest (McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276--277, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491; see Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 345 N.E.2d 556; Matter of Figueroa v. Bronstein, 38 N.Y.2d 533, 381 N.Y.S.2d 470, 344 N.E.2d 402). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has indicated, '(a) statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it' (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393).

The distinction between youths charged in superior as opposed to local criminal ...