People v. Duffield

• Decision Date: 04 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 31,31
• Citation: 387 Mich. 300,197 N.W.2d 25
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald DUFFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 25

197 N.W.2d 25

387 Mich. 300

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald DUFFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 31.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 4, 1972.

[387 Mich. 303] Herman A. Saitz, Pros. Atty., Cass County, Dowagiac, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender, by Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

There are two issues in this case.

I. Whether under common law or statute the Circuit Court of Cass County has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a manslaughter prosecution when the deceased was beaten in his home in Cass County II. Whether the trial judge lawfully accepted defendant's plea of guilty when the defendant alleged he could not remember some of the details of the crime?

Michigan, and died in a hospital in South Bend, Indiana?

The deceased, John Henry Frazier, was beaten in his home in Cass County, Michigan, and was taken to Memorial Hospital in South Bend, Indiana, where he died a few days later. Defendant was charged with manslaughter (M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553) and was represented by assigned counsel at his arraignment. At the arraignment, after the trial judge directly addressed the defendant explaining to him the offense with which he was charged and his right to a trial, defendant Duffield expressed his desire to plead guilty. He testified first that at the time of the assault he was intoxicated and did not know what had happened. In response to questioning by both Judge Anderson and the prosecutor, however, defendant testified that he did remember hitting the deceased with his fists while the deceased was on the floor and in response to further questions testified to essential facts. In response to final questions from the trial court the defendant answered that he had no doubt that he was guilty as charged and the court then accepted his plea of guilty. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter on his plea of guilty on May 25, 1967, and sentenced to 8 to 15 years in prison.

On January 26, 1968, at defendant's request, appellant counsel was appointed for him and on July 25 an order for leave to withdraw defendant's plea was filed. When defendant was examined concerning the motion to withdraw his plea he denied any knowledge of the beating of the deceased. The trial judge, after determining that defendant's intoxication was voluntary, held that the defendant was well aware of his guilt, and that no miscarriage of justice had resulted from acceptance of the guilty plea. In his motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea defendant also challenged the jurisdiction of the Cass County Circuit Court on the ground that since deceased actually died in Indiana the crime of manslaughter could not occur in Michigan under either common law or Michigan statutory law. In denying the motion the trial judge held that M.C.L.A. § 762.5, which grants jurisdiction to either the county of the blow or the county of the death, was applicable to the situation where blows occurred within the state but death occurred without. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 20 Mich.App. 473, 174 N.W.2d 137, holding that the common law rule permitting jurisdiction in either the county of the blow or the county of the death was embodied in M.C.L.A. § 762.5; M.S.A. § 28.848. People v. Duffield, 20 Mich.App. 473, 174 N.W.2d 137 (1969).

ISSUE ONE--JURISDICTION

In his brief and oral argument counsel for defendant ably contends that the Michigan Circuit Court was without jurisdiction either under statute or common law. He argues first that M.C.L.A. § 762.5 ¹ is purely a venue statute concerning only those cases where both the assault and death occur within Michigan; and that M.C.L.A. § 762.6 ² is the only extraterritorial jurisdictional statute and covers only those cases where death ensues within the state. Second, he argues that under the common law there is no jurisdiction to try a defendant for an assault where the resulting death occurs without the territorial jurisdiction.

We agree there is no Michigan statute giving jurisdiction in this situation (I Infra). However, we hold there is common law jurisdiction (II Infra).

I.--No Statutory Jurisdiction

M.C.L.A. § 762.6 is as follows:

'If any such mortal wound shall be given, or other violence or injury shall be inflicted or poison administered on the The question here is whether by virtue of this statute the Michigan courts have jurisdiction to hear a homicide case where it is undisputed that the death occurred in Indiana. As appellant correctly points out, by the plain language of the statute it is only applicable to a prosecution in Michigan courts when the death occurs in Michigan regardless of where the fatal agency was administered. This was recognized by the Court of Appeals below, 20 Mich.App. 473, 477 (1969), and we so hold.

high seas, or in any other navigable waters, or on land, either within or without the limits of this state, by means whereof death shall ensue in any county thereof, such offense may be prosecuted and punished in the county where such death shall have ensued.' M.C.L.A. § 762.6; M.S.A. § 28.849; 1927 P.A. 175, c. II, § 6.

The only relevance of this statute to these proceedings is that People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161 (1859), and Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320 (1860), are relied upon by both parties and these cases do involve a construction of this statute in relation to the common law. These cases are discussed Infra.

M.C.L.A. § 762.5 reads as follows:

'If any mortal wound shall be given or other violence or injury shall be inflicted, or any poison shall be administered in 1 county by means whereof death shall ensue in another county, the offense may be prosecuted and punished in either county.' M.C.L.A. § 762.5; M.S.A. § 28.848; 1927 P.A. 175, c. II, § 5.

Appellant claims that the Court of Appeals erroneously construed this statute as applicable to the case where death ensues outside the territorial jurisdiction of Michigan. The Court of Appeals noted that the statute was not specifically addressed to this issue and treated the statute as embodying the common law rule that jurisdiction lies in either the county of the blow or the county of the death. 20 Mich.App. 473, 476--477, 174 N.W.2d 137.

Appellant contends that M.C.L.A. § 762.5 is a Venue statute and cannot confer jurisdiction on the courts of Michigan where death ensued without the state. In support of his argument that the statute merely provides for the place of trial when both the assault and death occur within Michigan, defendant correctly points out that the reference to 'county' must refer only to Michigan counties. If we were to construe the statute as applicable to this case then it could mean that the offense may be prosecuted in either Cass County or in the county in Indiana where the death occurred, and it is evident that the legislature neither intended nor has the power to confer jurisdiction on Indiana courts. M.C.L.A. § 762.5 is not applicable in this case.

We find no statute giving jurisdiction in this case.

II.--Common Law Jurisdiction

1--What Constitutes the Common Law of Michigan?

Since there is no jurisdiction by statute, if the defendant was properly convicted it must be because the surviving common law rule is that in cases involving different jurisdictions the homicide occurs where the homicidal blow is struck.

Although we have recognized the common law as part of our jurisprudence, Const.1963, art. 3, § 7, it is the English common law unaffected by statute. English statutes of general operation were in force in the territory at one time, but in 1810 an act was passed putting an end to the effectiveness in Michigan of all the written law of England, France, Canada, and the Northwest and Indiana Territories. 1 Territorial Laws, 900; In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 108, 27 N.W. 882 (1886); Methodist Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 741, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 357, 365 (1861); Blume, Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan, 1805--1814, Vol. I, pp. xxxi--xl (1935); and see In the Matter of Jackson This case must therefore be governed exclusively upon common law prior to the enactment of the statutes of 2 and 3 Edward VI, c. 24 (1548) ⁴ and 2 George II, c. 21 (1729) ⁵ (reenacted 9 George IV, c. 31, § 8 (1828)) which related to striking or poisoning in one place and death ensuing in another.

15 Mich. 417, 438 (1867); Plaza Investment Co. v. Abel, 8 Mich.App. 19, 25, 153 N.W.2d 379 (1967). ³

2--Michigan Cases Construing Common Law Alternate Jurisdiction

There are no cases in Michigan which directly construe the common law on this point.

Obiter dicta occurs in three cases. In each case the language is that of Justice Campbell. In one case, he stated:

'Until provided for by statute, death in one county from an attack in another did not make murder in either county . . .' Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357, 360 (1878). ⁶

In another case, he stated:

'Where death does not immediately follow the mortal blow, and happens in another jurisdiction within the realm, the place of death was generally, under the views taken by the common law authorities, the proper place of jurisdiction . . .' People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 208--209 (1859) (hereinafter Tyler I). ⁷

Justice Campbell dissented in Tyler II, ⁸ 8 Mich. 320 (1860) and rejected the doctrine of 'constructive presence' apparently adopted by the majority. In the course of a lengthy dissent Justice Campbell interprets the common law as providing for trial at the place of the blow. He commenced on the common law as follows:

'The old rule requiring every offense tried in the common law courts to be inquired of in the county where it occurred, originated in the peculiar constitution of the early juries. They were not selected merely to hear evidence and pass upon it. They were witnesses, as well as triers, and were supposed to act on...