People v. Duffield

• Decision Date: 04 December 1969
• Docket Number: Docket No. 6562,No. 3,3
• Citation: 20 Mich.App. 473,174 N.W.2d 137
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald DUFFIELD, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 137

174 N.W.2d 137

20 Mich.App. 473

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald DUFFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 6562.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

Dec. 4, 1969.

Released for Publication Feb. 25, 1970.

Robert R. Waterson, Dowagiac, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Herman A Saitz, Pros. Atty., Cass County, Dowagiac, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before FITZGERALD, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and BRONSON, JJ.

FITZGERALD, Presiding Judge.

Ronald Duffield was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of manslaughter on May 25, 1967, in Cass County circuit court and sentenced to 8 to 15 years in prison. He requested appellate counsel about a year later, counsel was appointed, and a motion to withdraw his plea was filed. On September 12, 1968, the motion was denied and claim of appeal filed seeking review of the conviction and the order denying the motion.

It appears that Duffield and the victim were drinking heavily, that they quarreled over a petty debt, and it was charged that Duffield, a much larger man, beat the victim insensible and left him on the floor of his home in Cass County. Later the victim was taken to a hospital in Indiana where he died.

Defendant first argues that jurisdiction was lacking. He points out that death is an essential element of manslaughter, and that Chapman v. People (1878), 3. Mich. 357, p. 360, said:

'Until provided for by statute, death in one county from an attack in another Did not make murder in either county.' (Emphasis supplied.)

This, says defendant, is the common law of Michigan. He then states the doctrine of constructive presence from 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 136(n), p. 363, and a statement from Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes (6th ed.), p. 150. Finally, United States v. Palmer (1818), 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 4 L.Ed. 471; People v. Tyler (1859), 7 Mich. 161, and Tyler v. People (1860), 8 Mich. 320, are cited.

To analyze defendant's contention that this is the common law, we must look to see if change has been made by statute. M.C.L.A. § 762.5 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.848), states that:

'If any mortal wound shall be given or other violence or injury shall be inflicted, or any poison shall be administered in 1 county by means whereof death shall ensue in another county, the offense may be prosecuted and punished in either county.'

The trial court held that the fact the county of death is outside of the state, and prosecution in the county of death impossible, does not relieve defendant of liability to prosecution in the county where the injury was inflicted.

Since the wording of the Michigan statute is not specifically addressed to this precise issue, a question of construction arises. Moreover, there is a dispute as to the common law on this issue.

Defendant misconstrues the common law rule. The ancient common law is explored at length by Justice Campbell in Tyler v. People, Supra, and he points out that, 'the rule survived its reason.'

'But, formerly, if a fatal blow was given in one county, and death happened in another, the homicide could not be within the knowledge of the jurors of either county; those who could speak as to the blow having no means of ascertaining the death, and Vice versa. But it was settled that, by carrying the dead body into the county where the wound was given, so that death could be shown by view, the offense might be tried there. * * * At common law (but probably when jury trials became more improved) a trial might always be had in the county where the mortal blow was given, 'for that alone is the act of the party, and the death is but a consequence.' * * * The statute of 2 and 3 Edw VI, ch 24, provided that, in case of a mortal injury in one county, followed by death in another, an indictment found in the county where death happened should be as good and effectual in law as if the stroke or poisoning had been committed and done in the same county where the party shall die * * *' (Emphasis supplied.) Tyler v. People, Supra, 339, 340.

This is the English rule: jurisdiction lies in either the county of the blow or the county of death. This precise rule is enacted in M.C.L.A. § 762.5 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.848). As to cases like the instant one, the common law gives jurisdiction to the county of the blow. M.C.L.A. § 762.6 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.849) provides that where the blow is inflicted abroad, at sea, or in another state, and death occurs in Michigan, jurisdiction lies here.

'If a wound is inflicted outside the forum state, but the victim later dies in the state, it is considered to be murder or manslaughter in the state in which the death occurs, As well as in the state or country in which the wound was given. (citing Tyler) This approach purports to be a redefinition of homicide law, but its primary effect is to create jurisdiction where none would otherwise lie Under the common law concept that the place of homicide is where the blow was given' George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 Mich.L.Rev. 609, 622 (1966).

'According to the weight of authority it is the rule of the common law as adopted in this country that the courts of the state where the mortal wound was inflicted have jurisdiction of the offense, though the deceased died in another state; and in some jurisdictions this rule is expressly sanctioned by statute.' 3 Warren, Homicide, § 298, p. 475.

See also, Simms v. United States (1957), 101 U.S.App.D.C. 304, 248 F.2d 626; State v. Carrier (1956), 235 Ind. 456, 134 N.E.2d 688, 59 A.L.R.2d 896; Kelley v. State (1943), 181 Md. 642, 31 A.2d 614; Simpson v. State (1893), 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984, 22 L.R.A. 248; State v. Justus (1959), 65 N.M. 195, 334 P.2d 1104; and 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 185(17), p. 478.

Cass County had jurisdiction to try this case.

Defendant further asks that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty for the reason that he had no personal knowledge of the actions alleged and, therefore, Prima facie, he could not truthfully enter a guilty plea.

At the arraignment on May 25, 1967, the defendant pled guilty, but upon being questioned, he indicated his lack of personal knowledge as to any elements of the crime alleged due to the fact that he had been drinking.

Defendant contends that his statements at the arraignment were based only on what he had heard at the preliminary examination, and that, therefore, he had no independent knowledge of any actions which were alleged to have taken place. Nor did he have any independent knowledge of the resulting death of the deceased. Therefore, he did not have the ability to enter a valid guilty plea and it should be allowed to be withdrawn. GCR 1963, 785.3(2), M.C.L.A. § 768.35 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.1058).

By its court rules, Michigan has provided the following:

'Imposing Sentence. If the accused pleads guilty, after such plea and before sentence the court shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence of his plea; and regardless of whether he is represented by counsel, the court shall examine the accused, not necessarily under oath, and as...