People v. Duffy

• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Louis M. DUFFY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1231
990 N.Y.S.2d 346
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05464

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Louis M. DUFFY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 24, 2014.

[990 N.Y.S.2d 347]

Donna C. Chin, Ithaca, for appellant.

Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (John R. Thweatt of counsel), for respondent.

Before: STEIN, J.P., McCARTHY, GARRY, LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.

McCARTHY, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley, J.), rendered January 12, 2012, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts).

At approximately 1:15 a.m., defendant went to a nightclub that catered to the gay community and was managed by the victim. Defendant had agreed to perform construction work for the victim later that day and to spend the night at the victim's house before working. Although defendant knew that the victim was gay and had reason to expect that the victim would make sexual advances toward him, he informed his friends that he would kill the victim if the victim touched him. Shortly after arriving at the nightclub, defendant and the victim walked across the street to the victim's residence where the two had consensual sex in a bedroom. At approximately 3:20 a.m., defendant shot the victim in the head and ran out of the house immediately afterward.

When police arrived, they found the victim lying on his stomach in bed, under covers, bleeding from a gunshot wound to his left temple. The victim died shortly thereafter. Defendant was taken into custody

[990 N.Y.S.2d 348]

and gave a written statement indicating that he shot the victim because, when defendant tried to leave the victim's house, the victim told him that their sexual relationship was going to continue and then grabbed him by the throat. Defendant was thereafter charged in an indictment with murder in the second degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. At trial, defendant asserted the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance ( seePenal Law § 125.25[1][a] ), presenting testimony that his interactions with the victim had caused a “flashback” to his childhood sexual abuse at the hands of his step-grandfather. Nevertheless, the jury convicted defendant as charged, and County Court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant appeals.

Initially, defendant argues that County Court erred in failing to order, sua sponte, a competency hearing pursuant to CPL 730.30. “[A] defendant is presumed to be competent, and ... is not entitled, as a matter of right, to have the question of his [or her] capacity to stand trial passed upon before the commencement of the trial, if the court is satisfied from the available information that there is no proper basis for questioning the defendant's sanity” ( People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 765, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87 [1999],cert. denied528 U.S. 834, 120 S.Ct. 94, 145 L.Ed.2d 80 [1999] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d 878, 880, 638 N.Y.S.2d 942, 662 N.E.2d 260 [1995];People v. Yu–Jen Chang, 92 A.D.3d 1132, 1134, 939 N.Y.S.2d 596 [2012] ). A history of mental illness and drug abuse “does not in itself call into question [a] defendant's competence to stand trial” ( People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d at 765, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87); rather, “a [t]rial [j]udge determining whether a competency hearing is necessary may also consider expert medical proof ..., coupled with all other evidence and his [or her] own observations of the defendant” ( id. at 766, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87 [internal quotations marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d at 880–881, 638 N.Y.S.2d 942, 662 N.E.2d 260;People v. Poquee, 9 A.D.3d 781, 783, 780 N.Y.S.2d 247 [2004],lv. denied3 N.Y.3d 741, 786 N.Y.S.2d 821, 820 N.E.2d 300 [2004] ). In reviewing whether a trial court erred in not ordering a competency hearing, the critical question is whether the court abused its discretion ( see People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d at 766, 686 N.Y.S.2d 346, 709 N.E.2d 87;People v. Kulakov, 72 A.D.3d 1271, 1272, 898 N.Y.S.2d 373 [2010],lv. denied15 N.Y.3d 775, 907 N.Y.S.2d 464, 933 N.E.2d 1057 [2010],lv. dismissed16 N.Y.3d 896, 926 N.Y.S.2d 32, 949 N.E.2d 980 [2011] ).

Notwithstanding defendant's psychiatric diagnoses, drug use and emotional turmoil shortly after his arrest, defendant's own expert psychologist concluded that defendant was sufficiently competent to participate in his own defense. In addition, County Court had the opportunity to observe defendant during his...