People v. Dunaway

• Decision Date: 16 December 2015
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Dwight DUNAWAY, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

134 A.D.3d 952
22 N.Y.S.3d 476

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Dwight DUNAWAY, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 16, 2015.

22 N.Y.S.3d 477

Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Denise A. Corsi of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se.

Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Howard B. Goodman of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, ROBERT J. MILLER, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

134 A.D.3d 952

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Del Giudice, J.), rendered February 7, 2011, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reducing the defendant's conviction of assault in the second degree to assault in the third degree, and vacating the sentence imposed thereon; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the defendant's conviction of robbery in the first degree was not against the weight of the evidence

22 N.Y.S.3d 478

(see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).

The defendant requested permission to present three demonstrations to the jury in order to challenge the reliability of his identification by the complainant, who had known the defendant for more than 15 years. First, the defendant requested that the jury be brought outside of the courthouse to view the complainant inside of his sport utility vehicle to explain how the complainant had been positioned while being kidnapped. The defendant also requested that he be allowed to open and close his hands in the courtroom, to discredit testimony that his hands were recognizable because some of his fingers became stiff and locked during cold weather. Additionally, the defendant requested permission to stand up in the courtroom so that the jury could view his height and frame. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying these requests.

134 A.D.3d 953

Demonstrations and tests, when relevant to a contested issue, can "play a positive and helpful role in the ascertainment of truth" (people v. acevedO, 40 n.y.2d 701, 704, 389 n.y.s.2d 811, 358 N.E.2d 495 ; see People v. Caballero, 34 A.D.3d 690, 691–692, 824 N.Y.S.2d 427 ). Although demonstrations should not lightly be rejected when they would play such a role, courts must be alert to the danger that, when ill-designed or not properly relevant to the point at issue, instead of being helpful, they may serve to mislead, confuse, divert, or otherwise prejudice the purposes of the trial (see People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d at 704, 389 N.Y.S.2d 811, 358 N.E.2d 495 ). Accordingly, the trial court "must decide in the exercise of a sound discretion based on the nature of the proffered proof and the context in which it is offered, whether the value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice" (id.; see People v. Caballero, 34 A.D.3d at 691–692, 824 N.Y.S.2d 427 ).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in concluding that the value of the requested demonstrations did not outweigh their potential for prejudice or misleading the jury. The probative value of each demonstration was limited in light of the extensive testimony regarding the complainant's ability to observe the defendant during the crimes, as well as photographs of the complainant inside his sport utility vehicle. Moreover, the conditions surrounding the proposed demonstrations were not substantially similar to the conditions present when the crimes were committed (see People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d at 704, 389 N.Y.S.2d 811, 358 N.E.2d 495 ; People v. Mercereau, 84 A.D.3d 1270, 1271, 924 N.Y.S.2d 118 ; People v. Caballero, 34 A.D.3d at 692, 824 N.Y.S.2d 427 ; People v. Robinson, 133 A.D.2d 473, 473–474, 519 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; People v. Hamilton, 112 A.D.2d 951, 492 N.Y.S.2d 632 ). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the defendant failed to establish that the proposed demonstrations would be helpful to determine a "material factual issue" (CPL 270.50[1] ; see People v. Robinson, 133 A.D.2d at 473–474, 519 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; People v. Cassidy, 115 A.D.2d 487, ...