People v. Dupuis
| Citation | 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 923,7 Cal.App.4th 696 |
| Decision Date | 19 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. E010295,E010295 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter G. DUPUIS, Defendant and Appellant. |
Defendant seeks review of his case in this court, by way of this court's order transferring this case to it from the appellate department of the superior court (appellate department) upon certification of the appellate department. Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of one count of driving a vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and one count of driving a vehicle while having a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or greater (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b), as worded at the time of the offense), which convictions were attended by the municipal court's finding that defendant had suffered a prior conviction under section 23152 of the Vehicle Code (prior).
Notwithstanding defendant's attempts to secure our review of the entirety of the municipal court proceedings, we shall conclude that only one, limited issue--whether or not the appellate department committed error in remanding to the municipal court for retrial the question of whether defendant was convicted of the alleged prior--is before us for hearing and decision. With respect to that one issue, we shall conclude that the appellate department did err.
Following a jury trial in the municipal court, defendant was convicted of the aforementioned "driving under the influence" offenses and the trial court found true the alleged prior. Defendant appealed to the appellate department, raising four distinct issues, including the issue of whether the trial court had committed "Yurko error" in proceeding to determine the truth of the alleged prior without first advising defendant of his right to a jury trial on that question and then obtaining an express waiver by defendant of a jury trial on that matter. 1
The appellate department ruled on the matter as follows: Defendant thereafter petitioned the appellate department for a rehearing on the matter and, in the alternative, applied for a certification of the case to this court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 62 and 63(a). 2 The sole ground upon which defendant based his petition/application for rehearing/certification was his contention that the appellate department had committed error in remanding the case to the municipal court for retrial on the question whether defendant had been convicted of the alleged prior because the double jeopardy doctrine precluded a retrial.
The appellate department denied defendant's petition for rehearing, but did certify the transfer of the case to this court because: "A decision regarding the impaneling of a new jury to try prior conviction allegations as it relates to a criminal defendant's right against Double Jeopardy should be addressed within this Appellate District to settle this important question of law." 3
This court then ordered the transfer of the case to it for hearing and decision pursuant to rule 62(a), stating:
Defendant filed an Opening Brief with this court, in which brief defendant once again assigned as error by the municipal court the same four contentions he had originally raised in the appellate brief he had filed with the appellate department. The People responded to each of the four issues in its Respondent's Brief.
Additional facts will be referred to, as needed, in the discussion which follows.
Rule 62(a) states in pertinent part that: "A Court of Appeal may order a case transferred to it for hearing and decision when the superior court certifies ... that such transfer appears necessary to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law." (Emphasis added.) A literalistic argument can be made that rule 62(a)'s use of the phrase "a case" means that the entirety of a case (including all of the various issues raised on appeal in the appellate department of the superior court) is necessarily brought forward for further appellate review by a court of appeal when a case is transferred from a superior court to a court of appeal by way of certified transfer. We do not, however, interpret 62(a) to have that meaning.
As noted by our Supreme Court: "The Court of Appeal has uncontrolled discretion in deciding whether to transfer a case from the appellate department [citation], ..." (Dvorin v. Appellate Dept. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 648, 650, 125 Cal.Rptr. 771, 542 P.2d 1363, emphasis added.) In our view, "uncontrolled discretion in deciding whether to transfer a case" at all necessarily includes the discretion to determine that only certain, limited aspects of a case will be heard and decided after the transfer. This interpretation of rule 62(a) is particularly consistent with the fact that "[c]ases are transferred to the Court of Appeal under rules 61-69, not primarily for the benefit of the party who lost in the superior court, but 'to secure uniformity of decision or to settle important questions of law.' " (Corcoran v. Universal Guardian Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 904, 910, 140 Cal.Rptr. 421.)
In this case, the petition for a rehearing which defendant filed with the appellate department was based solely on his contention that the appellate department had committed error by remanding the case to the municipal court for retrial of the truth of the alleged prior. This same contention formed the sole basis of defendant's application to the appellate department to have his case certified for transfer to this court for hearing and decision. This same issue was the only issue referred to (indirectly) by the appellate department in its certification. And finally, this same issue is the sole issue referred to by this court in ordering the transfer of defendant's case. Given all of the above, we decline to address any of defendant's...
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Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc.
...and expressing reluctance to increase the role of that court in reviewing such convictions].) Thereafter, in People v. Dupuis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 696, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 (Dupuis ), the Court of Appeal ordered transfer of a case after the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor in the munic......
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People v. Gonzalez
...order of the Court of Appeal limiting the issues, and we therefore do not consider its propriety. (See, e.g. People v. Dupuis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 696, 700, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 [concluding Court of Appeal has power to limit issues when it transfers cause to itself under rule 62(a) of the Cali......
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...fully served by exercising our discretion to limit our review to the discrete issue certified by transfer. (See People v. Dupuis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 696, 700, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 923.) ...
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...Council amend the California Rules of Court to make explicit that which is currently only implicit" (People v. Dupuis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 696, 701, fn. 4, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 923), in this case, to provide expressly for appellate calendar preference for ailing or elderly litigants. We turn now t......
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...Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law , 2d ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1988), Vol. 3, §1527(2)(a)). In People v. Dupuis (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 696, a prior conviction allegation was found true in a court trial. But the true finding was reversed on appeal because there was no valid waiv......