People v. East

• Decision Date: 15 February 1960
• Citation: 206 N.Y.S.2d 963,23 Misc.2d 529
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Donald EAST, Appellant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 963

206 N.Y.S.2d 963

23 Misc.2d 529

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Donald EAST, Appellant.

Wayne County Court.

Feb. 15, 1960.

Maurice E. Strobridge, Asst. Wayne County Dist. Atty., Newark, N. Y., for the People.

Robert L. Purchase, Marion, for Donald East.

GEORGE B. PARSONS, Judge.

Defendant in the above-entitled action has appealed to the County Court of the County of Wayne, New York, from a judgment of conviction entered in the above-entitled action on the 8th day of November, 1958, convicting the defendant of a traffic infraction in violation of Article 14, Section 1124 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, allegedly committed on October 7, 1958, in the Town of Williamson, New York, on the following grounds:

1. That the statute involved is unconstitutional, it being too vague and indefinite to constitute a sufficient definition of criminal conduct and contains no sufficient standard whereby such conduct can be tested;

2. That the information was legally insufficient;

3. That the laying of the second information and charge was improper in that the defendant was held to answer for a charge previously dismissed;

4. That upon the whole evidence the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant;

5. That there was error in the admission and rejection of evidence upon the trial to which objection and exception was made.

This matter was argued before the Court in the latter part of July, 1959, by Attorney Robert L. Purchase, for the Appellant, and Assistant District Attorney, Maurice E. Strobridge, for the People. Memoranda was submitted to the Court in September, 1959, and by stipulation of both attorneys the decision was deferred until after the December Term of County Court for further memoranda and an elaboration of the facts.

There are, of course, a number of points on which the Appellant, Donald East, makes his appeal to the County Court. The memoranda has been studied thoroughly as have the Minutes of the proceeding, together with all the other papers in connection therewith, and a number of pertinent cases.

The Court is not going to, in this decision, give any opinion on any of the points brought up by the Appellant except the first and fourth points because the decision of the Court in respect to either point will eliminate the necessity of ruling on the others. The Court holds with the Appellant that the statute involved, namely, Article 14, Section 1124 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, is unconstitutional on the grounds that Section 1124 is not clear, concise and positive enough by its wording to give a definite and unequivocal definition from which either a citizen or the police can have any criteria on which to base just what the Law requires.

The police or enforcement officers should not have to be uncertain as to just what and where to draw the line between obedience and compliance with the Law as against a breach of the law. This has been done, as the Court in this case is trying to do, in order to assert the right of the Judiciary to look into the interpretation of the statutes and by declaring them unconstitutional infer to the Legislature that they should be corrected for the benefit of both the citizenry and the law enforcement. Making rules for traffic controls is peculiarly a legislative job. This decision is handed down while the Legislature is in Session and they may rewrite the Section to clarify it if they follow the thinking of the Court.

The Section states in the first full sentence: 'No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken.' The Court does not believe that this is as clearly defined as it could or should be. It vaguely refers to 'clearly visible' and to being free of oncoming traffic for a 'sufficient' distance ahead. The Legislature in enacting this then goes into the second sentence of the same Section and refers to exact numbers of feet. They refer to numbers of feet in other Sections. They refer to distances and define such distances not leaving a conjecture as to 'sufficiency' but definitely stating, hazards, dangers or feet distances. Whether it be an ordinary citizen, an ordinary police officer, or even a truck driver, they could not be able to agree among themselves as to what is a 'sufficient' distance, what constitutes a 'complete' passing, and a conclusion, which is all it would be, as to whether under all circumstances in each particular case passing would or would not interfere with safe operation. The Court agrees with the contention of the Appellant that this Section leaves too much up in the air for either the citizen or the police officer to determine what is a 'sufficient' distance to permit overtaking and passing completely without interfering with the safe operation of approaching or overtaken vehicles. It remains a question of guesswork, conjecture, and a conclusion which could be drawn in diametrically opposite ways...