People v. Klose

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Citation: 272 N.Y.S.2d 352,219 N.E.2d 180,18 N.Y.2d 141
• Parties: , 219 N.E.2d 180 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Christopher KLOSE, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 07 July 1966

Page 352

272 N.Y.S.2d 352

18 N.Y.2d 141, 219 N.E.2d 180

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Christopher KLOSE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1966.

John R. Heilman, Jr., Dist. Atty. (Albert M. Rosenblatt, Poughkeepsie, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert L. Ostertag, Poughkeepsie, for respondent.

KEATING, Judge.

This appeal by the People is from an order of the Dutchess County Court which reversed a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions, Town of Rhinebeck (Harrington, J.), convicting respondent of violating section 1124 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71, remitted the fine and dismissed the information. Reversal is on the law to the extent that section 1124 was declared unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. Reversal is on the facts to the extent that the County Court held 'The People's proof did not dispel a reasonable doubt.'

The jurisdictional contention raised by the respondent is that the reversal on the facts by the County Court constitutes an acquittal which is not appealable. The same question is considered in People v. Nappi, 18 N.Y.2d 136, 272 N.Y.S.2d 347, 219 N.E.2d 176.

Whether the County Court had jurisdiction to reverse on the facts and Dismiss the information is a question of law. If a question of fact was presented to the trial court, the County Court could not reverse and dismiss on the facts. At most it could order a new trial (People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 73, 22 N.E.2d 238, 240; People v. Rudolph, 303 N.Y. 73, 100 N.E.2d 142; People v. Scheinman, 295 N.Y. 142, 65 N.E.2d 750; People v. Potskowski, 298 N.Y. 299, 83 N.E.2d 125; People v. Lee, 308 N.Y. 302, 125 N.E.2d 580).

The questions before us, therefore, are (1) whether section 1124 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to make out a question of fact for the trial court sitting without a jury. Section 1124 stated: 'No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within one hundred feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.'

The County Court, relying in part upon an identical decision by the Wayne County Court (People v. East, 23 Misc.2d 529, 206 N.Y.S.2d 963), held the statute vague, indefinite and not capable of an intelligent application. We disagree.

Applying the same standards applicable to prosecutions under the criminal law (People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377, 49 A.L.R.2d 449), in our opinion, the statute is sufficiently clear and positive to give the average citizen unequivocal warning of the rule to be obeyed (People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949, 146 N.E.2d 682; People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 183 N.E. 273, 86 A.L.R. 1266; People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851).

The statute clearly deals with a standard for passing other vehicles in circumstances too numerous or unpredictable for particular enumeration (see People v. Lewis, 13 N.Y.2d 180, 183, 245 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 194 N.E.2d 831, 832). Section 1125 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law treats such specific situations as passing when approaching the crest of a grade or a hill, or a railroad crossing bridge, viaduct or tunnel.

The substance of the challenge against the statute seems to be directed at such terms as 'clearly visible', 'sufficient distance' and 'completely made' (People v. East, 23 Misc.2d 529, 531, 206 N.Y.S.2d 963, 965, supra). Presumably, the argument is that they leave too much to conjecture and that reasonable people may reach different conclusions from the same factual setting.

This misconstrues the constitutional standard. The use of terms such as 'reasonable and prudent under the conditions' (People v. Lewis, 13 N.Y.2d 180, 245 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 194 N.E.2d 831, 832, supra), 'unnecessary or impracticable' (People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 165 N.E.2d 851, supra), 'offensive, disorderly, annoy, or interfere' (People v. Harvey, 307 N.Y. 588, 123 N.E.2d 81) and 'adequate * * * to prevent any excessive or unusual noise' (People v. Byron, 17 N.Y.2d 64, 268 N.Y.S.2d 24, 215 N.E.2d 345) all require an exercise of judgment upon which people may disagree. People may disagree upon whether an act, otherwise criminal, was committed with the requisite 'intent' or whether a person's conduct was 'reasonable' under the circumstances but, as the above cases make clear, these requirements are not unconstitutional infirmities.

So long as the standards laid down by the statute are clear in their meaning and are capable of reasonable application to varying fact patterns, they cannot be faulted. There is no requirement that those who venture perilously close to proscribed conduct not run the risk of crossing the line, as subsequently determined by a jury. Such questions are constantly presented to juries, as where the question is one of recklessness or disorderliness or reasonableness. If, in each case, the statute, where read as a whole, makes its purpose clear, gives "'unequivocal warning' to citizens of the rule to be obeyed" (People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 394, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279, 165 N.E.2d 851, 853, supra) and by its terms provides a reasonably definite standard by which conduct can be measured, it will not be struck down as vague or uncertain. It meets the test so long as it affords 'some comprehensible guide, rule, or information as to what must be done and what must be avoided, to the end that the ordinary member of society may know how to comply with its requirements' (People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 145, 183 N.E. 273, 276, supra).

Returning to the language of the statute itself, it provided in its last sentence that 'In every event the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before...