People v. Elizalde

• Decision Date: 25 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. S215260.,S215260.
• Citation: 61 Cal.4th 523,189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518,351 P.3d 1010
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gamaliel ELIZALDE et al., Defendants and Appellants.

61 Cal.4th 523

351 P.3d 1010

189 Cal.Rptr.3d 518

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Gamaliel ELIZALDE et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S215260.

Supreme Court of California

June 25, 2015.

Solomon Wollack, Pleasant Hill, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Gamaliel Elizalde.

Stephen B. Bedrick, Oakland, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Jose Mota–Avendano.

John Ward, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Javier Gomez.

Kamal D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Rene A. Chacon, David M. Baskind and Juliet B. Haley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion

CORRIGAN, J.

Under the rule of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 478–479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda ), certain admonitions must be given before a suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation can be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief.

Here we consider whether routine questions about gang affiliation, posed to defendant while processing him into jail on murder charges, come within Miranda 's well-recognized booking exception. We hold that the questions exceeded the scope of the exception and that officers should have known these questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response because of California's criminal gang statutes and defendant's pending charges. While officers were permitted to ask these questions for institutional security purposes, defendant's un-Mirandized responses were inadmissible against him during the case-in-chief. We nonetheless find that admission of the statements was not prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached the same conclusions.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Jose Mota–Avendano¹ was convicted of murdering Antonio Centron, Luis Perez, and Rico McIntosh on theories of conspiracy and aiding and abetting, along with other charges and enhancements. Briefly, the facts supporting his convictions are as follows:

Varrio Frontero Loco (VFL) is a subgroup of the Sureño criminal street gang and is active in Contra Costa County. Three witnesses who knew Mota testified he belonged to VFL. Robert Brady, a San Pablo police officer and street gang expert, also opined that Mota was a VFL member.

In 2007, Gamaliel Elizalde rose to power in VFL when another leader fled after committing a murder. Thereafter, the VFL organization began to deteriorate. To reestablish its position, Elizalde directed several members to “put in more work” by assaulting Norteños to let them “know we around, we ain't gone.” Mota and four others were put in charge of the gang's efforts. Violence was an important part of enhancing the gang's standing because it helped garner respect, money, and new members. Elizalde directed VFL associate, Oscar Menendez, to beat up or shoot Norteños. Mota told Menendez that he had to “earn” a VFL tattoo by doing something “big” like killing a Norteño.

On December 22, 2007, VFL members Jorge Sanchez, Francisco Romero, and Hector Molina drove to San Pablo planning to beat or shoot Norteños. They saw three men walking down the street, two wearing the Norteño color, red. Molina hid behind a fence. When the three men rounded the corner, Molina identified himself as VFL and shot at them repeatedly. Antonio Centron was killed; the other two men were wounded but survived.

On February 16, 2008, Mota and other VFL members drove around gang territory in two cars. The car carrying Mota stopped near Luis Perez, who was standing on the street dressed in a red jacket. After the men in the car argued with Perez, Jorge Camacho fatally shot him.

On April 26, 2008, Mota was in Norteño territory with Menendez and Javier Gomez. Mota pulled the car he drove alongside Rico McIntosh, who was wearing a red bandana. Gomez asked McIntosh if he was a “buster.” McIntosh replied, “what the fuck is a buster?” and reached into his jacket. Menendez thought he heard Mota say, “pull it out.” Gomez drew a gun and shot at McIntosh several times; Mota and Gomez laughed. McIntosh died the next day.

Mota was convicted of three first degree murders and of conspiracy to participate in a criminal street gang² and to commit murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury found true several street gang enhancements³ and an enhancement for intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Mota was sentenced to 100 years to life in prison.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Proceedings Below and Standard of Review

Before trial, Mota moved to exclude his admissions of gang membership during bookingand classification interviews at a Contra Costa County jail. Inmates are typically asked three questions during intake: if they have been to the unit before, if they have a gang affiliation, and if they are fearful for their safety. A classification interview is conducted for all gang-affiliated inmates. Before placement, personnel review an inmate's pending charges, gang affiliation, and need for protective custody. The review is conducted to maximize the safety of all inmates and jail employees. Rival gang members are housed separately.

After Mota's arrest and before he received Miranda admonitions, a sheriff's deputy asked him the standard booking questions. Mota admitted he was a Sureño gang member. When told he would be searched for contraband, Mota laughed nervously and said, “man, I'm in here for some shit that I didn't do. They said that I killed someone, but it wasn't me. I was there, but I didn't kill anyone. The guy that did it is already in jail. He confessed already, but now he is trying to bring me down, too[.]” He also said: “I'm a gang-banger, but I'm not a murderer[.]” He continued: “I told those other cops that I didn't know anything because I thought I would be in trouble, but now I don't care[.]” The deputy asked Mota if he wanted to speak with a police detective.

He replied, “Yeah, I will, but first I should talk to my lawyer. After I talk to him I will tell you guys what really went down [.]” The deputy wrote a report summarizing the conversation to assist the San Pablo police investigation.

Subsequently, Deputy Bryan Zaiser of the classification unit interviewed Mota using a standard questionnaire. He did not advise Mota of his rights to silence and counsel. Nor did he say that Mota was required to answer the questions or threaten repercussions if he refused. Zaiser typically told inmates that the interview was “for their housing.” He knew Mota had been charged with murder, but did not know if the crime was gang related. Zaiser's goal was to ensure the safety of jail inmates and personnel, not to investigate the charges. Asked about his gang affiliation, Mota responded that he was “affiliated with the Sureño street gang,” specifically VFL, and that he was an active gang member.

The trial court held Mota's statements about his gang membership were admissible. It reasoned that “the sole purpose of this interview and the form is to ensure the safety of inmates and staff at the county jail. The information gathered is essential to maintain security at the jail. [¶] ... [I]f the jail were to house rival gang members together at random it would pose a grave risk to both the inmates and the staff. [¶] So I find that it is a fundamental and essential obligation of the sheriff's department to determine whether it is dangerous to house any inmate with any other inmate or any gang member with any rival gang member.” The court further found that Deputy Zaiser was not aware of any gang charges against Mota, that he used no coercive tactics, that his purpose for the interview was to ensure jail safety, and that “he had no actual subjective intent to gather incriminating information.” It applied the same rationale to the booking officer's initial inquiry. Also, because Mota faced extreme danger if he were to be housed with Norteños, the court found it in Mota's best interest to be classified correctly and that “he willingly and voluntarily answered the questions for that reason.” At trial, the prosecution introduced only the admissions to Deputy Zaiser.

On review, the Court of Appeal found Mota's statements to Zaiser inadmissible. Because the error was harmless, however, it affirmed the judgment.

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a claimed Miranda violation, “ ‘we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from [those facts] whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ ” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342, quoting People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.)

B. Custodial Interrogation and the Booking Exception

In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards, including the familiar admonitions,⁴ as a prophylactic measure to protect a suspect's right against self-incrimination.

Id. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) Chief Justice Warren summarized the holding: “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” (Ibid., italics added.) For Miranda purposes, custodial status arises if a person has been “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Ibid. )⁵

In Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (Innis ), the court granted certiorari “to address for the first time the meaning of ‘interrogation’ under Miranda v. Arizona. ” (Id. at p. 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682.) The court clarified that “interrogation” was not limited to...