People v. Eubanks
| Decision Date | 29 April 1982 |
| Citation | 114 Misc.2d 1097,454 N.Y.S.2d 768 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Rhoda EUBANKS, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term |
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., New York City , for appellant.
William E. Hellerstein and Bertrand J. Kahn, New York City, for respondent.
Before PINO, P. J., and BUSCHMANN and HIRSCH, JJ.
Defendant herein was charged with sixteen counts of illegally obtaining unemployment insurance in violation of Labor Law section 632, subdivision (1)(a). The court below, 108 Misc.2d 108, 436 N.Y.S.2d 953, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss in the interests of justice relied primarily upon the supposed "exceptionally serious misconduct" of the People in the prosecution of defendant (CPL 170.40, subd. 1, par. ). The misconduct consisted of two conversations with the defendant, who was without counsel, by representatives of the prosecution regarding a plea and restitution, after the filing of the accusatory instrument. The court found that the People's conduct violated defendant's right of counsel and constituted a compelling factor justifying dismissal of the charges. We cannot agree. While the court possesses the discretion to dismiss an information in the furtherance of justice, that discretion is neither absolute or uncontrolled (People v. Wingard, 33 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 351 N.Y.S.2d 385, 306 N.E.2d 402). Judicial discretion in this area should be employed cautiously and sparingly (People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106; People v. Boyer, 105 Misc.2d 877, 430 N.Y.S.2d 936; People v. James, 98 Misc.2d 755, 415 N.Y.S.2d 342).
In our opinion, the lower court has expanded the defendant's State constitutional right to counsel far beyond its intended bounds. Upon the commencement of criminal proceedings, the right to counsel indelibly attaches without regard to whether a defendant in fact has or has not requested counsel (People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360; People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344). Further, there can be no effective waiver of counsel unless made in the presence of an attorney (People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 385 N.E.2d 612). The rationale for this rule is that once the character of the police function shifts from investigatory to accusatory the assistance of counsel becomes indispensable (People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247, 420 N.E.2d 45).
According to defendant's testimony at the Clayton hearing, she appeared in court after receiving a letter from the Labor Department advising her that she owed the State $1,017.75. She brought $200 with her to commence repayment although no one had advised her to do so. The money was given to a representative of the Labor Department. On her second court appearance she spoke to a representative of the Attorney General's office who explained to her that she had been charged with a misdemeanor and "what would happen."
The record reveals that the matter was adjourned a number of times, without a plea being taken, to permit defendant to complete her restitution. Apparently, counsel was assigned to represent defendant after the second court appearance.
While we do not consider it proper for the Attorney General's office to have discussed this case with defendant, absent counsel, after the commencement of the proceeding (see People v. Settles, supra, 46 N.Y.2d p. 164, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 385 N.E.2d 612), it cannot be said that such conduct constituted "exceptionally serious misconduct" within the purview of the statute. The only prejudice claimed by defendant arising from these uncounseled discussions was that she made a damaging admission of wrongdoing by agreeing to a schedule of restitution payments. However, defendant stated that she had volunteered to make restitution without any solicitation by the People.
The solicitude with which our courts treat the fundamental right to counsel is based upon the belief that the presence of counsel is the most effective way of minimizing the disadvantage at which an accused is placed when confronted with the awesome power of the State (People v. Cunningham, supra, 49 N.Y.2d p. 207, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360; People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894). While the rule prohibits, after the filing of an accusatory instrument, interrogation or other similar conduct by law enforcement personnel in the absence of counsel (see People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 440...
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...385, 306 N.E.2d 402 (1973). In fact, this power is to be “employed cautiously and sparingly.” See, People v. Eubanks, 114 Misc.2d 1097, 1098, 454 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App.Term, 2d Dept.,1982). On a motion to dismiss in the interests of justice, the burden is on the Defendant to establish “some com......
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