People v. Farell

• Decision Date: 11 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. S092183.,S092183.
• Citation: 28 Cal.4th 381,48 P.3d 1155,121 Cal.Rptr.2d 603
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alejandro FARELL, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

121 Cal.Rptr.2d 603

28 Cal.4th 381

48 P.3d 1155

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alejandro FARELL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S092183.

Supreme Court of California.

July 11, 2002.

Nolan & Armstrong, Nolan, Armstrong & Barton, Thomas J. Nolan, Palo Alto, Mark K. Goldman, Mara I. Kapelovitz and Daniel J. Barton, Palo Alto, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Joan Killeen, Raymond A. Cardozo, Moona Nandi, Gerald A. Engler and George F. Hindall III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

In this case we determine whether Penal Code section 1203.044, which requires the imposition of a minimum county jail sentence as a condition of probation upon conviction of certain theft offenses, applies to the theft of property other than money, including trade secrets.¹ We conclude that it does.

I

On April 18, 1997, an amended complaint was filed charging defendant with the theft of a trade secret, in violation of section 499c, subdivision (b)(1). It was further alleged as a sentence enhancement that the loss exceeded $2.5 million within the meaning of section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(4), and as a restriction on the granting of probation that the theft was of an amount exceeding $100,000 within the meaning of sections 1203.044 and 1203.045. Defendant pleaded no contest to the theft charge, a charge based upon evidence that he had printed out confidential design specifications for certain computer chips on the last day of his employment as an electrical engineer at Digital Equipment Corporation and also had done so on the following day. This evidence was obtained during execution of a search warrant at his home a few days later. The confidential specifications potentially could be useful in designing other technology. Defendant waived preliminary hearing and jury trial on the section 12022.6 enhancement allegation. He objected, however, to the potential application of section 1203.044 to his sentence. (He did not object to the application of § 1203.045.)

A hearing was held in the superior court on the limited question of whether section 1203.044 applies to the theft of property other than money, including trade secrets. The court concluded that the provision applies to the theft of all property of a certain value, including trade secrets. Defendant subsequently admitted the truth of an amended enhancement allegation (§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(3) [loss exceeding $1 million]), and further admitted that the theft was of an amount exceeding $100,000. (§§ 1203.044, 1203.045.) In accordance with the requirements of section 1203.044, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years on condition that he serve three months in county jail, with credit for time served of seven days. The court granted a stay of the jail term pending appeal.²

The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that section 1203.044 applies only to the theft of what it termed "monetary property." We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.

II

Defendant stands convicted of theft, specifically a violation of section 499c, subdivision (b)(1), which provides: "[¶] (b) Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to deprive or withhold the control of a trade secret from its owner, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret to his or her own use or to the use of another, does any of the following: [¶] (1) Steals, takes, carries away, or uses without authorization, a trade secret." The statute defines the term "trade secret" as follows: "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: [¶] (A) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and [¶] (B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." (§ 499c, subd. (a)(9).)

The trial court determined that section 1203.044 applies to such a theft. This statute, entitled The Economic Crime Law of 1992, requires that a defendant who is convicted of certain theft offenses and is granted probation shall be sentenced to at least 90 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. (§ 1203.044, subd. (e).) It also subjects persons who are convicted of qualifying offenses and are granted probation to exacting requirements with respect to reporting assets and income (see § 1203.044, subds. (h)-(o)), and imposes stringent restitution requirements upon convicted defendants. (§ 1203.044, subds.(g), (p)-(s).) In addition, a defendant must pay a surcharge to the county equalling 20 percent of the restitution ordered. (§ 1203.044, subd. (g).) The statute also renders ineligible for probation those defendants alleged and found to have been previously convicted of a specified felony. (§ 1203.044, subd. (b).)

As relevant to the present case, the statute provides: "This section shall apply only to a defendant convicted of a felony for theft of an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in a single transaction or occurrence. This section shall not apply unless the fact that the crime involved the theft of an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in a single transaction or occurrence is charged in the accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be true by the trier of fact. Aggregate losses from more than one criminal act shall not be considered in determining if this section applies." (§ 1203.044, subd. (a).)³

The Court of Appeal determined that section 1203.044 may not be applied to persons convicted of the theft of trade secrets. It examined the words of the statute and the legislative history of the enactment and, concluding that the statute is at best ambiguous, applied the so-called rule of lenity to give defendant the benefit of the doubt. Closely examining the text of the statute, the appellate court turned first to the dictionary. The court asserted that in ordinary usage, "[t]he word `amount' is defined as `the total number or quantity' and/or `a principal sum and interest on it.' [Citation.] The only `number,' `quantity,' or `sum' designated in subdivision (a) is described in `dollars.' There is no specific reference to other property to which the subdivision might apply. One could argue that there is no language in the subdivision that could reasonably be construed as including other kinds of property. Phrasing such as, `property taken is of a value exceeding' or `property worth more than' would have had such an effect, but is not present." The Court of Appeal declared that its function was to interpret statutory language, but not to insert omitted language regarding the value or worth of the property taken. The court also inferred an intent that section 1203.044 apply only to "monetary theft" from the circumstance that, in those portions of the statute imposing upon a convicted defendant the duty to disclose assets for the purpose of ensuring appropriate restitution, the Legislature referred not simply to dollar amounts but to disclosure of property exceeding certain "worth" or "value." The Court of Appeal also pointed to other references in the Penal Code to property according to its value, and declared that these examples establish "that the Legislature knew how to make the distinction between monetary property and other property where its worth would be at issue and did so in section 1203.044."

Our task is one of statutory interpretation and, "as with any statute, [it] is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] We turn first to the words of the statute themselves, recognizing that `they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.'" (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) We examine the meaning of the phrase "convicted of a felony for theft of an amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars," keeping in mind that the words must be interpreted in context. (See People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228.)

In outlining the circumstances under which a person given a probationary term for a theft offense must be sentenced to a minimum period in custody and subjected to demanding restitution requirements, section 1203.044 does not specify that the theft must involve cash—or that it must involve what is referred to by the Court of Appeal as "monetary property" and by defendant as a "cash equivalent."

The crime of theft, of course, is not limited to an unlawful taking of money. Rather, "[e]very person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft." (§ 484, subd. (a).)

The crime of theft may involve the theft of trade secrets; indeed, in enacting section 499c, the Legislature specified that the theft of trade secrets is akin to the theft of any other property. (See Stats. 1967, c. 132, § 1, p. 1163 ["It is the purpose of this act to clarify and restate existing law with respect to crimes involving trade secrets and to make clear that articles representing trade secrets, including the trade secrets represented thereby, constitute goods, chattels, materials and property and can be the subject of...