People v. Farley
| Decision Date | 01 May 1973 |
| Docket Number | Cr. A |
| Citation | 109 Cal.Rptr. 59,33 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 |
| Court | California Superior Court |
| Parties | 33 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert E. FARLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 24051. Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Joaquin County, California |
The defendant was charged with violating section 597 of the Penal Code in that he subjected certain horses to 'needless suffering and unnecessary cruelty.' At the beginning of the trial the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated that the 'cruelty' that would properly be involved in the trial was the failure to provide the animals with proper feed and water.
Evidence was introduced from lay witnesses that there was a lack of proper food and water. Two veterinarians testified as to the physical condition of the animals. Neither was able to say that any animals died because of lack of feed or water.
Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed that conviction requires proof of malice, i.e., In the sense that the failure of feeding and watering was committed with intent to injure the animals (or with reckless disregard of whether they were injured or not).
The trial court refused to give the instruction, and instead instructed the jury that guilt could be found upon proof that the animals were not properly fed or watered and that the defendant acted 'wilfully' only in the sense of Penal Code section 7, i.e., That he intended to do, or failed to do, the acts he did without any necessity of proof of (a) intent to injure, or (b) reckless disregard of whether injury might occur, or (c) negligent failure to take reasonable care to avoid injury.
Farley was convicted and has appealed. We must decide whether a person can be convicted of cruelty to animals without any proof of culpability by way of intent, recklessness or negligence other than his conscious intention to give the amount and type of feed and water he provided.
This superficially innocuous question leads us into an area where the California appellate decisions are in astonishing disarray.
First, we should note that despite the long history of Penal Code section 597 there is no square case in California deciding the question. In re Mauch, 134 Cal. 500, 66 P. 734, which required proof of malice was decided in 1901 at a time that the statute specifically required proof of malice, a requirement later removed or made applicable by the Legislature to only small portions of the statute.
Second, decisions in other states involving similar statutes are inconsistent. In State v. Vance (1956), 119 Vt. 268, 125 A.2d 800, Vermont ruled that proof of malice is not necessary for the crime of cruelty to animals. State v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.1962), however, required proof of criminal intent as did Muhlhauser v. State, 15 Ohio Cir.Dec. 81, 1 Ohio Cir.Ct.R.,N.S., 273; 82 A.L.R.2d 853. Commonwealth v. Wood, 111 Mass. 408; 82 A.L.R.2d 809 declared its equivalent of 'wanton disregard' to be necessary.
Third, the California decisions in various analogous areas of criminal law to which we must look for guidance are impossible to wholly reconcile.
At common law, of course, there could be no conviction of any substantial crime without proof of moral culpability by showing that the defendant intended to violate the law or to inflict the injury or that he acted with wanton and reckless disregard of the injurious consequences of his act.
In California, however, as the Legislature continually added new crimes to the Penal Code, courts began to ignore the necessity of proving malice unless the statute specifically required it. Defendants were convicted upon proof that they intentionally committed the act irrespective of their lack of moral culpability (e.g., People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 P. 915, good faith belief that the girl was over 18 no defense to charge of statutory rape).
Finally, in a landmark series of cases in 1956 the California Supreme Court resurrected from oblivion Penal Code section 20--'Every crime requires proof of either criminal intent or criminal negligence'--and held that if the specific criminal statute is silent on the question, Penal Code section 20 prevails and conviction requires proof by the prosecutor of malice. In People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850, the court ruled that a good-faith belief in legality or remarriage was a defense to bigamy.
People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, 299 P.2d 850, 853: 'So basic is this requirement (of criminal intent) that it is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or By necessary implication.'
See 45 California Law Review at page 70 discussing People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 where bona fide belief in freedom to remarry was held a defense to bigamy because under Penal Code section 20 there was no 'criminal intent.'
Squarely held that the word 'intent' in Penal Code section 20 means 'criminal intent.' The Penal Code section 7 'willfulness' is insufficient.
In People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 302 P.2d 5: Druggist without negligence puts sodium nitrite instead of sodium citrate in a prescription and kills a baby. Held, he cannot be guilty of a violation of Penal Code section 192 (manslaughter) because there was no criminal intent or criminal negligence, citing People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 861, 285 P.2d 926. Criminal intent or criminal negligence is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication (People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850).
People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 overruled earlier cases to hold that the language 'without due caution and circumspection' in the manslaughter statute must be interpreted to require Criminal negligence. In People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 the court overruled People v. Ratz and held good faith belief in appropriate age a defense to statutory rape.
People v. Hernandez, Supra, 61 Cal.2d 529, 532--533, 39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 363 ().
These decisions were hailed by the commentators (see 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1257; 17 Hastings L.J. 12) who had always been aghast at the idea of criminal liability without fault, a concept sometimes expressed as absolute criminal liability or as strict liability in crime. The concept of the decisions has, in effect, been adopted in the Model Penal Code sections 2.02, 2.02(3) and 2.05, to wit:
Model Penal Code section 2.02: 'Except as provided in section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.'
Model Penal Code section 2.02(3): If the culpability necessary is not specifically provided by law such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or Recklessly.
Model Penal Code section 2.05: Absolute liability only if Legislature clearly prescribes it.
Vogel, Stuart and Penny each contained the same exception to their new rule; an exception which sometimes seems to threaten to gobble-up the new rule completely. This exception is that the new rule does not apply to 'public welfare offenses' or 'regulatory offenses' such as traffic regulations, food and drug statutes where (a) Penalties are light and (b) No moral obloquy is involved and (c) The intent is to regulate and not correct or punish People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850. Convictions of this type of crime are permitted without proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence.
This concept of 'public welfare offenses' and which crimes to include therein has proved baffling to the Courts of Appeal (see fn. in People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal.App.2d 650, 3 Cal.Rptr. 28, frankly acknowledging their frustration). 1 Witkin, On California Crimes (1963) pages 66--68 points out that the Courts of Appeal have not only included within 'public welfare offenses' such obvious candidates as sanitary regulations (People v. Balmer, 196 Cal.App.2d Supp. 874, 17 Cal.Rptr. 612) but also some 'true crimes' such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor (People v. Miller, 145 Cal.App.2d 473, 302 P.2d 603) and embezzlement by a public officer (People v. Dillon, 199 Cal. 1, 248 P. 230).
They have not followed logical or rational Principles in defining or restricting 'public welfare offenses' so we can best be helped in reaching our decision by a brief marshalling of the Results of recent appellate cases. It is to be noted that in most of these cases the California Supreme Court has denied a hearing whether or not the results appear to be in strict conformity with Vogel, Penny and Stuart.
In the following cases, the courts have held that Vogel, Penny and Stuart apply and that criminal intent or reckless disregard (i.e., malice) must be shown even though the criminal statute does not specify it:
(1) People v. Stephens, 30 Cal.App.2d 67, 85 P.2d 487, where the word 'abandon' in Penal Code section 271 construed to mean Intentional failure to supply Known needs of a child;
(2) People v. Swiggy, 69 Cal.App. 574, 232 P. 174, where failure to provide for child held to require Criminal intent. To same effect, see People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal.Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495;
(3) People v. Thomas, 267 Cal.App. 698, 73 Cal.Rptr. 590 ...
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