People v. Farrell

Decision Date22 October 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00SC307.,00SC307.
Citation34 P.3d 401
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Antonio S. FARRELL, Respondent.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 13, 2001.1

Ken Salazar, Attorney General Laurie A. Booras, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Petitioner.

James Grimaldi, Denver, CO, Attorney for Respondent.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this case, we address the issue of whether the trial court properly admitted a co-defendant's statement against interest in the case against Defendant Antonio Farrell. The trial court ruled that the co-defendant's confession was reliable and accordingly admitted it into evidence in a redacted form that omitted certain portions of the statement it found to be prejudicial. In People v. Farrell, 10 P.3d 672 (Colo.App.2000), the court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, concluding that the statement did not possess the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to justify its admission under the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.

We reverse the court of appeals' decision regarding admissibility of the statement. Specifically, we find that our decision in Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305 (Colo.2001), controls this case. When we analyze the statement within the framework of Stevens, we conclude that it was genuinely self-inculpatory and therefore sufficiently reliable to be admissible.

I.

On August 18, 1997, a jury convicted Defendant Antonio Farrell of intentional first-degree murder,2 felony first degree murder,3 robbery of an at-risk adult,4 aggravated robbery,5 second degree kidnapping,6 two counts of second degree burglary,7 theft,8 first degree criminal trespass,9 and two counts of conspiracy.10 The trial court sentenced Farrell to a mandatory life sentence for the merged first degree murder convictions and concurrent sentences for the aggravated robbery, kidnapping, second degree burglary, first degree criminal trespass, theft, and conspiracy convictions. In addition, the trial court, finding extraordinarily aggravating circumstances, sentenced Farrell to consecutive sentences totaling fifty-six years for the convictions of robbery of an at-risk adult and second degree burglary against a second victim.11

In November 1996, a witness observed a woman, driving a gray four-door sedan, who appeared confused about which way to turn. As the witness attempted to pass that woman's car, she saw one of the two "dark-skinned" males in the back seat exit the car. The witness observed that the male who remained in the car had a gun to the driver's neck. In court, the witness identified Farrell as the person she believed had exited the car. Subsequently, several Brighton residents observed two unfamiliar males leaving the residence of their seventy-six-year-old neighbor, Barbara Castor. They also noticed a broken bathroom window and decided to contact Castor's family who, in turn, contacted the police.

While the police were investigating, Tim Maldonado, the brother of Farrell's girlfriend, arrived at Castor's house. Upon questioning, Maldonado confessed that he had engaged in ransacking Castor's house with Farrell and Farrell's sixteen-year-old companion, Kevin Blankenship. Maldonado admitted that the three had also stolen guns from the garage of a second house. He informed the police officers that, when he expressed concern about whether Castor would return home and discover the three, Defendant and Blankenship told him that it was "taken care of" and that they had put her in the trunk of her vehicle and left her in a field buried under rocks and branches.

Based on information provided by Maldonado, law enforcement officers arrested Defendant and Blankenship in connection with the disappearance of Castor. When the police entered the room to make the arrests, Defendant and Blankenship were standing on opposite sides of a bed. Blankenship was trying to hide something under the mattress. Under Defendant's side of the mattress, police found several automobile registration cards, an insurance card, and an AT & T calling card, all belonging to Castor.

After the officers informed Blankenship of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Blankenship agreed to talk to the officers. The statement that ensued is the subject of this particular controversy. According to Blankenship, he and Defendant had been living in Rockford, Illinois and had come to Colorado to see Defendant's girlfriend. The pair stole a car in Rockford to begin their trip. When that car had mechanical difficulties, they stole a second car in Nebraska, which also developed problems. The third car they stole belonged to Castor.

Blankenship initially told the officers that he and Defendant had stolen the car from a K-Mart parking lot while Castor was looking under the hood of the vehicle and then had ransacked and robbed her house over a period of three days. The officers expressed disbelief that the pair would persist in plundering the house unless they knew that Castor would not return. The officers expressed hope that the victim might still be alive and that "the sooner we find this lady, the better off it's gonna be for everybody involved." They asked if Blankenship felt sorry for the lady and how he would feel if she were his own grandmother. They expressed the need to return Castor to her family.

Blankenship then admitted that he did not know where they had left Castor. He informed the officers that he and Defendant had asked Castor for a ride; Castor agreed and drove the pair to a gas station where she asked them to get out. Blankenship then brandished a BB gun, which looked like a pistol, and told Castor to drive. Blankenship stated that Defendant exited the car and Blankenship forced Castor to drive down a side road where he threatened her with death and made her get into the trunk of the automobile. He then returned and retrieved Defendant. They drove the car a long way until they reached deserted fields. Blankenship informed the officers that he and Defendant tied Castor to a cement structure in a field. He explained that they had used pieces of string and Castor's blanket, which Defendant ripped into pieces while Blankenship bound Castor. Blankenship related that, after he and Defendant had secured Castor, they placed logs, rocks, and a spare tire on top of her.

Blankenship claimed that while they were restraining Castor, she pleaded with them. He explained that Defendant Farrell had said that God would "get us for this," so the two said a prayer before departing the scene. Blankenship and Defendant stopped at a gas station to get directions to Castor's residence. They then ransacked the house, searching for valuables. Blankenship informed the police that they had returned to the house several times to continue searching, to sleep, and to shower, describing in detail their actions and behavior over the course of the three-day period. Blankenship also explained that Maldonado had been involved in vandalizing Castor's house. Further, Blankenship confessed that the trio had broken into a second residence to steal guns.

A.

Based on Blankenship's detailed description of the surroundings where they had restrained Castor, the police located the deceased victim's body covered with 411 pounds of large logs, rocks, and a spare tire. They found her tied to an old washed-out dam with a ripped-up blanket and pieces of string. Law enforcement officers found Castor's blood in the trunk of her vehicle. They found Defendant's fingerprints in the house and the car. The police also recovered three pubic hairs from the shower at Castor's home that matched Defendant's pubic hair. Further, a handwriting analysis demonstrated that Defendant's handwriting was consistent with that found on a check written from Castor's account.

While Farrell was in jail, he had a conversation with a detention facility deputy, in which he described meeting Castor at K-Mart and asking for a ride. He stated that Blankenship pulled a gun on Castor and told Farrell to get out of the automobile. Blankenship returned shortly, with Castor in the trunk. Defendant reentered the car, and they drove away. Defendant stated that thereafter he started to black out and that he didn't want to tell the deputy "because of his defense." Although the trial judge ruled that Defendant's statement was voluntary, he did not admit it at trial because he held that it was obtained in violation of that court's protective order.12

Both Blankenship and Farrell were tried on various charges. The trial court severed the trials, and the People sought to admit Blankenship's confession into evidence at Farrell's trial. With certain redactions,13 the trial court found the statement reliable and allowed it into evidence.

II.

The court of appeals concluded that admitting Blankenship's confession violated Farrell's constitutional right to be confronted with witnesses against him. Farrell, 10 P.3d at 675. The court of appeals determined that the statement's clearly self-inculpatory nature did not establish the requisite reliability necessary to rebut the statement's inherent untrustworthiness. Id. at 676. Although we hold that the statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, we conclude that it is nonetheless sufficiently self-inculpatory to be deemed reliable under Stevens.

The statement at issue is indisputably hearsay. Hence, we begin our analysis, as we did in Stevens, with the applicable hearsay rule. Colorado Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides that, if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, the trial court may admit the declarant's statement against interest into evidence at trial. The Rule defines a statement against interest as:

A statement which ... at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject [the declarant] to civil or criminal liability ... that a
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