People v. Feeley
| Decision Date | 29 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 152534. |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. FEELEY. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, PC, Lansing (by Brian P. Morley and Aaron L. Davis ), for defendant.
BERNSTEIN
, J.
At issue in this case is whether the term “police officer” in MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i )
encompasses reserve police officers. We reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that reserve police officers are not police officers for purposes of MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i ), and we remand to the Court of Appeals to address whether the district court correctly ruled that the reserve police officer in this case lacked the authority to conduct a stop of defendant.
In the early morning hours of May 5, 2014, a ruckus at a Brighton bar resulted in a call to the police. Two officers from the Brighton Police Department responded: Christopher Parks, a full-time police officer, and Douglas Roberts, a reserve police officer. At the time of the incident, Roberts had worked as a reserve police officer for six years. Roberts had been sworn in as a reserve police officer after a 16–week police training program. He was assigned a uniform, a patrol car, and a gun. Roberts worked full 12–hour shifts alongside a full-time police officer about two or three times a month, filling in for officers on sick leave or vacation. He was not certified by the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES), which is required of full-time police officers under the MCOLES Act, MCL 28.601 et seq.
At the preliminary examination, Roberts testified that he and Parks arrived at the bar in a fully marked police vehicle. Roberts was dressed in a uniform, which Roberts described as “[b]lue pants, blue police shirt marked on the sleeves, and a[n] outside carrier vest that has [a] badge, name tag and any insignias on it.” Roberts also testified that he was carrying a weapon. Roberts recalled that as the two officers approached a small crowd outside the bar, a woman informed Roberts that the troublemaker was her intoxicated husband, defendant Ryan Scott Feeley. Roberts further testified that he approached defendant and asked him to stand aside, at which point defendant ran away from Roberts. Roberts chased defendant, yelling “police officer, stop.” Roberts added that he repeated his command after running about a block, and defendant slowed down. According to Roberts, defendant “turned and squared off,” swore at Roberts, and “took his right arm and reached behind his back.” Roberts testified that in fear for his safety, he drew his gun and ordered defendant to the ground.
Defendant was arrested and charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d
. Defendant objected to the prosecution's request for a bindover, arguing that (1) Roberts did not have an articulable suspicion for stopping defendant in the first place, and (2) defendant could not be held criminally liable for resisting and obstructing under MCL 750.81d because Roberts, being a reserve police officer, was not a “police officer” within the meaning of that statute.
On August 29, 2014, the district court issued an opinion and order denying the prosecution's request for a bindover. People v. Feeley, opinion and order of the Livingston County Trial Court–District Court Division, issued August 29, 2014 (Case No. 14–1183 FY). The district court determined that “Roberts was not a police officer as provided by statutory language, legislative intent, training requirements, proper oath administration, and written instrument requirements.” Id. at 5. The district court also concluded sua sponte that the stop of defendant was unlawful and invalid because Roberts “lacked the authority to make a stop of a person.” Id. at 8.1 The prosecution appealed in the circuit court. On January 13, 2015, the circuit court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.
The prosecution appealed in the Court of Appeals. On September 15, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a split, published opinion. People v. Feeley, 312 Mich.App. 320, 876 N.W.2d 847 (2015)
. In affirming the district court's denial of the prosecution's bindover request, the Court of Appeals' majority concluded that a reserve police officer did not fall within the scope of a “police officer” as used in MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i ). Pointing to the Legislature's explicit mention of other types of law enforcement personnel, the majority assigned great significance to the omission of the term “reserve police officer” from the statute's enumerated list. To the contrary, the dissent found no significance in the omission of the term “reserve police officer” from MCL 750.81d(7)(b) and would have concluded that Roberts was a police officer of a political subdivision of this state, namely the City of Brighton. The Court of Appeals did not address the district court's ruling that Roberts lacked the authority to stop defendant.
The prosecution appealed, arguing that the term “police officer” in MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i )
encompasses reserve police officers. This Court ordered oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. We directed the parties to address whether the term “police officer” in MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i ) encompasses reserve police officers. People v. Feeley, 498 Mich. 969, 873 N.W.2d 305 (2016).
A district court's decision regarding a bindover is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and “[a court] necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” People v. Waterstone, 296 Mich.App. 121, 131–132, 818 N.W.2d 432 (2012)
. Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 329, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999).
In reviewing questions of statutory construction, our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 236, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999)
. We begin by examining the plain language of the statute. Id. Id. “The law is not properly read as a whole when its words and provisions are isolated and given meanings that are independent of the rest of its provisions.” Mayor of the City of Lansing v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 470 Mich. 154, 168, 680 N.W.2d 840 (2004).
The resisting and obstructing statute, MCL 750.81d
, provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who assaults, batters, wounds
, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
* * *
(7) As used in this section:
(a) “Obstruct” includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.
.
(x ) An individual engaged in a search and rescue operation as that term is defined in section 50c. [Emphasis added.]
Put simply, an individual is guilty of resisting or obstructing if he “resists [or] obstructs ... a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties....” MCL 750.81d(1)
. To “obstruct” includes “a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.” MCL 750.81d(7)(a).2 A “person” in this context includes “[a] police officer of this state or of a political subdivision of this state....” MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i ).
Defendant claims that a reserve police officer is not a “police officer” under MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i )
. We disagree.
The plain language of the statute does not explicitly distinguish reserve police officers from police officers, nor does the statute provide any indication that the two should be treated differently. Rather, we find that, for purposes of MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i )
, reserve police officers are a subset of police officers.
First, we note that the statute does not define the term “police officer.” “All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language[.]” MCL 8.3a
. “If a statute does not define a word, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word.” Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration LLC, 498 Mich. 518, 529, 872 N.W.2d 412 (2015), citing Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., LLP, 481 Mich. 419, 427, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). The dictionary definition of the term “police officer” supports the interpretation that reserve police officers are police officers...
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