People v. Feeley
| Decision Date | 15 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 325802. |
| Citation | 876 N.W.2d 847,312 Mich.App. 320 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. FEELEY. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, and William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, PC, Lansing (by Brian P. Morley ), for defendant.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and M.J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ.
SHAPIRO
, J.
Defendant was arrested and charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d
, for failing to comply with the command of a Brighton reserve police officer. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court denied the prosecution's bindover request on the grounds that failure to comply with the command of a reserve police officer was not within the scope of the statute. The circuit court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal the district court's order, and the prosecution appealed in this Court by leave granted.1 We affirm.2
The resisting and obstructing statute, MCL 750.81d
, states:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who assaults, batters, wounds
, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
* * *
(7) As used in this section:
(a) "Obstruct" includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.
(b) "Person" means any of the following:
(i ) A police officer of this state or of a political subdivision of this state including, but not limited to, a motor carrier officer or capitol security officer of the department of state police.
(ii ) A police officer of a junior college, college, or university who is authorized by the governing board of that junior college, college, or university to enforce state law and the rules and ordinances of that junior college, college, or university.
(iii ) A conservation officer of the department of natural resources or the department of environmental quality.
(iv ) A conservation officer of the United States department of the interior.
.
(x ) An individual engaged in a search and rescue operation as that term is defined in section 50c. [Emphasis added.]
The prosecution contends that by implication, reserve police officers fall under subsection (7)(b)(i ), i.e., "[a] police officer of ... a political subdivision of this state...." When interpreting statutes, we are required to look at the plain language of the statute to discern the Legislature's intent. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 329–330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999)
. In the resisting and obstructing statute, the Legislature did not include the term "reserve police officer" in the definition of persons whose lawful orders must be obeyed in order to avoid criminal liability. Many other law enforcement personnel one might reasonably consider implicitly included in the term "police officer" were nevertheless explicitly listed in the statute. Had the Legislature intended a broad meaning to apply to the term "police officer," there would have been no need to specify the statute's application to, inter alia, university police officers, sheriff's deputies, and federal conservation officers. See People v. Jahner, 433 Mich. 490, 500 n. 3, 446 N.W.2d 151 (1989) (); see also People v. Malik, 70 Mich.App. 133, 136, 245 N.W.2d 434 (1976). That the Legislature pointedly did not include reserve police officers indicates that the omission was intentional. See People v. Underwood, 278 Mich.App. 334, 338, 750 N.W.2d 612 (2008) (); see also Houghton Lake Area Tourism & Convention Bureau v. Wood, 255 Mich.App. 127, 135, 662 N.W.2d 758 (2003) (). Thus, by its terms, the statute does not apply to the failure to obey the order of a reserve police officer.3
The cases relied on by the prosecution are inapposite. In People v. McRae, 469 Mich. 704, 710–715, 678 N.W.2d 425 (2004)
, the Supreme Court held that a reserve police officer was a state actor for Sixth Amendment purposes. The case involved the application of constitutional standards. There is no basis to conclude that because a reserve police officer has been held to be a state actor under certain circumstances that he or she is also a police officer for purposes of the resisting and obstructing statute. Indeed, a completely private citizen may be held to be a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966). The term "state action" is broad and of no consequence in this case; for example, a public university and its employees are generally state actors, but no one could argue that by virtue of that legal classification, they are also police officers for purposes of the crime of resisting and obstructing.
In Bitterman v. Village of Oakley, 309 Mich.App. 53, 868 N.W.2d 642 (2015)
, this Court considered whether information concerning reserve police officers fell within the law enforcement exception to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq. We reject the prosecution's reliance on Bitterman because the phrase used in MCL 15.243(1)(s) (viii ), "law enforcement officer, agent, or informant," is undoubtedly broader than the term "police officer." Indeed, as this Court opined, reserve police officers likely fit within the FOIA phrase.4
Bitterman, 309 Mich.App. at 71–72, 868 N.W.2d 642. The term "police officer" in the resisting and obstructing statute is markedly narrower. If the Legislature had intended "police officer," as used in the statute, to be read so broadly, it would not have needed to include a lengthy list of law enforcement professionals and other occupations like firefighters, etc., to whom the law applies, notably omitting reserve police officers.
The prosecution and the dissent make reasonable policy arguments in support of their view that the failure to obey a properly supervised reserve police officer should result in some level of criminal liability. However, the decision whether to criminalize such actions, and if so, what sanctions to impose for engaging in such conduct, is a matter reserved for the Legislature. See People v. Ayers, 213 Mich.App. 708, 716, 540 N.W.2d 791 (1995)
().
Affirmed.
, J.
SAWYER
, P.J. (dissenting).
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Police Officer Douglas Roberts, a reserve officer with the City of Brighton, is not, in fact, a police officer for purposes of MCL 750.81d
. The majority bases its conclusion on the fact that MCL 750.81d does not specifically list the job title "reserve police officer" in its definition of "person" under the statute. I find this reasoning unpersuasive.
establishes as a two-year felony the following:
Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who assaults, batters, wounds
, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.
Subsections (2), (3), and (4) establish greater penalties depending on the level of injury caused to the "person." Furthermore, MCL 750.81d(7)(b)
defines "person" as any of the following:
.
(x ) An individual engaged in a search and rescue operation as that term is defined in section 50c.
The majority finds great significance in the fact that the term "reserve police officer" is not included in this list. I find no significance in that fact. The majority argues that because this list explicitly includes individuals in a number of categories that might implicitly be considered police officers, the Legislature must have intended to exclude other categories that are not explicitly mentioned. I find this reasoning to be flawed.
The majority's reasoning is correct only if we start with the presumption that the Legislature has implicitly reached the same conclusion that the majority has reached—that a reserve...
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People v. Feeley
...of that statute.On August 29, 2014, the district court issued an opinion and order denying the prosecution's request for a bindover. People v. Feeley, opinion and order of the Livingston County Trial Court–District Court Division, issued August 29, 2014 (Case No. 14–1183 FY). The district c......