People v. Fernandez

• Decision Date: 25 October 2012
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Sandy FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

20 N.Y.3d 44

980 N.E.2d 491

956 N.Y.S.2d 443

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 07145

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Sandy FERNANDEZ, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 25, 2012.

Steven Banks, Legal Aid Society, New York City (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Terry–Ann Corniffe and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge LIPPMAN.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the accusatory instrument was a facially sufficient simplified traffic information, although it was titled “Complaint/Information,” and contained factual information. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the accusatory instrument was sufficient to serve as a simplified traffic information because it was substantially in the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.

On January 9, 2009, defendant was arrested and arraigned on charges of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(1)(a).¹ Defendant had 13 prior license suspensions. The accusatory instrument was four by eight inches and the front of the accusatory instrument was denominated, “COMPLAINT/INFORMATION.” In a space designated, “Description of Violation” the instrument stated, “Aggravated Unlicensed Operator.” The instrument listed defendant's name, address, date of birth, sex, license information, vehicle description and vehicle registration information. The accusatory instrument also listed the date, time and address at which defendant was stopped. The reverse side was denominated “CRIMINAL COURT INFORMATION (DESCRIBE OFFENSE),” and was accompanied by the following handwritten description: “At t/p/o, A/O observed Deft driving S/B on 4th Ave & 40th St. operating a Black, 1998 Lincoln Town car Indiana Plate # 1375E complete a left turn onto 40th St. across three lanes of traffic. Informed by DMV that Deft license revoked (13 on 7 dates) [sic].”

A box was marked indicating outstanding warrants had been checked. The arresting officer dated and signed the instrument immediately below the factual write up, that the officer “PERSONALLY OBSERVED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED HEREIN.”

Traffic misdemeanors may be prosecuted in criminal court by a misdemeanor information, misdemeanor complaint or simplified traffic information. A facially sufficient misdemeanor complaint complies with the form and content requirements of CPL 100.15 and, in its factual portion, alleges evidentiary facts providingreasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged. (CPL 100.15[3]; 100.40[4][b].) Omission of an element of the charged crime renders a misdemeanor complaint jurisdictionally defective ( People v. Dreyden, 15 N.Y.3d 100, 905 N.Y.S.2d 542, 931 N.E.2d 526 [2010] ). A defendant may only be prosecuted upon a misdemeanor complaint if prosecution by misdemeanor information is waived.

As defined in CPL 100.10(2),² a simplified traffic information is a streamlined instrument designed for the expeditious processing of traffic infractions; it is a short, written accusation, signed by a police officer and filed with a criminal court. Evidentiary facts are not required. To be facially sufficient, the instrument must also comply with the requirement of CPL 100.25(1) that it be “ substantially in the form prescribed by the commissioner of motor vehicles” (emphasis added).

The arraignment court declined to rule on “whether ... this is a simplified traffic [information],” or a misdemeanor complaint. Defense counsel waived the reading of defendant's rights—which included the reading of his right to have a supporting deposition filed ³—and waived prosecution by information “[j]ust in case,” and defendant pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(1)(a), in exchange for a $350 fine and a conditional discharge that required him to clear up his outstanding traffic tickets. Defendant violated the terms of the conditional discharge, and the court sentenced him to 30 days, a term that has been fully served.

Defendant challenged his conviction by arguing that the accusatory instrument was a facially insufficient misdemeanor complaint, because it omitted an element of the offense charged. The People, on the other hand, argued that the accusatory instrument was a simplified traffic information, which required no factual allegations.

The Appellate Term held that

“although the accusatory instrument is denominated a ‘complaint/information,’ it is a sufficient simplified traffic information since it designates the offense charged, substantially conforms to the form prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and provides the court with sufficient information to establish that it has jurisdiction to hear the case” 31 Misc.3d 144[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 50932[U], [2011 WL 2086591, at] *1 [2011] [citations omitted] ).

The Appellate Term relied on People v. Ferro, (22 Misc.3d 7, 871 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App.Term 2d Dept.2008), lv. denied,12 N.Y.3d 757, 876 N.Y.S.2d 709, 904 N.E.2d 846 [2009] ), in holding that the title of the instrument is not controlling.

I

Defendant's main argument is that the accusatory instrument was denominated “Complaint/Information,” and included factual allegations as to only some of the elements of the offense charged, and therefore must be held to be an insufficient misdemeanor complaint, rather than a simplified traffic information. As explained below, we reject this contention.

A

Defendant points to our decision in People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 (2000) for the proposition that a title controls what a document is and since the document at issue is titled “Complaint/Information,” it is a misdemeanor complaint.

Casey concerned claims that a misdemeanor information for criminal contempt was jurisdictionally defective because of its hearsay nature ( id. at 358–359, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233). The Appellate Term held that since the information would have “qualifie[d] as a misdemeanor complaint,” and since defendant waived the right to be prosecuted by information, it was not jurisdictionally defective ( People v. Casey, 181 Misc.2d 744, 745, 698 N.Y.S.2d 404 [App.Term 2d Dept.1999], citing People v. Connor, 63 N.Y.2d 11, 479 N.Y.S.2d 197, 468 N.E.2d 35 [1984] ). We upheld defendant's conviction, but for different reasons ( Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 359, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233). We explained that we did not find a basis in the record for a waiver of a right to be prosecuted by information ( id.). We then noted:

“Moreover, as the Appellate Term acknowledged, the accusatory instrument here was denominated, and purported to be, a misdemeanor information with a supporting deposition, not a misdemeanor complaint. That the instrument would have qualified as a misdemeanor complaint did not make it one. Since the accusatory instrument here was in fact a local criminal court information, and not a misdemeanor complaint, the District Court would not have had the statutory obligation to inform defendant that he ‘may not be prosecuted [on a misdemeanor complaint] ... unless he consents' ” ( id.).

Nonetheless, we held that the nonhearsay requirement could be satisfied by the contents of the supporting deposition, and, more broadly, an information should be given “a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” ( id. at 359–360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233).

Our comment about denomination was a side-note, peripheral to the main holding and relevant only to the issue of waiver. A misdemeanor information is an accusatory instrument alleging nonhearsay evidentiary facts supporting every element of the offense charged. A defendant may be prosecuted by misdemeanor information alone. By contrast, a misdemeanor complaint is a misdemeanor information but with hearsay allegations permitted. A defendant may not be prosecuted by a misdemeanor complaint—and the trial court is required to so inform the defendant—unless prosecution by information is waived, or unless a supporting deposition is filed. Plainly, our comment in Casey was simply about whether the instrument did or did not include hearsay allegations, and what corresponding obligations the trial court had in ensuring that defendant properly waived his rights.

Moreover, a simplified traffic information need only “substantially” conform to the requirements of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (CPL 100.25). Title then cannot be dispositive when it is the legislature's intention that no single part of the form be dispositive. This holistic approach to identifying the form is entirely consistent with the central holding of Casey. There, we said that “[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading” ( id. at 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233). Furthermore, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles does not require a simplified traffic information to have any title at all ( see15 NYCRR 122.2). It would be illogical, then, to find that the title of the form governs over its substance ( see e.g. People v. Chestnut, 19 N.Y.3d 606, 611 n. 2, 950 N.Y.S.2d 287, 973 N.E.2d 697 [2012] [noting that a party's adherence to the preservation rule's “specific objection” requirement should not “emphasize form over substance”]; People v. Vespucci, 75 N.Y.2d 434, 442, 554 N.Y.S.2d 417, 553 N.E.2d 965 [1990] [holding that prosecutor's alternative arrangement complied with sealing requirement of eavesdropping statute because “(t)o rule otherwise would sacrifice substance for form and not advance” the purposes of the statute] ).

The Appellate Term correctly concluded that the principles...