People v. Fleetwood
| Decision Date | 30 August 1985 |
| Citation | 217 Cal.Rptr. 612,171 Cal.App.3d 982 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert FLEETWOOD, Defendant and Appellant. D001643. |
Appellate Defenders, Inc. and Howard C. Cohen, San Diego, as amicus curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Robert M. Foster, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
*
Robert Fleetwood appeals his conviction of robbery and burglary.
A jury found Fleetwood guilty of two counts of robbery in an inhabited dwelling, using a deadly weapon and inflicting great bodily harm (PEN.CODE, §§ 2111, 213.5, 12022, subd. (b), and 12022.7) and one count of burglary upon an inhabited dwelling using a deadly weapon ( §§ 459, 460, and 12022, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to prison for 11 years and 4 months.
Debbie B., a prostitute, had lived in a boarding hotel for two weeks when Fleetwood kicked in her door demanding money from her and her customer. After wounding each of them with a knife, he made off with a small amount of money.
The questions presented are as follows:
I. Does an occupied hotel room qualify as a "dwelling house" under section 213.5? Yes.
II. Did the court erroneously equate "occupation" with "inhabitance" in its instructions? No.
III. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding Ms. B.'s hotel room was a "dwelling house"? Yes.
IV. Was Fleetwood denied effective assistance of counsel? No.
Fleetwood contends the court erred in sentencing him under section 213.5's harsher sentence for residential robbery. On the burglary count, the judge told the jury:
On the robbery counts, the judge told the jury:
Fleetwood asserts the court erred by stating a hotel room is a dwelling house because section 213.5 should not apply to hotel rooms. Section 213.5 reads:
"Every robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach as defined in the Vehicle Code is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years."
It is Fleetwood's position the Legislature did not intend to protect hotel room occupants because it did not also include the "inhabited portion of any other building" language of section 460, subdivision (1) 2 (which applies to burglaries). It is reasoned that the Legislature's omission of said language in its later enactment of section 213.5 reveals a statutory intent to limit section 213.5's protection to house dwellers as opposed to inhabitants of other residential structures.
Robbery is a compound crime against property and persons including elements of both theft and assault. (People v. Guerin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 775, 781, 99 Cal.Rptr. 573, see People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 587, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908.) Although intending to deter both theft and personal harm, robbery legislation emphasizes personal protection. 3 Implementing its intent to protect robbery victims, the Legislature has developed a statutory scheme increasing sentences for increased victim vulnerability. 4
Victims inside buildings are more vulnerable to felonious conduct than victims out of doors. (People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 440, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22.) Recognizing victims inside their residences are especially vulnerable, the Legislature enacted section 213.5 as an "urgency statute necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning of Article IV of the Constitution ..." (Stats.1982, ch. 1293, p. 4783) because:
Residential burglary is first degree burglary punishable by two, four, or six years. ( §§ 460, 461.) Before enactment of section 213.5, a court could only sentence a residential robber to two, three or five years. Despite a residential robber's greater potential for violence, the sentence for just entering an inhabited dwelling, occupied or not, was greater than the sentence for robbing the victim in his own residence. Viewing this sentencing inequity as partially responsible for the dramatic increase in violent residential robberies, the Legislature enacted section 213.5 to deter residential robberies by equalizing the robbery and burglary statutes. It did not express the intent to reserve these protections for house dwellers only. Intending to implement sentencing equity, the Legislature would not equalize sentences under sections 213.5 and 460, while severely limiting the circumstances to which section 213.5 applies. Creation of parallel sentencing statutes for residential robbery and burglary requires a similarity of both terms of punishment and application. The same meanings should apply to the identical language in both statutes.
In section 460, "inhabited dwelling house" means a structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes. (People v. Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 838, 848, 193 Cal.Rptr. 54.) A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future. (Id.; People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 484, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109.) There may be more than one dwelling under the same roof. Apartments and hotel rooms may be the dwelling house of persons living in them. (People v. St. Clair (1869) 38 Cal. 137.)
The burglary statutes make no distinction between the character of a burglary of an "inhabited dwelling place" and of an "inhabited portion of any other building." (People v. O'Bryan (1985) 37 Cal.3d 841, 844, 210 Cal.Rptr. 450, 694 P.2d 135.) These burglaries have the same character regardless of the structure in which they occur. (See also Wyatt v. State (1971) 4 Tenn.Cr.App. 1, 467 S.W.2d 811 [hotel room]; Herbert v. State (Fla.App.1983) 439 So.2d 971 [motel room]; People v. Germany (1978) 41 Colo.App. 304, 586 P.2d 1006 [hospital room]; Jones v. State (Ind.App.1983) 457 N.E.2d 231 [three-room log cabin]; State v. Auger (Mo.1968) 434 S.W.2d 1 [apartment]; Bacon v. State (1952) 85 Ga.App. 630, 70 S.E.2d 54 [rooming-house]; Sallee v. State (1931) 51 Okl.Cr. 414, 1 P.2d 794 [bunkhouse].)
Historically and traditionally, hotel rooms have been included within the definition of a dwelling house. (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 257.) We are convinced the Legislature intended the same result under section 213.5. Accordingly, we hold that the term "inhabited dwelling house" in section 213.5 includes the "inhabited portion of any other building."
Fleetwood contends the court's instruction erroneously equated "occupation" with "inhabitance." However, the court's instructions do not equate these terms. In defining "inhabited dwelling" for burglary, the court used "occupation" only to instruct on the necessity of having a current resident. A "dwelling," unoccupied by a person currently using it for living and sleeping, is not a "dwelling" under the burglary statute. (People v. Cardona, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 483-484, 191 Cal.Rptr. 109.) The correctness of the court's use of "occupancy" within the context of the instructions as a whole is shown by its properly stating "dwelling" status was uneffected by the temporary absence of the occupant. Although the court made this distinction less clearly when it later defined "inhabited dwelling" for robbery, the court said the definition was the same for both robbery and burglary. The court's statements as a whole properly instructed the jury on robbery of an inhabited dwelling.
Fleetwood claims the evidence does not support the jury's finding Ms. B. resided in the hotel room. He asserts the fact the room was furnished with only two mattresses and a television set shows it was not a dwelling, but a place of business. However, Ms. B. testified:
The night manager for the hotel testified Ms. B. was staying at the hotel, paying as much as two weeks rent in advance. We must view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Although Ms. B. clearly engaged in acts of prostitution on the premises, the jury had substantial and sufficient evidence to find she also resided therein.
Fleetwood contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel. He claims his attorney acted improperly by agreeing to the court's instruction an inhabited hotel room was an inhabited dwelling house, and by specifically...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Khoa Khac Long
...or not." 6 Since the statutes use the same phrases, they should receive the same interpretation. ( People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612 ( Fleetwood ).) An issue on appeal in Fleetwood was whether there was sufficient evidence that a prostitute's room in a bo......
-
People v. Cruz
...with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future." (People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987-988, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612; see also People v. Guthrie, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 838, 193 Cal.Rptr. 54; People v. Cardona (1983) 142 C......
-
People v. Alvarado
...494, 462 P.2d 22; People v. Hicks, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 796-797, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 469, 863 P.2d 714; People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 982, 987, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612.) Thus, it is clear that in section 667.61(e)(2), the Legislature sought to deter by harsher punishment those who burg......
-
People v. Sparks
...room]; People v. Fond (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 129, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 660 [entry into a hospital room]; People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 985, 988, 217 Cal.Rptr. 612 [entry into a hotel room].) In all of these cases, the expectation of protection from intrusion into the room is ......