People v. Flood
| Decision Date | 02 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. S059454,S059454 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 957 P.2d 869, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5266, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7349 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Hal Lee FLOOD, Defendant and Appellant |
Carlton E. Lacy, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Walnut Creek, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Stan M. Helfman, Sharon G. Birenbaum and David D. Salmon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant Hal Lee Flood guilty of the offense of evading a vehicle operated by a pursuing peace officer resulting in serious bodily injury, a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3. 1 To establish the offense set forth in that statute, the prosecution must prove, among other things, that the motor vehicle that the defendant was attempting to elude was operated by a "peace officer" as defined in the Penal Code. When instructing the jury regarding the elements of the offense, however, the trial court did not advise the jury that it should determine whether the persons in the pursuing motor vehicle were "peace officers," but instead informed the jury--in conformity with the uncontradicted evidence that had been presented at trial--that the police officers in that vehicle were peace officers, thus effectively removing this element of the crime from the jury's consideration. We granted review to decide whether the trial court's action in this regard amounted to constitutional error, and, if so, whether such an error requires reversal of defendant's conviction whether or not the error actually was prejudicial under the circumstances of the case.
We conclude that although the trial court committed constitutional error, its action does not amount to "structural error" within the meaning of the governing federal constitutional decisions and thus is not reversible per se, but rather, like most constitutional errors, is subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and United States Constitutions. We further conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the error in question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus does not warrant reversal of the judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached a similar conclusion, is affirmed.
On May 22, 1994, City of Richmond Police Officers Rudy Bridgeman and Michael Gurney were on duty in their police vehicle when they stopped a Cadillac that had made an illegal U-turn. Bridgeman exited from the vehicle and approached the driver's side of the Cadillac. He observed the driver, whom he identified as defendant, looking at him in the rearview mirror. When Bridgeman almost had reached the driver's door, the Cadillac took off rapidly. Bridgeman returned to the police car, and the officers gave chase. Eventually the Cadillac entered an intersection and struck a van, which flipped over and ejected four occupants, all of whom sustained serious bodily injury. Defendant was charged with evading a vehicle operated by a pursuing peace officer resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 2800.3), 2 as well as unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a)). 3
When Bridgeman and Gurney testified at trial concerning the foregoing events, the prosecutor questioned them regarding their employment as police officers. The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the prosecution's case, during the direct examination of Bridgeman: Gurney similarly testified on direct examination: "I'm a police officer for the [C]ity of Richmond Police Department," and he stated that he was on duty the day of defendant's offense. Defendant did not cross-examine Bridgeman or Gurney with regard to their status as Richmond police officers.
The defense case regarding the section 2800.3 charge was based upon three contentions: (1) the police vehicle which Bridgeman and Gurney were operating, a "detective's car," was not "distinctively marked" as required to establish a violation of section 2800.3; (2) defendant lacked the requisite intent to evade the officers because the passenger in the Cadillac was holding a gun to defendant's head and forced him to speed away after the officers stopped them; and (3) defendant's actions in evading the police officers were not a proximate cause of injury to the van's occupants, because the van entered the intersection against a red light and its driver testified that he saw no pursuing police vehicle as he approached the intersection. None of the testimony elicited during the defense case specifically addressed Bridgeman's and Gurney's employment status as police officers with the Richmond Police Department. Throughout the trial, however, evidence presented in connection with other issues corroborated Bridgeman's and Gurney's testimony that they were employed as police officers by the City of Richmond. 4
When instructing the jury on the elements of the offense defined by section 2800.3, the trial court stated:
This instruction was taken from CALJIC No. 12.86 (5th ed.1993 new) as it appeared in the January 1994 through January 1995 pocket parts to volume 2. After the first paragraph quoted above, this version of CALJIC No. 12.86 included the bracketed phrase: "[________ is a peace officer.]." 5 On the instruction given by the trial court, the handwritten words "Officers Bridgman [sic ] and Gurney" appear in the blank portion of the bracketed phrase quoted above; in addition the word "is" is changed to "are," and the word "officer" is made plural. The blank on the instruction form next to "REQUESTED BY: PEOPLE" is checked. The space next to "REQUESTED BY: DEFENDANT" is left blank, although defendant's list of requested instructions contains a check mark next to CALJIC No. 12.86, and the trial court's discussion with counsel regarding which instructions would be given suggests that both parties requested the instruction. 6 Nothing in the record, however, indicates that defendant specifically asked the court to give the optional peace officer portion of CALJIC No. 12.86. On the other hand, the record does not indicate, and defendant does not claim, that he objected to this aspect of CALJIC No. 12.86.
The jury found defendant guilty of violating sections 2800.3 and 10851, subdivision (a). On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Bridgeman and Gurney were peace officers. As set forth above, one element of the crime described in section 2800.3 is that the pursuing vehicle must be "operated by a peace officer, as defined in ... the Penal Code, and that peace officer is wearing a distinctive uniform." (§ 2800.1, subd. (a)(4).) The trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove that the "peace officer's motor vehicle was operated by a peace officer wearing a distinctive uniform" but failed to give an instruction defining the term "peace officer" (in accordance with Penal Code section 830.1, subdivision (a)), instead informing the jury that the two officers were peace officers. Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court's instruction impermissibly removed the peace officer component of this element of the charged offense from the jury's consideration, and that such an error cannot be deemed harmless and necessarily requires reversal.
The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Bridgeman and Gurney were peace officers, but it rejected defendant's argument that the error could not be considered harmless. Relying primarily upon People v. Richie (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1354-1360, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, the appellate court held that harmless error analysis was appropriate under the Cantrell-Thornton exception to the state constitutional rule of per se reversal for instructional omissions relating to an element of the charged offense. (People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539, 556, 205 Cal.Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826; see People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256; and People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, both overruled on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) The Court of Appeal observed that the Cantrell-Thornton exception permits affirmance when an element omitted from the jury...
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