People v. Flores

• Decision Date: 12 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. S105762.,S105762.
• Citation: 69 P.3d 979,30 Cal.4th 1059,135 Cal.Rptr.2d 63
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steven A. FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

135 Cal.Rptr.2d 63

30 Cal.4th 1059

69 P.3d 979

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Steven A. FLORES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S105762.

Supreme Court of California.

June 12, 2003.

Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, David C. Cook, Mary Sanchez and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

Subdivision (b) of section 987.8 of the Penal Code (section 987.8(b))¹ provides that, upon the conclusion of criminal proceedings in the trial court, the court may, after giving the defendant notice and a hearing, make a determination of his present ability to pay all or a portion of the cost of the legal assistance provided him. The subdivision further provides that the court may, in its discretion, "hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of the criminal proceedings." (Ibid.)

Defendant contends, the People concede, and the Court of Appeal held that the reimbursement order in this case violated section 987.8(b) because it was made without the requisite notice and hearing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to give it another opportunity to provide the notice and conduct the hearing required by the statute.

The question before us is whether, as defendant contends, the remand order was erroneous because it occurred more than six months after judgment was pronounced. Defendant's contention lacks merit. Under section 1260, appellate courts have the power to remand a cause to a trial court "for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances," and the language used in section 987.8 does not, on the face of it, suggest the Legislature intended to carve out an exception to section 1260 by placing a six-month time limit on the power to remand for the correction of errors of the sort made in this case. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1978 amendment to section 987.8, which authorized the holding of "one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of the criminal proceedings," clearly reveals defendant's contention to be meritless.

Factual and Procedural History

As defendant observes, the issue presented by this case does not turn on the facts of the offense, so we simply note that defendant was convicted of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and was sentenced to prison for three years.

At sentencing, without having given him the notice or hearing required by section 987.8(b), the trial court ordered defendant "to pay attorney's fees of $5,000, significantly less than those services are worth, and less than the public defender schedule would indicate, just as a general rule for appointed counsel. That's subject to his ability to pay, out of state prison or other funds."

The Court of Appeal remanded for notice and hearing under section 987.8(b), holding that such a remand is the proper remedy when a defendant has been deprived of these statutorily required safeguards, and in all other respects it affirmed the judgment. The Court of Appeal added that "[t]he defendant's ability to pay must, of course, be determined with reference to his financial condition at the time of sentencing or not later than six months after sentencing.²

Discussion

Section 987.8(b) provides: "In any case in which a defendant is provided legal assistance, either through the public defender or private counsel appointed by the court, upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court, or upon the withdrawal of the public defender or appointed private counsel, the court may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof. The court may, in its discretion, hold one such additional hearing within six months of the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The court may, in its discretion, order the defendant to appear before a county officer designated by the court to make an inquiry into the ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the legal assistance provided."

Recoupment statutes such as section 987.8(b) reflect a legislative concern for "`replenishing a county treasury from the pockets of those who have directly benefited from county expenditures.'" (People v. Amor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 20, 27, 114 Cal.Rptr. 765, 523 P.2d 1173, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577.) "`Recoupment proceedings may protect the State from fraudulent concealment of assets and false assertions of indigency. Many States, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets, and this Court has required appointed counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases and stages of prosecution. Such trends have heightened the burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the added costs.'" (Amor, at p. 27, 114 Cal.Rptr. 765, 523 P.2d 1173, quoting James v. Strange (1972) 407 U.S. 128, 141, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600.)

To reiterate, defendant contends the remand order was erroneous under section 987.8(b) because, by the time it was made, more than six months had passed since the pronouncement of judgment.

The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) To determine legislative intent, we turn first, to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (Trevino, at p. 241, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283; Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259.) When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. (Granberry v. May Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 889 P.2d 970; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.)

Defendant relies primarily upon People v. Turner (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1690, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 736 (Turner).

In Turner, as in this case, the People conceded that the trial court violated section 987.8(b) by ordering reimbursement of attorney fees without holding a hearing to determine the defendant's ability to pay. "The more difficult question," in the Court of Appeal's view, was "whether the trial court retain[ed] jurisdiction to modify its order, following the issuance of our remittitur." (Turner, at p. 1695, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 736.)

In Turner, the Court of Appeal began by reciting "the general rule that '[t]he filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur' (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554, 153 Cal.Rptr. 40, 591 P.2d 63), thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over anything affecting the judgment. (People v. Lockridge (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1752, 1757, 16 Cal. Rptr.2d 340; People v. Schulz (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 563, 570, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 269.) Jurisdiction survives, however, where provided by statute. (People v. Karaman [ (1992) ] 4 Cal.4th 335, 351-352, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 801, 842 P.2d 100; People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 1757, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.) In such cases, the jurisdictional period generally is not tolled during the pendency of an appeal. (See People v. Lockridge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1755, 1757-1758, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 340.)" (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 736.)

In Turner, both parties agreed that "section 987.8 constitutes a statutory exception to the general rule." (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 736.) The Court of Appeal agreed. "Under the plain language of the statute at issue here, the ability-to-pay hearing need not be held on the date judgment is pronounced; rather, the statute empowers the court to hold such hearing within six months of the pronouncement of judgment.... Since, from a practical standpoint, such reports could not always be prepared and filed on the day of judgment, it must be concluded that the Legislature intended the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the matter of attorney fees for a reasonable period of time—that is, a six-month period—following the pronouncement of judgment. [H] A notice of appeal, however, must be filed within 60 days of judgment. Hence, if we were to apply the general rule divesting the trial court of jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal, that provision of the statute providing for an additional hearing within six months of judgment would be effectively defeated in every case where an appeal was filed. Such a result would frustrate the intent of the Legislature and render the provision surplusage. Thus we agree with the parties that the trial court is not divested of jurisdiction to act on the question of attorney fees under section 987.8 upon the filing of a notice of appeal." (Turner, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1696, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 736.)

This brought the Court of Appeal "to the crucial question of whether the six-month period prescribed in the statute for the ability-to-pay hearings is jurisdictional—in other words, does the court lose jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings under section 987.8 once the six-month period has expired?" (Turner, supra, ...