People v. Flushing Hosp. & Medical Center
| Decision Date | 15 November 1983 |
| Citation | 471 N.Y.S.2d 745,122 Misc.2d 260 |
| Court | New York City Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. FLUSHING HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant. |
On May 5, 1982 at approximately 10:20 P.M., Katherine Streletsky, an 89 year old patient of the Rego Park Nursing Home was transported, at the direction of her physician, by private ambulance to Flushing General Hospital for emergency treatment for congestive heart failure. When the ambulance arrived at the hospital's parking lot entrance to the emergency room it was met by a nurse on duty in the emergency room who advised the ambulance attendants to transport Ms. Streletsky to another hospital for treatment because, according to the nurse, no "beds" were available. The attendants promptly transported Ms. Streletsky to Booth Memorial Hospital where she died several hours later of congestive heart failure.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the incident led to extensive media coverage as well as the commencement of a Grand Jury investigation by the District Attorney of Queens County.
On July 2, 1982, the defendant was served with a summons and accusatory instrument charging it with a violation of Section 2805-b(2) of the Public Health Law, an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $2,000.00.
The accusatory instrument alleged that:
Based upon official police investigation and on information supplied by Dr. John Rawlings that at the above mentioned date, time, and place, the defendant, a general hospital located in New York City; a city with a population in excess of one million, willfully refused to provide emergency medical care and treatment to Katherine Streletsky, a person in need of such care and treatment and who applied to defendant hospital for such care and treatment.
Deponent further states that he is informed by Dr. Rawlings, the attending physician to Katherine Streletsky, that in the opinion of Dr. Rawlings the defendant hospital did, at the above mentioned date, time and place, have the proper equipment and personnel at hand to deal with Katherine Streletsky's condition and that an actual medical emergency existed when Katherine Streletsky applied to the defendant hospital for emergency care and treatment.
On July 7, 1982 the defendant appearing through retained counsel, was arraigned in Part AR 2 of this Court and the case was transferred that same day to Jury Part 3 for a possible disposition.
Later that day the case appeared in Jury Part 3 and the defendant, through its attorney, pled guilty to the above charge, and was sentenced to the maximum fine of $2,000.00.
On July 12, 1983 the defendant through its present attorney, moved pursuant to Section 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law for an order vacating its judgment of conviction and withdrawal of its plea of guilty on the following grounds:
1. The Court lacked jurisdiction to accept the defendant's plea of guilty because the information was insufficient on its face; 1
2. The Court erred in accepting a plea of guilty because it failed to conduct a proper allocution;
3. The defendant was in fact, not guilty of the crime charged;
4. The judgment was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution in that the defendant was not represented by effective counsel;
5. Newly discovered evidence; and
6. The interests of justice require a vacature of the plea and sentence.
On September 21, and October 14, 1983 the Court conducted a hearing and permitted oral argument on the grounds alleged.
Based upon all of the credible evidence adduced, I find and conclude as follows:
I. The Jurisdiction of the Court
The defendant contends that the instant accusatory instrument was insufficient on its face on three grounds:
1. It did not state all of the necessary elements of the crime charged in that it failed to allege the appropriate mental state necessary for the commission of the crime, and 2. it did not allege sufficient facts to support the elements of this crime in that it did not specify in what manner the hospital refused to provide emergency care, by whom it acted and whether this person was acting as an agent of the corporation, and
3. the accusatory instrument failed to provide sufficient "non-hearsay" allegations of fact establishing every element of the charge and the defendant's commission thereof.
The defendant contends that these defects are jurisdictional and therefore not waived by a plea of guilty.
Section 2805-b(2) of the Public Health Law in pertinent part provides as follows:
Paragraph (2) of Section 12-b of the Public Health Law declares that a "willful" violation of any provision of the Public Health Law is a misdemeanor.
The defendant contends that these two sections read in conjunction require an assertion of "bad intent", and that a mere allegation of a "willful" denial of emergency services is an insufficient allegation of the mental element necessary to commit the crime charged.
The Court does not agree. Research does not reveal any previous prosecution under this statute, nor has any Court had the opportunity to interpret the underlying legislative purpose, or material elements of this offense. The legislative background of the statute reveals that it was designed to prevent hospitals from restricting access to emergency rooms and to prohibit the denial of treatment to patients brought to emergency rooms by volunteer ambulance corps.
The Court agrees that Sections 2805-b and 12-b of the Public Health Law should be read in conjunction to determine the elements of the crime charged in the instant case.
Such an analysis reveals that a hospital is guilty of a violation of section 2805-b(2) when:
1. It is a general hospital (as that term is defined therein), and
2. the hospital willfully denies emergency treatment to a person, for any reason, and
3. that person is actually in need of such treatment as determined by the attending physician.
The requirement that the denial be "willful " in the context of this legislation means no more than that the denial be a deliberate and voluntary act of a person acting as the agent of the corporation. Contrary to defendant's assertion that section 2805-b(2) mandates a finding of "bad intent," the section specifically prohibits a denial for any reason whatsoever. The statute provides no exception for a lack of "bad" intent. Assuming the existence of the other elements, a hospital would be liable, if it refuses treatment for any reason whatsoever regardless of the motive for the denial of treatment.
Essentially, therefore, this statute imposes strict liability upon a public hospital for any deliberate and voluntary (i.e. willful ) refusal to provide emergency treatment.
It appears that the legislature desired to place considerable pressure on general hospitals, in cities such as New York, to exercise every precaution in carrying out their responsibilities with respect to emergency treatment. In so doing the Legislature, by enacting Section 2805-b has created a crime that does not require proof of fault. It is conclusively presumed, in effect, that no valid excuse exists that would justify such a hospital's refusal of emergency medical care. Such an effect may be inconsistent with the basic premise that punishment should be imposed only where culpability exists. Nevertheless, the need to protect the public and insure proper and prompt treatment in emergency situations was obviously thought to outweigh the need for blameworthiness as a basis for criminal liability.
Consequently an allegation that the denial was "willful" is all that is required and the Court finds that all of the elements of the crime were properly averred in the accusatory instrument.
The standard of factual sufficiency applicable to a Criminal Court accusatory instrument is set forth in Section 100.40 of the CPL, which provides that an accusatory instrument must allege sufficient facts which, if true, would establish every element of the crime charged.
This standard serves several purposes: from a jurisdictional perspective it serves to satisfy the Court that proof of the facts alleged will establish a crime; from a due process perspective it provides the defendant with adequate notice of the nature of the charges against him.
The instant accusatory instrument alleges in pertinent part that "on May 5, 1982 at approximately 10:45 P.M. at 45th Avenue and Parsons Blvd., County of Queens [the defendant] ... willfully refused to provide emergency medical care and treatment to Katherine Streletsky."
The defendant contends that this allegation is insufficient to establish the element of a willful denial of the emergency services required by the statute. The defendant further contends that the prosecutor should have provided details as to the manner in which the denial of such services occurred and, specifically, the identity of the person through whom the corporation is alleged to have acted, as well as an indication that this person acted within the scope of his/her authority. The Court does not agree. While the prosecutor may have drawn this instrument more artfully by including greater detail, what was alleged is sufficient to meet jurisdictional and notice requirements.
It is frequently difficult to distinguish between what is a "fact" and what is a "conclusion," for the...
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