People v. Angelakos

• Decision Date: 18 April 1985
• Citation: 491 N.Y.S.2d 221,128 Misc.2d 844
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Thessaloniki ANGELAKOS, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 221

491 N.Y.S.2d 221

128 Misc.2d 844

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Thessaloniki ANGELAKOS, Defendant.

Criminal Court of the City of New York Bronx County, Part AR I.

April 18, 1985.

Edward J. Kuriansky, Deputy Atty. Gen. by Lawrence N. Gray, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

Milton M. Witchel, New York City, for defendant.

Decision and Order

ROBERT L. COHEN, Judge:

The defendant, a physician, was arraigned before me on September 15, 1983 and pleaded guilty to a one-count Criminal Court misdemeanor complaint which charged her with having violated Public Health Law 12-b (subd. 2). ¹ Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $2000 or in lieu of payment to serve three months in jail. The fine was immediately paid.

Approximately one year later, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that the plea allocution was legally deficient.

The People argue that the motion is untimely and, additionally, should be denied on the merits.

The complaint ² charged defendant with a "Wilful Violation of Health Laws in Violation of Public Health Law Section 12-b(2) One Count." The factual allegations alleged that defendant, "a physician registered as a provider under the New York State Plan for Medical Assistance to the Needy (Medicaid), leased space for the practice of medicine at West Bronx Medical Dental Offices, a shared health facility located at 1713 University Avenue, Bronx, New York, the rental fee for which was calculated and paid as a percentage of the defendant's earnings for services rendered on the premises. Pursuant thereto, the defendant made a payment of $2000 on the date specified above (January 22, 1982), knowing the same to be in violation of subdivision 1 of Section 4708 of the Public Health Law and 10 N.Y.C.R.R. 83.12(a)." ³

During the plea allocution, the defendant admitted renting space for the practice of medicine at a shared health facility and that she agreed to pay rent to the operator of the facility based upon a percentage of her medicaid earnings for services rendered at that facility. The defendant also admitted making a payment on January 22, 1982, as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to that agreement.

Before sentence was imposed, defense counsel stated that "Dr. Angelakos has been practicing medicine in this particular country since 1980. The crime that she is charged with is really unrelated to the practice of medicine and patient care, is basically a crime which she had no particular knowledge of. She was not aware of the existence of the statute prior to the time that she was summoned by the Attorney General's office to discuss this matter with them.... She is being charged with one count of what amounts to fee splitting with an owner of a medical care facility. She was unaware of the fact that would constitute fee splitting or she was doing anything improper, ...". (Emphasis added).

I then asked Dr. Angelakos if she wished to say anything before I imposed sentence. In response she stated: "I agree with my lawyer. I wasn't aware that was illegal, splitting the fee with the manager of the place." (emphasis added).

Based upon the above-noted on the record statements of counsel and defendant, I believe it was error to have imposed judgment convicting defendant of "wilfully" violating Public Health Law 4708 (subd. 1) and 10 N.Y.C.R.R. 83.12(a), in the absence of further inquiry by the court advising the defendant that her admissions "might very well not amount to the crime to which" she pleaded guilty and inquiring further whether she "nevertheless, wished to plead guilty ..." (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304 at 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330; see also, People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 68); ⁴ People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 318 N.E.2d 784; People v. Francis, 38 N.Y.2d 150, 319 N.Y.S.2d 21, 341 N.E.2d 540; Matter of Kim "F", App.Div., 487 N.Y.S.2d 31; People v. Sobczak, 105 A.D.2d 1053, 482 N.Y.S.2d 171 (4th Dept 1984); People v. Steedly, 50 Misc.2d 921, 271 N.Y.S.2d 752; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418; North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162; Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108; cf. People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 471 N.Y.S.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170).

Although a "uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants "is not required (People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 353, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687, supra; People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 16-17, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170, supra ), a plea of guilty must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered before a valid judgment based upon the plea is imposed. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.

In Boykin, the court stated: "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment (citations omitted)" Id. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711. Thus, as a general rule before judgment is imposed upon a guilty plea, the defendant's factual admissions to the court should establish beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime which is being admitted (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330 supra; People v. Reyes, 92 A.D.2d 776, 459 N.Y.S.2d 614; People v. Riley, 91 A.D.2d 671, 457 N.Y.S.2d 122; People v. Royster, 91 A.D.2d 1074-75, 459 N.Y.S.2d 16; People v. Lee, 90 A.D.2d 960, 456 N.Y.S.2d 896; Matter of Kim "F", App.Div., 487 N.Y.S.2d 31, supra; cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 supra; Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. at 642-43, n. (13) at 645, 96 S.Ct. at 2256-57, n. (13) at 2257), just as a conviction by verdict must be based "upon trial evidence which is legally sufficient and which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt every element of such offense and the defendant's commission thereof." (CPL 70.20).

Under appropriate circumstances, however, a court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who asserts innocence but wishes nevertheless to plead guilty to avoid a more severe judgment based upon a rational assessment of the evidence against him. In such a case, there is no constitutional bar to imposing judgment provided the plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 supra; People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 309-310, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330.

Similarly, a plea bargain agreement either to a hypothetical or lesser crime will ordinarily make unnecessary a factual basis for the crime confessed (see People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 225 N.E.2d 200; People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 329 N.Y.S.2d 580, 280 N.E.2d 366; cf. People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 166 N.E.2d 684; People v. Serrano, supra; and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108, supra ).

At bar, Dr. Angelakos pleaded guilty to the one and only count contained in the misdemeanor complaint, and her guilty plea was neither hypothetical nor to a lesser included offense to any other offense charged in this criminal action. ⁵

Although the guilty plea entered by defendant at her arraignment was undoubtedly the result of a plea-bargain agreement, the court still had a constitutional duty to determine that it was truly voluntary, knowingly and understandingly entered (see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 supra ), and that her guilty plea convicting her (see CPL 1.20(13)) of the one count charged in the accusatory instrument had a proper factual basis. By informing the court that she was unaware that her rental arrangement with the operator of the shared health facility was in violation of the law, the court was on notice that defendant possibly lacked the required culpable mental state, that she "wilfully" violated the law, and cast a reasonable doubt upon one of the essential elements required to sustain a conviction for the crime to which she pleaded. See People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d at 307-308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330. In the absence of further inquiry by the court apprising the defendant that lack of knowledge of the illegality of her rental arrangement might negate the element of wilfullness, the plea should not have been accepted as a valid one (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d at 308, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330; see also, People v. Reyes, 92 A.D.2d 776, 459 N.Y.S.2d 614; People v. Riley, 91 A.D.2d 671, 457 N.Y.S.2d 122; People v. Royster, 91 A.D.2d 1074-75, 459 N.Y.S.2d 16; People v. Lee, 90 A.D.2d 960, 456 N.Y.S.2d 896; Matter of Kim "F", App.Div., 487 N.Y.S.2d 31 supra.

The prosecutor argues that ignorance of the law is no defense and that wilfully merely means the doing of an act deliberately and voluntarily, citing People v. Flushing Hospital & Medical Center, 122 Misc.2d 260, 471 N.Y.S.2d 745 and People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230, 158 N.E.2d 817.

In Flushing, a corporate defendant was involved as well as a different underlying statute (P.L. 2805-b, subd 2). Section 2805-b (subd 2) prohibits a public hospital's denial of emergency treatment, "for any reason whatsoever," to a person in need of such treatment. 122 Misc.2d at 263, 471 N.Y.S.2d 745.

In Broady, the defendant was convicted of wire tapping in violation of subdivision 6 of section 1423 of the Former Penal Law. The Court distinguished the phrase "unlawfully and wilfully," contained in subdivision 6, from the other subdivisions of section 1423 which used the phrase "wilfully and maliciously," stating, "it is fair to assume that the Legislature indicated that the word 'wilfully', as used in subdivision 6, meant deliberately, as opposed to maliciously or viciously." (Id. 5 N.Y.2d at...