People v. Ford

• Decision Date: 04 February 1964
• Docket Number: Cr. 7096
• Citation: 36 Cal.Rptr. 620,388 P.2d 892,60 Cal.2d 772
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 388 P.2d 892 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William J. FORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 620

36 Cal.Rptr. 620

60 Cal.2d 772, 388 P.2d 892

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William J. FORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 7096.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 4, 1964.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1964.

Arnold H. Gold, Beverly Hills, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Gordon Ringer, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Defendant appeals (by operation of Pen.Code, § 1239(b)) from judgments of death and imprisonment imposed pursuant to jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder, first degree burglary, possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon (Pen.Code, § 12021), first degree robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of kidnaping.

Defendant advances a variety of contentions relating to the non-homicide counts, but we have concluded that no prejudicial error occurred in connection with those convictions. ¹ As to the murder count, however, the record substantiates defendant's contentions that the court erred in giving improper instructions on intoxication and in failing to give of its own motion the required cautionary instruction as to defendant's alleged oral admissions, and that on the evidence in this case such errors were prejudicial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment on the murder count to prevent a miscarriage of justice (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 4 1/2).

By information defendant was charged with the burglary of the home of John B. Roope on June 2, 1961 (Count I); in the remaining counts, all referring to events occurring on June 9, 1961 (one week after the Roope burglary), defendant was charged with possessing a concealable weapon in violation of Penal Code section 12021 (Count II), robbing Roope of $29 (Count III), kidnaping Roope (Count IV), assaulting Ben Hardy with a deadly weapon (Count V), kidnaping defendant's wife, Emma Ford (Count VI), and murdering David Harvey Stahl (Count VII). A motion to suspend the proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 (doubt as to sanity for trial) was denied, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. An additional plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was withdrawn when the cause was submitted to the jury on the not guilty plea. The jury convicted defendant on each count, finding the burglary, the robbery, and the murder to be of the first degree. By stipulation the question of penalty was submitted to the jury on the evidence received at the trial of the not guilty plea to the charge of murder. The jury fixed the penalty at death, and defendant's motions for new trial or for reduction of the penalty were denied.

Analysis of the record discloses that the evidence relating to the issue of defendant's capacity (as affected by such factors as his seeming intoxication at the time of the homicide) to deliberate and premeditate sufficiently to form an intent to commit, or to so carry out a previously so formed intent to commit, murder in the first degree appears to admit of conflicting inferences. The prosecution's case on this issue as to deliberated and premeditated specific intent (aside from the physical facts, which in the main are undisputed) is based in principal part on various oral admissions or declarations assertedly made by defendant during the course of the events in question, as reported however by seemingly hostile witnesses whose testimony was impeached in several significant respects on cross-examination. Forming a background for the claimed inculpatory evidence is the largely uncontradicted and in certain material respects corroborated (see, e. g., fns. 2, 4, 5, and 6, post) testimony of defendant as to his wife's confessed and continuing adultery, his knowledge that their children had observed her sexual misconduct, his inability (or perhaps lack of implemented desire) to provide shelter for his family or to secure a job, his deteriorated physical condition caused by malnutrition, lack of sleep, exposure, and ill health, and finally, his consumption of a large amount of alcohol immediately prior to and during the commission of the alleged crimes. ² In such a case, under the current framework of our substantive and procedural law, we must scrutinize the record with particular care to determine not merely the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that defendant committed the acts charged but also how far it reflects the errors assertedly committed and their probable effect on the fairness of defendant's trial. (People v. Briggs (1962) 58 Cal.2d 385, 404(1)-405(2), 24 Cal.Rptr. 417, 374 P.2d 257.)

In February 1960 defendant brought his wife Emma and their four children from Illinois to California. Six months later (i. e., in August) he was extradited to Illinois on a bad check charge. ³ This certainly did not help him support his family, or keep them together. However, he was not prosecuted, and after an absence of some five months returned to California on January 10, 1961. He arrived at his home in Atascadero by bus at approximately 2 a. m., and found his wife in an advanced state of pregnancy. She had not previously told him of her condition and said 'she had her own reasons for not letting me know.' In spite of the hour she kept insisting that he take her out of the house, and finally admitted that she was expecting a visit by one Ole or Ollie Atkins. Atkins arrived a half hour later, and defendant told him that he knew of the affair and that he wanted Atkins to 'stay away and leave my wife alone and not return again to the house.'

Defendant and his wife then agreed to resume a normal marital life. The baby was born prematurely on January 19, 1961, and was put in an incubator. About a week later, having learned that his wife had undertaken arrangements to have the baby adopted by a minister, defendant asked her whether or not he was the father. She confessed that while he was away she had had sexual relations with Atkins and one Frank Nado. It does not appear likely, however, that either Atkins or Nado could have fathered the child during defendant's absence (August 1960 to January 1961) in Illinois; there was no evidence that the child, although premature, was or could be of only five months' gestation. Defendant said he forgave her misconduct because he 'wanted to keep the family together.' ⁴

A series of illnesses then struck the other children and Mrs. Ford, and defendant was unable to find a steady job. Defendant, according to his testimony, overheard two men in a cafe say that 'Ole Atkins had had my wife out and they thought they could go out and get her too.' Defendant asked his wife to go with him to tell Atkins again to stay away from her because defendant 'was afraid of it getting back to the kids.' They drove to Atkins' house in Creston and defendant went in alone. Atkins pulled a pistol out of his pocket and fired at defendant's head, then ordered him out of the house, saying, 'if I ever see you downtown, I will have this pistol in my pocket.' ⁵

Shortly afterwards further family difficulties arose. The oldest son, Billy (about 11 years old at the time of these events), had to be hospitalized; defendant was able to find work for only one or two days a week; the family was evicted for nonpayment of rent; and defendant was arrested for bad checks that his wife had written, then released upon his promise to make restitution. About April 10 most of their furniture was repossessed and they had to move again. They went to live at the house of one Charles Spores (or Porter). While there Mrs. Ford was hospitalized for an operation, and when defendant returned to the house his two young daughters (respectively about 10 and 8 years old at the time) told him that Spores had tried to molest them. Spores denied it and ordered the family out at the point of a rifle. They went to a nearby National Forest, and some slept in the car while others slept on the ground. It was then agreed that defendant and Billy would look for work while Mrs. Ford and the other children would live with a Mrs. Owens. Mrs. Ford returned to the forest that evening and told defendant that Spores had signed a warrant against him for assault with a deadly weapon, and that there were also warrants out against him on bad check charges.

Defendant and Billy travelled around for some days in a fruitless search for work, then returned to the forest outside Atascadero on May 20 and telephoned Mrs. Ford. She met them and refused to take Billy back into town because she had told the school nurse he had gone east with defendant. She agreed to bring them food and money, however, and took the car into town, For two days she brought them small amounts of food, then she did not return. While they were living in the forest Billy told defendant that he thought Nado or Atkins was the father of the baby because 'he had seen them making love with his own eyes.'

Defendant's story continues: Four or five days after Mrs. Ford stopped bringing them food Billy walked into town to see what was wrong. He never returned. The next day defendant, weak and hungry, also walked into town, stopping on the way to eat some deer entrails. He telephoned his wife from the train depot and she said she would come and pick him up. He waited all night, but she never came. The next day he telephoned again, and Mrs. Owens told him that his wife was gone and didn't want to see him.

Defendant returned to the forest and spent his nights either sleeping in the river bed or walking around Atascadero trying to find his wife and children. On the morning of May 31 he stopped at the house of John Roope and asked to use the telephone to call his children at their school. He talked to his daughter Beverly, who told him that they had moved back in with Spores. Thereafter, according to defendant's testimony, in the course of a conversation with Roope he asked Roope why the latter was not married;...