People v. Ford
| Decision Date | 28 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. S212940.,S212940. |
| Citation | 61 Cal.4th 282,187 Cal.Rptr.3d 919,349 P.3d 98 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William J. FORD, Defendant and Appellant. |
61 Cal.4th 282
349 P.3d 98
187 Cal.Rptr.3d 919
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent
v.
William J. FORD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S212940.
Supreme Court of California
May 28, 2015.
Law Offices of Andrian & Gallenson and Jane Gaskell, Santa Rosa, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Catherine McBrien, Eric D. Share and Huy T. Luong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Opinion
CUÉLLAR, J.
Defendant William J. Ford appeals from an order awarding victim restitution. He contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the April 6, 2012, hearing prescribing the amount of restitution he owed because his term of probation—including the condition of restitution—had expired one week earlier. For support, defendant relies on Penal Code section 1203.3, subdivision (b)(5), which provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the court from modifying the dollar amount of a restitution order pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4 at any time during the term of the probation. ” (Italics added.) The People maintain that the trial court retained jurisdiction to award full restitution in the amount of the victim's loss, even after the term of probation expired. They rely on Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), which requires the court to “order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states them on the record,” and on Penal Code section 1202.46, which provides that “when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined.”
We need not decide whether a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify the amount of restitution once a defendant's term of probation has expired. So long as a court has subject matter jurisdiction—and both parties agree the trial court had it here—then a party seeking or consenting to action beyond
the court's power may be estopped from complaining that the resulting action exceeds a court's jurisdiction. (Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 584, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 83, 187 P.3d 934.) By agreeing to a continuance of the restitution hearing
to a date after his probationary term expired, defendant implied his consent to the court's continued exercise of jurisdiction. He is therefore estopped from challenging it. For this reason, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. Background
In February 2008, defendant severely injured Elaine Jennings in a hit-and-run accident. He was charged with felony hit and run, enhanced for personal infliction of great bodily injury (Veh.Code, § 20001, subd. (a) ; Pen.Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a) ), and driving while his license was suspended or revoked (Veh.Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a) ). On August 21, 2008, defendant pleaded no contest in a negotiated disposition to felony hit and run in exchange for dismissal of the other charges, a grant of probation, and the option to have his conviction reduced to a misdemeanor if he successfully completed probation. The plea agreement provided that he would pay “restitution directly to any victim(s).”
At sentencing on October 9, 2008, defendant was placed on probation for three years, ordered to serve six months in jail, and directed to pay various fines and restitution amounting to $12,465.88 for the victim's medical expenses. At defendant's
request, the court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of additional restitution, including lost wages.1
On May 7, 2010, the probation office determined the appropriate amount of victim restitution to be $211,000. Defendant requested a hearing. The hearing was originally scheduled for September 24, 2010, but was continued many times, sometimes at defendant's explicit request, and always with defendant's consent. Probation was extended three times, also with defendant's consent. The final extension was to March 30, 2012.
At the restitution hearing on January 27, 2012, Jennings testified that she had needed considerable time to gather information supporting her claim of lost income, given that she could not have known that such documentation would be required at the time the business was operating. Based on a full review of her records, she estimated that she had suffered losses of $275,017. The trial court found that Jennings had made a prima facie case for restitution
in the amount of $275,017, and granted the defense request for more time to rebut the justification for that amount.
The restitution hearing was scheduled to resume on March 1, 2012. Because a defense witness failed to comply with a subpoena, the restitution hearing was continued to March 8 and then to March 27, 2012. On March 27, the deputy district attorney assigned to the case advised that she was unavailable to proceed that afternoon because she was conducting a preliminary hearing in another courtroom. Defendant agreed to continue the matter to April 6, 2012. But on April 6, defense counsel made a special appearance contesting the court's jurisdiction to order additional restitution on the ground that defendant's term of probation had expired one week earlier. After setting a briefing schedule on the jurisdictional issue, the court conducted a hearing on May 17, 2012, at which it determined that jurisdiction existed to order the full amount of restitution. The court then confirmed the restitution amount was $275,017. The court's order of restitution was appealable, as it was made after judgment and affected defendant's substantial rights. (Pen.Code, §§ 1202.4, subd. (f), 1237, subd. (b).)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that its earlier decision in People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 had held that Penal Code sections 1202.4, subdivision (f) and 1202.46 “mean exactly what they say and that the completion of a prison term was irrelevant to the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction.... The same reasoning applies here, and the court retained jurisdiction to award additional restitution without regard to the expiration of Ford's probation.”
We granted review.
II. Discussion
Although the term “jurisdiction” is sometimes used as if it had a single meaning, we have long recognized two different ways in which a court may lack jurisdiction. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (American Contractors ).) A court lacks jurisdiction
in a fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 109 P.2d 942.) If a court lacks such “ ‘fundamental’ ” jurisdiction, its ruling is void. (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 226 P.3d 322.) A claim based on a lack of fundamental jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Ibid. )
Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction, however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act only in a
particular manner, or subject to certain limitations. (Burtnett v. King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805, 807, 205 P.2d 657 ; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 291, 109 P.2d 942.) In American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th 653, 660–662, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020, for example, we explained that a court with fundamental jurisdiction over the parties nonetheless lacked the power to enter a judgment forfeiting a bail bond prior to the end of the period allowed for the surety to make an appearance. When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted “in excess of its jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 661, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020.) Because an ordinary act in...
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People v. Ford
...61 Cal.4th 282349 P.3d 98187 Cal.Rptr.3d 919The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondentv.William J. FORD, Defendant and Appellant.No. S212940.Supreme Court of CaliforniaMay 28, 2015.187 Cal.Rptr.3d 920Law Offices of Andrian & Gallenson and Jane Gaskell, Santa Rosa, for Plaintiff and Appellant.187 ......