People v. American Contractors Indem. Co.

• Citation: 33 Cal.4th 653,93 P.3d 1020,16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76
• Decision Date: 22 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. S120474.,S120474.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY CO., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76

93 P.3d 1020

33 Cal.4th 653

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY CO., Defendant and Appellant.

No. S120474.

Supreme Court of California.

July 22, 2004.

Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez, Fresno, for Defendant and Appellant.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, and Wendy J. Phillips, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning, Sacramento, and Doraine F. Meyer, Los Angeles, for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (Pen. Code, § 1305, subd. (a).)¹ The surety that posted the bond then has a statutory "appearance" period in which either to produce the accused in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or to demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. If the forfeiture is not set aside by the end of the appearance period, the court is required to enter summary judgment against the surety. (§ 1306, subd. (a).) The issue in this case is whether a summary judgment entered on the last day of the appearance period, or one day prematurely, is void or merely voidable. We also consider whether the surety may collaterally attack the premature judgment 11 months after its entry.

We conclude the premature summary judgment entered here was voidable, and not void. Thus, while it was subject to correction by appeal or a timely motion to vacate the judgment, there is no basis under the circumstances of this case to set it aside by collateral attack once it was final. In particular, here we need not rely on estoppel principles, but simply on the rule that collateral attack on a voidable but final judgment is not available absent unusual circumstances, not present here, that precluded earlier challenge of the judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. BACKGROUND REGARDING BAIL BOND STATUTES

While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. (People v. Wilcox (1960) 53 Cal.2d 651, 654, 2 Cal.Rptr. 754, 349 P.2d 522.) "The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court." (Id. at pp. 656-657, 2 Cal. Rptr. 754,349 P.2d 522; see Stack v. Boyle (1951) 342 U.S. 1, 5, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 ["Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused"].) "In matters of this kind there should be no element of revenue to the state nor punishment of the surety." (Wilcox, at p. 657, 2 Cal.Rptr. 754,349 P.2d 522.) Nevertheless, the "bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond." (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13, 22, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 807.) Thus, when there is a breach of this contract, the bond should be enforced. (See People v. North Beach Bonding Co. (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 663, 675, 111 Cal.Rptr. 757.)

When a person for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a).)² The 185 days after the date the clerk of the court mails a notice of forfeiture (180 days plus five days for mailing) to the appropriate parties is known as the appearance period. (§ 1305, subd. (b).) During this time, the surety on the bond is entitled to move to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on certain grounds, such as an appearance in court by the accused. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court may also toll the appearance period under certain circumstances, or extend the period by no more than 180 days from the date the trial court orders the extension, provided that the surety files its motion before the original 185-day appearance period expires and demonstrates good cause for the extension. (§§ 1305, subds.(e), (i), 1305.4.)

After the appearance period expires, the trial court has 90 days to enter summary judgment on the bond.³ (§ 1306, subds.(a), (c).)⁴ If summary judgment is not entered within the statutory 90-day period, the bond is exonerated. (§ 1306, subd. (c).)

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are undisputed and taken largely from the Court of Appeal opinion. On September 19, 1999, defendant American Contractors Indemnity Company (ACIC) issued a $50,000 bail bond to secure the release of Juan P. Garcia (Garcia or accused), a criminal defendant. On August 7, 2000, Garcia failed to appear for trial, and the bail bond was ordered forfeited. On August 14, 2000, the clerk of the court mailed notice of forfeiture to ACIC and its bail agent. February 15, 2001, was the 185th day after the notice of forfeiture was mailed. On the same date, the trial court entered summary judgment against ACIC on the bail bond. The summary judgment was therefore premature because it was entered on the last day of the appearance period. ACIC did not appeal the judgment, which became final 60 days from the mailing of the notice of entry of judgment in February 2001.⁵ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2(a)(1).)

On February 14, 2001, the day before summary judgment was entered, ACIC filed a motion to extend the appearance period. On March 5, 2001, the trial court ordered the appearance period extended to October 5, 2001.⁶ On March 6, 2001, the People filed a demand for payment of the summary judgment, and on December 13 and 18, 2001, respectively, the People served and filed an amended demand for payment.

On January 7, 2002, 94 days after October 5, 2001, ACIC filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment, discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate the bail. It argued that the summary judgment was void because it was entered prematurely.

Assuming that the summary judgment had never been entered, the last day the trial court could have entered summary judgment was January 3, 2002, 90 days after the expiration of the appearance period, and 4 days before ACIC filed its motion. Garcia was not produced in court at any time relevant to these proceedings.

The trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment, discharge the forfeiture, and exonerate the bail. It stated that the extension of the appearance time granted in March 2001 "was in essence without basis and void" because the time to request such an extension had already expired. The court further stated the summary judgment was not premature. Even if it was premature, the court found the surety had failed to timely raise the issue, and hence it lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion. Finally, even if there was jurisdiction, the court concluded the motion should be denied on the grounds of unclean hands and waiver.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Expressly disagreeing with People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1229, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 371 (Ranger) and People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 470, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (International Fidelity), it concluded the prematurely entered summary judgment was merely voidable, not void, and that ACIC's challenge to the judgment was barred by the doctrines of estoppel and disfavor of collateral attack.

We granted ACIC's petition for review.

III. DISCUSSION

The parties agree that under section 1306, subdivision (c), summary judgment in this case was premature because it was entered on the last day of the appearance period. The issue is whether this error rendered the judgment voidable or void, and whether, if it is merely voidable, it was subject to collateral attack long after the judgment was final.

The term "jurisdiction," "used continuously in a variety of situations, has so many different meanings that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a definition." (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287, 109 P.2d 942 (Abelleira).) Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. "Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties." (Id. at p. 288, 109 P.2d 942.) When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and "thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time." (Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 119, 101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817 (Barquis).)

However, "in its ordinary usage the phrase `lack of jurisdiction' is not limited to these fundamental situations." (Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288, 109 P.2d 942.) It may also "be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no `jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites." (Ibid.) "[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction." (Id. at p. 290, 109 P.2d 942.) When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 55, 14 Cal. Rptr.3d 50, 90 P.3d 1209; Conservatorship of O'Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1088, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 386.) That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by "principles of...