People v. Fordyce, 3

• Decision Date: 24 August 1966
• Docket Number: No. 3,3
• Citation: 378 Mich. 208,144 N.W.2d 340
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Charles J. FORDYCE, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 340

144 N.W.2d 340

378 Mich. 208

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Charles J. FORDYCE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 24, 1966.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Donald L. Reisig, Pros. Atty., Ingham County, James R. Ramsey, Asst. Pros. Atty., Ingham County, Lansing, for plaintiff and appellee.

Willingham, Learned, Cote & Spanos, East Lansing, for defendant and appellant.

Before KAVANAGH, C.J., and KELLY, BLACK, SOURIS, SMITH, O'HARA and ADAMS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Upon this appeal, defendant claims (1) a right to be advised of an absolute constitutional right to remain silent and (2) a right to be advised of the right to counsel at the time when he was being held after arrest and prior to judicial proceedings charging him with breaking and entering in the night time with intent to commit a larceny. C.L.1948, § 750.110 (Stat.Ann.1962 Rev. § 28.305).* The larceny occurred about 3 a.m., September 9, 1963. Defendant was found in the building. Although Fordyce was advised any statement must be voluntary and could be used against him, he was not advised of the two rights here claimed. The police officers who apprehended him obtained oral admissions at the time of his arrest. Fordyce signed a typed confession later the same day. Except as stated above, there is no dispute as to the voluntariness of defendant's confession.

On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, held:

'(W)hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.'

On June 20, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, held that the guidelines set forth in Miranda are available only to persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 1966. Fordyce was tried in circuit court for Ingham county by jury trial beginning April 20, 1964. On April 23, 1964, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Johnson, supra:

'(R)etroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws. It would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy...