People v. Maxson

• Decision Date: 22 December 2008
• Docket Number: Docket No. 129693.
• Citation: 482 Mich. 385,759 N.W.2d 817
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Allen MAXSON, Defendant-Appellant.

759 N.W.2d 817

482 Mich. 385

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Allen MAXSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 129693.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

December 22, 2008.

Mark Allen Maxson, in propria persona.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

At issue here is whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), should be applied retroactively to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant's motion for relief from judgment, and we conclude under federal and state law that Halbert should not be applied retroactively to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2001, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and subsequently failed to request appointed counsel or to file a direct appeal. On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued Halbert, which held that indigent defendants who plead guilty to criminal offenses are entitled to appointed appellate counsel on direct appeal. Id. at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. After Halbert was decided, defendant requested appointed counsel in the instant motion for relief from judgment. However, because defendant's conviction was final before Halbert was decided, defendant is only entitled to counsel if the rule announced in Halbert is applied retroactively.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The retroactivity of a court's ruling presents an issue of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v. Sexton, 458 Mich. 43, 52, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS

A. RETROACTIVITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW

"New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed." Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995). This is because "at some point `the rights of the parties should be considered frozen' and a `conviction ... final.'" Id., quoting United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). There are, however, "certain special concerns — related to collateral review of state criminal convictions — that affect which cases are closed, for which retroactivity-related purposes, and under what circumstances." Id.

In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the United States Supreme Court set forth the federal standard for determining whether a rule regarding criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final. Teague established the "general rule" that "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. However, Teague laid down two exceptions to this general rule: first, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places "`certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" id. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (citation omitted); and second, a new rule should be applied retroactively "if it requires the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, the first question under Teague is whether the rule in Halbert constitutes a new rule. "`[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.'" Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (citation omitted). Deciding whether a rule is "new" requires a court to determine "whether `a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.'" O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). If a reasonable jurist would not have felt compelled by existing precedent, then the rule is new. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). In other words, the relevant question is not simply whether existing precedent might have supported the rule, but whether the rule "was dictated by then-existing precedent." Id. at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis in original).

We conclude that the rule in Halbert constitutes a new rule. Although Halbert found support in the earlier United States Supreme Court decision of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), that case did not clearly require the outcome in Halbert. Douglas held that when a state grants a first appeal as of right, the state is required to appoint appellate counsel for indigent defendants. Id. at 357, 83 S.Ct. 814. Because Michigan does not grant an appeal as of right to a defendant who pleads guilty,¹ and because the United States Supreme Court had previously decided that appointment of appellate counsel is unnecessary when an appellate court, such as a state's highest court, has the discretion to choose whether to reach the merits of a defendant's appeal, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), a reasonable jurist could well conclude that Douglas did not compel the result in Halbert.

Because "it is more difficult ... to determine whether [the Supreme Court] announce[d] a new rule when a decision extends the reasoning of [its] prior cases," Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the "new rule" principle is designed to "validate[] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990). In Halbert, the dissenting Supreme Court justices argued against extending Douglas, further supporting the conclusion that Douglas did not compel the result in Halbert and that this Court's previous interpretation was reasonable.

Because the rule in Halbert was new, the remaining question under Teague is whether either of the two Teague exceptions applies. The first exception is clearly inapplicable, as the rule in Halbert does not concern a rule that "`forbid[s] criminal punishment of certain primary conduct ... [or] prohibit[s] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.'" O'Dell, supra at 157, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (citation omitted). Thus, the only issue is whether Halbert constituted a "watershed" decision that involved "procedures ... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the second Teague exception. The Court has observed that because any such rule "would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt [that it is] unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge, it should come as no surprise that we have yet to find a new rule that falls under the second Teague exception." Beard, supra at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has referred to the right to counsel set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), as an example of a rule that would fall into the second Teague exception. It is significant that in referring to this example, the Supreme Court observed, "In providing guidance as to what might fall within this exception, we have repeatedly referred to the rule of Gideon (right to counsel), and only to this rule." Beard, supra at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).

Notably, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel articulated in Gideon and its progeny has a constitutional basis distinct from that underlying the Douglas line of cases addressing the right to counsel on appeal that are rooted in the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, considering that Halbert is unlikely to apply to any situation other than Michigan's unique legislative system of appeals from plea-based convictions, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that "[i]t does not represent a shift in `bedrock procedural elements' and it cannot be said to be `on par' with Gideon." Simmons v. Kapture, 474 F.3d 869, 887 (C.A.6, 2007) (Reeves, J., dissenting), adopted by Simmons v. Kapture, 516 F.3d 450, 451 (C.A.6, 2008) (holding that Halbert is not retroactive under Teague).

Additionally, a state is not required to provide any appellate proceedings at all for defendants who plead guilty. Halbert, supra at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. In Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995), the Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause due process does not require a State to provide appellate process at all, a former fugitive's right to appeal cannot be said to be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt as to fall within this exception...." Id. at 120, 115 S.Ct. 1275 (citations and internal quotations omitted).² Considering these holdings, the provision of appointed counsel for such a proceeding can hardly be said to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Accordingly, in our judgment, Halbert cannot be construed as a "watershed" decision, neither of the Teague exceptions applies, and Halbert thus is not retroactive under federal retroactivity jurisprudence.

B. RETROACTIVITY UNDER STATE LAW

The conclusion that Halbert is not retroactive under federal law does not end our analysis, however. A state may accord broader effect to a new rule of criminal procedure...