People v. Foy

• Decision Date: 17 October 1996
• Citation: 650 N.Y.S.2d 79,88 N.Y.2d 742,673 N.E.2d 589
• Parties: , 673 N.E.2d 589 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward FOY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 79

650 N.Y.S.2d 79

88 N.Y.2d 742, 673 N.E.2d 589

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward FOY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 17, 1996.

Natalie Rea, New York City, for appellant.

Lisa Ellen Mudd, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

Defendant-appellant was charged with multiple petty offenses. None carries a maximum term of incarceration greater than six months upon conviction when prosecuted individually. The issue framed for our consideration is whether defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial because the maximum aggregate sentences for the charged offenses, as consolidated, may exceed six months (U.S. Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 2). The Appellate Term affirmed a judgment of New York City Criminal Court convicting defendant of harassment, after a bench trial, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge. A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal and we now affirm.

Defendant was originally charged, under two separate informations, with multiple misdemeanors and lesser offenses relating to two altercations with his wife. By the time of the trial, the charges remaining on the first information were attempted criminal mischief in the fourth degree and menacing. These are classified as class B misdemeanors carrying maximum authorized jail sentences of three months. The charges in the second information were reduced to three class B misdemeanors, attempted third degree assault, attempted fourth degree criminal mischief, and attempted second degree criminal contempt, in addition to a single count of harassment. The latter is a violation punishable by a maximum sentence of 15 days and the others, as class B misdemeanors, are punishable by a maximum sentence of up to three months. Upon motion by the People, the informations were consolidated for trial.

Criminal Court rejected defendant's demand for a jury trial. Relying on Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, it concluded that a jury trial is not constitutionally mandated when the maximum statutory sentence for a petty charge does not exceed six months. Furthermore, the court noted that CPL 340.40(2) requires a trial before a Judge where no one charge carries an authorized sentence of more than six months. The court reasoned that because the two informations here involved entirely separate incidents which occurred on different dates, there was no constitutional authority or precedent requiring a jury trial.

The Appellate Term held that each count was a "petty" offense within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and, thus, not triable by jury if prosecuted individually (166 Misc.2d 358, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559). The court found unavailing defendant's argument that a jury trial was required because he could have been sentenced to an aggregate jail term in excess of six months had he been convicted of more than one of the petty offenses joined under the consolidation. The court reasoned that "[t]he central point of inquiry in determining whether a jury trial is required is the seriousness of the offense with which the defendant is charged [citation omitted], and not the sheer number of accumulated offenses tried on a given day or on a given accusatory instrument" (id., at 360, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559). Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he administrative convenience of litigating these multiple charges in one trial did not serve to enhance the ultimate risk faced by the defendant or to somehow transform the 'petty' offenses alleged to the level of a 'serious' crime" (id., at 360, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559). Finally, the court stated that "the widespread application of [an aggregate sentence] rule in our already overburdened criminal justice system would only serve to 'overwhelm the courts and prosecutors by consuming large amounts of time for selecting juries and would cause unmanageable delays' " (id., at 361, 636 N.Y.S.2d 559, quoting Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150).

Defendant argues that, when a defendant is charged with multiple petty offenses in a joined prosecution, carrying a potential aggregate sentence greater than six months' imprisonment, both the New York and United States Constitutions mandate that the defendant be afforded a jury trial. Defendant urges this Court to adopt the "aggregate-sentence approach" for determining the constitutional right to a jury trial. We reject defendant's arguments and agree with the Appellate Term that the determination as to whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial hinges on the seriousness of the offense, not the potential aggregate sentence for a series of petty offenses that may be consolidated for trial.

It is well settled that offenses carrying a maximum statutory term of imprisonment of greater than six months are "serious" offenses for which the New York and United States Constitutions unquestionably afford defendants the right to a jury trial (see, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, supra; Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150, supra ). Equally settled is the proposition that offenses carrying sentences of less than six months are "petty" offenses, to which no right to a jury trial attaches (see, Baldwin v. New York, supra; Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, supra ). Courts are required to examine each offense in a prosecution individually and separately, to determine whether the Legislature has ascribed a serious level classification fixed by the measurement of whether any of the individual offenses carry a potential maximum sentence of greater than six months. When a court determines that none does, the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.

In Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum (59 N.Y.2d 143, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150, supra ), defendants were charged with multiple counts of prostitution. They challenged the constitutionality of CPL 340.40(2), which mandates that crimes punishable by imprisonment of six months or less be heard before a Judge. We concluded that the statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the misdemeanors, each punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of three months, were "petty" offenses within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to which there is no right to a jury trial (id., at 154, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150). The Court stated that "[a]lthough earlier cases may have considered various factors of a crime [citations omitted], recent Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the length of sentence to the exclusion of virtually everything else" (id., at 153, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150). Our Court further stressed that "[t]he penalty is deemed of major relevance, a gauge of the locality's social and ethical judgments on the heinousness of the offense" (id., at 153-154, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150, citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-160, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452-53, 20 L.Ed.2d 491).

At one point in time, this Court had even held the view that crimes for which the maximum punishment was...