People v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 03 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. S068112,S068112
• Citation: 975 P.2d 30,20 Cal.4th 249,84 Cal.Rptr.2d 241
• Parties: , 975 P.2d 30, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3174, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4153 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald Dwayne FRANKLIN, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 241

84 Cal.Rptr.2d 241

20 Cal.4th 249, 975 P.2d 30, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3174,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4153

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Donald Dwayne FRANKLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S068112.

Supreme Court of California

May 3, 1999.

[975 P.2d 31] William D. Farber, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Rafael, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, Kyle S. Brodie and Christina Russotto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

State law imposes an annual registration requirement on certain sex offenders while they reside or are located in California. (Pen.Code, § 290, subd. (a)(1)(A),(C).) ¹ Offenders subject to registration must also notify authorities of any change of their address. (§ 290, subd. (f)(1).) A 1998 amendment to section 290, adding subdivision (f)(1), specifically requires offenders to give change-of-address notification on leaving California. (Stats.1998, ch. 930, § 1.1.)

Defendant in the present case failed to notify the California authorities with whom he had initially registered under section 290 that he and his wife had moved from California to Texas on May 1, 1995. The trial court found him guilty of violating the notification provisions of the state registration law then in effect (§ 290, former subd. (f)), and also found true two prior "strike" allegations (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), arising out of two sex offenses he committed in 1985. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for 25 years to life for failing to comply with the registration statute. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. We granted review.

We consider whether the notification requirement in effect when defendant moved to Texas applied to persons who left the state to live elsewhere. As will appear, we conclude that, before the amendment of the registration statute in 1998, it was ambiguous as to its application to departing residents such as defendant. Accordingly, we must construe the ambiguous statute in defendant's favor and will reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming his conviction.

SECTION 290

Under the registration provision applicable to defendant, a sex offender was required "for the rest of his ... life while residing in California, ... to register ... within 14 days of coming into any county [or] city ... in which he ... temporarily resides or is domiciled for that length of time." (§ 290, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7; see § 290, present subd. (a)(1)(A) [registration within five working days].) Language limiting section 290 to California residents was added in 1994. (§ 290, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7.) At the same time, violation of the statute became a felony for registrants previously convicted of felony sex crimes. (§ 290, former subd. (g)(2), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7.) Persons subject to section 290 were required to inform the appropriate law enforcement agency of any change of "residence address" within 10 days. (§ 290, former subd. (f), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7; see § 290, present subd. (f)(1) [notice within five working days].) Under both versions of the registration statute, the agency is required to forward changed address information to the Department of Justice, which in turn must forward it to the appropriate agencies in the new place of residence. (§ 290, former subd. (f), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7; see present § 290, subd. (f)(1).) Likewise, under both versions, willful violation of the registration or notification provisions by a person initially required to register because he committed a prior felony is itself a felony offense. (§ 290, former subd. (g)(2), as amended by Stats.1994, ch. 867, § 2.7; see present § 290, subd. (g)(2).)

A 1998 amendment to section 290, subdivision (f)(1), adopted after we granted review in this case, and effective January 1, 1999, specifically requires change of address notification when a registrant "changes his ... residence address or location, whether within the jurisdiction in which he ... is currently registered or to a new jurisdiction inside or outside the state . ..." (Stats.1998, ch. 930, § 1.1, italics added.) Although the amendment makes it clear that in the future registrants must give change-of-address notification when leaving California, courts confronted with violations of earlier versions of section 290 may benefit from our clarification of the issue.

FACTS

The following uncontradicted facts are largely taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in this case. Defendant was subject to the sex offender registration law as a result of his 1985 convictions of child molestation and child sodomy. He first registered in 1989, but evidently failed to register annually after that time. (Defendant's conviction was not based, however, on his failure to register, an offense of which he was acquitted.) In late 1994 and early 1995, defendant lived in North Hollywood and Wilmington, California. On May 1, 1995, defendant and his wife moved to Texas. Defendant failed to notify any California law enforcement agency of any of his various address changes. In December 1995, defendant was arrested in Texas and then returned to California.

Defendant was charged with two counts of child molestation (§ 288, subd. (a)), two violations of the sex offender registration law (§ 290, former subds. (a)(1) [failure to re-register in June 1995], (f) [failure to notify of changed address from January 1995 through December 1996], (g)(2) [making these violations felony offenses] ), and various felony conviction enhancements and "strikes." Defendant waived jury trial, in return for which the prosecution agreed to dismiss both molestation charges. Defendant did not testify or present any evidence at trial.

The trial court acquitted defendant of the failure to re-register count but convicted him of the other registration act count, based solely on his failure to notify state authorities of his move to Texas. The court also found true both "strikes." Defendant was subject to the sex offender registration law as a result of his 1985 felony convictions of child molestation and child sodomy. Accordingly, his present offense was likewise a felony. (§ 290, subd. (g)(2).) As previously noted, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for 25 years to life.

THE COURT OF APPEAL DECISION

The Court of Appeal would have affirmed the judgment, reasoning as follows: "The duty to register and give notice of address changes is a continuing one. (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, 936 P.2d 101.) As our Supreme Court has observed: 'Plainly, the Legislature perceives that sex offenders pose a "continuing threat to society" [citation] and require constant vigilance.' (Id. at p. 527 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, 936 P.2d 101].)[p] We hold that 'while residing in California' (Pen.Code, § 290, [former] subd. (a)(1)) applies to a person who changes his residence from California to a residence outside California. When [defendant] departed his California residence he did not yet reside in Texas. The departure, however, created a notification of address change duty. Had [defendant] fulfilled this duty, established residency in Texas, and then moved again (but not back to California) he could properly make the argument he now asserts: He was not 'residing in California.' "

DISCUSSION

We disagree with the Court of Appeal's overly technical analysis. Initially, we note that failure to comply with California's sex offender registration law constitutes a penal offense. (§ 290, subd. (g).) In the present case, defendant was convicted of a felony for failing to comply with the statute and was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. ² That being so, the statute must be construed as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application reasonably may permit. (People v. McCleod (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 545; see People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 312, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042; In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 780, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574; Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617; cf. Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 229, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228["[A]ctual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are necessary before a conviction under the [sex offender registration] ordinance can stand."].)

This principle of favorable construction is especially apposite to registration statutes, which, to assure effective compliance, must give clear notice to all registrants of their responsibilities so that laypersons such as defendant can readily understand and properly discharge them. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 7 [due process clause]; Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 143, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 [" 'A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions....' "]; Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 [Laws must "give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning."].)

Defendant argues that, under one reasonable interpretation of the version of section 290 applicable to him, his duty to register annually with California law enforcement agencies continued only while he resided in this state. Assuming his registration duty terminated when he left the state, his related obligation...