People v. Galak

• Decision Date: 16 February 1993
• Citation: 594 N.Y.S.2d 689,610 N.E.2d 362,80 N.Y.2d 715
• Parties: , 610 N.E.2d 362 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Martin GALAK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 689

594 N.Y.S.2d 689

80 N.Y.2d 715, 610 N.E.2d 362

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Martin GALAK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 16, 1993.

[80 N.Y.2d 716] [610 N.E.2d 363] Mahler & Harris, P.C., Kew Gardens (Stephen R. Mahler, of counsel), for appellant.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty. of Nassau County, Mineola (Lawrence J. Schwarz and Peter A. Weinstein, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Acting Chief Judge.

Defendant has been convicted of several criminal possession charges based upon incriminating evidence found during an inventory search of a car in which he was a passenger. He contends that the search was unlawful under both the Federal and State Constitutions (U.S. Const. 4th Amend.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12). Defendant recognizes that law enforcement officers may conduct an inventory search of an impounded automobile without a warrant, provided the search is conducted according to a " 'single familiar standard' " or procedure established by the police agency (Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, 93 L.Ed.2d 739; see also, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2d 65; People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386, 390, 477 N.Y.S.2d 103, 465 N.E.2d 823), and that the courts below found the police department had an established procedure here. He contends, however, that the department's policy is so unrelated to the governmental interests it is intended to promote and so lacking in appropriate safeguards against police abuse that it does not survive constitutional scrutiny. We agree. The police department policy governing the search failed to generate a meaningful inventory of the vehicle's contents and allowed the officer conducting the search undue discretion. It, therefore, violated both the State and Federal Constitutions (see, People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386, 389-390, 477 N.Y.S.2d 103, 465 N.E.2d 823, supra [stating the general rule of consistency in applying the two constitutional clauses].

I

On the night of August 5, 1990, Officer William Straub of the Lynbrook Police Department noticed a car with two occupants parked near a closed automobile dealership. A check of the license plate number indicated that the plates were from another vehicle and that the registration had expired more than a year earlier. Additional officers were called, and both the driver and her passenger, defendant Galak, were questioned by Officer Straub. Discovering that neither had a valid driver's license, the officer placed the driver under arrest and impounded the vehicle.

Officer Straub then searched the car and found a dagger, a blackjack and an ignition device in the passenger compartment. Defendant admitted owning them and was subsequently charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, one count of the sale or possession of master or manipulative keys for motor vehicles and one count of possession of burglar tools. The car was driven back to police headquarters by one of the other officers and some five hours later, at the station, Officer Straub filled out the inventory report.

Following a suppression hearing, County Court ruled that the search was reasonable and the items found in the car admissible evidence. ^* Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty and appealed to the Appellate Division, and it affirmed the judgment of conviction. 182 A.D.2d 702, 582 N.Y.S.2d 469.

Both courts below determined that the inventory search by Officer Straub was conducted pursuant to a standard departmental procedure and, inasmuch as there is support in the record for that factual finding, this Court is bound by it (see, N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 3[a]; see, e.g., People v. Brooks, 65 N.Y.2d 1021, 494 N.Y.S.2d 103, 484 N.E.2d 132; People v. Calhoun, 49 N.Y.2d 398, 405, 426 N.Y.S.2d 243, 402 N.E.2d 1145). But a determination that a standard procedure existed and that Officer Straub followed it does not end our inquiry, for the standard procedure itself must conform to constitutional dictates ( Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1). A departmental procedure, like the conduct of the searching officer, is judged by a standard of reasonableness, and it is self-evident that an unreasonable search is not somehow rendered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, by the mere fact that a departmental procedure was followed.

II

The analysis of what constitutes a reasonable inventory search begins with the language of the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens not from all searches by governmental actors but only from those that are "unreasonable". In its modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness of a search is calculated by weighing the governmental and societal interests advanced by the search against the individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607; see also, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3101, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 [Powell, J., concurring]; Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, supra ).

Three specific objectives are advanced by inventory searches: protecting an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police; insuring police against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property; and guarding police and others from dangerous instrumentalities that would otherwise go undetected (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, at 372, 107 S.Ct. at 741; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2609, supra ). Against these governmental interests is weighed the individual's expectation of privacy and, more particularly, the risk that the search will exceed the scope of its purposes and intrude without justification on the privacy interests of citizens (Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, supra; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379-380, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3102, supra [Powell, J., concurring].

Although a warrant based on probable cause is not required (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at 371, 107 S.Ct. at 741), courts have insisted that an inventory search be conducted according to a familiar routine procedure (id., at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743) and that the procedure meet two standards of reasonableness. First, the procedure must be rationally designed to meet the objectives that justify the search in the first place (Florida v. Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. at 1635). Second, the procedure must limit the discretion of the officer in the field (id.). In the absence of a warrant from a neutral and detached Magistrate, it is an established procedure clearly limiting the conduct of individual officers that assures that the searches are carried out consistently and reasonably and do not become little more than an excuse for general rummaging to discover incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court has underscored both the risk posed and the safeguard required: "We reaffirm these principles here: ' "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront" ' " (Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 743, supra, quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, supra; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2863, 69 L.Ed.2d 768). While a certain latitude may be extended to the officers in the field for the "exercise of judgment based on concerns related to the purpose" of the search, the power to grant and define such latitude remains the province of departmental policy makers ( Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, supra).

Thus, two elements must be examined: first, the relationship between the search procedure adopted and the governmental objectives that justify the intrusion and, second, the adequacy of the controls on the officer's discretion. The procedure followed by the police in this case fails to meet constitutional standards in both respects.

III

Officer Straub testified at the suppression hearing that he did not know of any written regulations for inventory searches by the Lynbrook police. Asked how he was instructed on conducting an inventory search, he responded, "Training officers, on-the-job training, supervisor." Later the following exchange occurred between him and defense counsel:

"Q. What is your--do you have particular standard instructions?

"A. Instructions? No, we don't have instructions.

"Q. Nothing written anywhere?

"A. Not that I recall.

"Q. They leave it to your judgment on the scene?

"A. That's correct."

The officer's testimony further established the departmental procedure he followed when searching the car the night defendant was arrested. No inventory report of any sort was made at the time of...