People v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 17 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cesar GARCIA, Appellant |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Mark W. Zeno of counsel), for appellant.
Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (David M. Cohn and Robert Brent Ferguson of counsel), for respondent.
The order of the Appellate Term should be affirmed.
Defendant was originally charged with public lewdness, two counts of forcible touching, and two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree after police officers observed him masturbating on a subway platform and pressing himself against two women on a subway car. The People thereafter filed a prosecutor's information reducing the two class A misdemeanor charges of forcible touching to attempted forcible touching, so that the top charges against defendant were Class B misdemeanors obviating his right to a jury trial under state statute (see CPL 340.40 ).* After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of public lewdness and acquitted of all other charges. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Applying our holding in ( People v. Suazo 32 N.Y.3d 491, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 [2018] )—decided after defendant's conviction—the court held that defendant had not met his burden of establishing deportability based on the crimes for which he was tried ( 63 Misc.3d 158[A], 2019 WL 2347176 ).
While the Appellate Term first improperly conducted the deportability analysis based only on the crime of conviction, that court went on to correctly analyze defendant's deportability based on all the charges he faced (see Suazo, 32 N.Y.3d at 508, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 ). It remained, however, "the defendant's burden to overcome the presumption that the crime charged is petty and establish a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial" ( id. at 507, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 ). We agree with the Appellate Term that here, defendant's conclusory allegation that he was deportable if convicted "on any of the charged B misdemeanors," supported by a bare citation to 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), under which an alien is deportable if "convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct," was insufficient to establish his right to a jury trial.
In Suazo by contrast, defendant's assertion that "the possibility of deportation upon conviction rendered the class B misdemeanors sufficiently serious to mandate a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment" met his burden to show deportability because it was clear from the face of the accusatory instrument "that at least one of the charges lodged against him ... qualified as a deportable offense" ( 32 N.Y.3d at 494, 508, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 ). Our dissenting colleague asserts that defendant's charges "required no greater analysis or piecing together of federal law than that in Suazo " (dissenting op. at 1144, 173 N.Y.S.3d at 197, 193 N.E.3d at 1110). But the insufficiency of defendant's assertion is quite ably demonstrated by the dissent's "cursory review" of this issue, which spans pages of text and includes a 34–line footnote analyzing federal immigration law (dissenting op. at 1142–1146, 1145–1146 n. 1, 173 N.Y.S.3d at 195–99, 197–99 n. 1, 193 N.E.3d at 1108–12, 1110–12 n.1). Holding this defendant to the standard we articulated in Suazo as we do and the Appellate Term did below, does not create an "ambiguous and heightened burden," nor does it violate "the principle of stare decisis " (dissenting op. at 1139–1140, 173 N.Y.S.3d at 193–94, 193 N.E.3d at 1106–07).
Charged with three B misdemeanor offenses and facing the threat of potential deportation upon conviction, Cesar Garcia demanded a jury trial, informing the court that "any of the charged B misdemeanors would result in deportability under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)." Today, the majority holds his clear statement was insufficient to invoke his constitutional right to a jury trial, as recognized in ( Suazo, 32 N.Y.3d 491, 493, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 [2018] ). Mr. Garcia's request is no less clear and no less accurate that Mr. Suazo's was, yet Mr. Garcia is denied the jury trial Mr. Suazo was granted.
In Suazo we held that deportation constitutes a significant consequence of criminal conviction such that even for an otherwise petty offense, if the charges bear the potential for deportation upon conviction, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment ( id. ). I dissented in Suazo because federal law provides for deportation itself without a jury trial, hence the possibility of deportation cannot, in my view, confer the right to a jury trial where none otherwise exists ( 32 N.Y.3d at 518, 93 N.Y.S.3d 629, 118 N.E.3d 168 ). However, the principle of stare decisis is important; courts that overturn settled precedent simply because a court as currently composed would have decided the initial case differently are functioning as legislative bodies, not courts. "The doctrine of stare decisis provides that once a court has decided a legal issue, subsequent appeals presenting similar facts should be decided in conformity with the earlier decision" ( People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 558 N.E.2d 1011 [1990] ). Indeed, "the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law" ( Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494, 107 S.Ct. 2941, 97 L.Ed.2d 389 [1987] ). "Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority ... For all these reasons, [the United States Supreme Court] will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification" ( Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commn., 502 U.S. 197, 202, 112 S.Ct. 560, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 [1991] ). Our Court has recognized that stare decisis "promotes predictability in the law, engenders reliance on our decisions, encourages judicial restraint and reassures the public that our decisions arise from a continuum of legal principle rather than the personal caprice of the members of this Court" ( People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 194, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280, 3 N.E.3d 617 [2013] ). Wrong though I believe Suazo to be, my duty is to follow it.
The majority follows Suazo but only to a point. I agree with the majority that Suazo requires a court to determine a person's deportability based on the crimes with which the defendant is charged—not those for which the person was ultimately convicted. I also agree with the majority's recognition that Suazo governs this case, inasmuch as Suazo ’s Constitutional rule applies to all pending cases as a substantive requirement of constitutional criminal procedure (see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 [1987] ). However, the majority's creation of an ambiguous and heightened burden to invoke a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury in this context is incompatible with Suazo Because Mr. Garcia supported his motion with the clear and accurate statement that if he were convicted of any of the charged B misdemeanor crimes, he would face the potential of deportation, his conviction after a bench trial violated his constitutional rights.
On June 25, 2015, an undercover police officer standing on the northbound 4 train platform at Union Square observed Mr. Garcia with his hand in his pants pocket. Mr. Garcia appeared to be masturbating. After approximately 10 minutes, the officer followed Mr. Garcia onto an arriving train, where he pushed "his groin up against a woman's buttocks and repeatedly rub[bed] against her." He then departed that train and boarded a different, southbound train. The officer again followed him and observed Mr. Garcia push his groin into a second woman.
Mr. Garcia was subsequently charged with two counts of forcible touching ( Penal Law § 130.52 ), two counts of sexual abuse in the third degree ( Penal Law § 130.55 ), and one count of public lewdness (Penal Law § 245). Prior to trial, the people moved to reduce the charges to B misdemeanors. Mr. Garcia then moved for a jury trial. In the affirmation and memorandum of law supporting the motion, his counsel disclosed that Mr. Garcia was a non-citizen and stated that "any of the charged B misdemeanors would result in deportability under 8 USC § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)." Mr. Garcia cited to ( Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 [1989] ) and ( Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 [2010] ) to argue that deportation constitutes a severe statutory penalty, rendering the charges serious offenses that warranted a jury trial. Mr. Garcia's motion and supporting papers were filed well before we decided Suazo .
In the in-court colloquy, the People relied on ( People v. Urbaez, 10 N.Y.3d 773, 856 N.Y.S.2d 520, 886 N.E.2d 142 [2008] ) to assert their right to reduce the charges to B misdemeanors to avoid giving Mr. Garcia a jury trial. The People did not dispute Mr. Garcia's contention that his conviction of any of the B misdemeanors would render him subject to deportation. Although the Trial Court described Mr. Garcia's argument as "interesting," it denied the application "based upon the fact that I believe that the Court of Appeals, at least at this stage, has said that the People have broad discretion in reducing these cases and moving forward on a bench trial." However, the court noted that the issue "may ultimately resolve in defense favor if the definition of serious is looked at as more than just potential incarceration." After a bench trial, the trial court acquitted Mr. Garcia of the forcible touching and sex abuse charges but convicted him of public lewdness. Mr. Garcia was sentenced to seven days of community service with a $200 mandatory surcharge and a $50 DNA...
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