People v. Garza
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 3-17-0525 |
| Citation | 127 N.E.3d 853,431 Ill.Dec. 320,2018 IL App (3d) 170525 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony GARZA, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 Following the circuit court's grant of defendant Anthony Garza's motion to suppress evidence, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and notice of appeal. The State argues the court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm.
¶ 3 The State charged defendant, by information, with one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled substance ( 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2014) ), unlawful possession of cannabis ( 720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2014) ), and possession of drug paraphernalia ( 720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West 2014) ). Defendant retained private counsel, who filed a motion to suppress defendant's confession. 725 ILCS 5/114-11 (West 2016). The motion alleged that defendant made an incriminating statement during a custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. As a result, defendant sought suppression of the statements that he had made in response to the police questioning.
¶ 4 At the hearing on defendant's motion, Rock Falls police officer Scott Allspaugh testified that on November 20, 2015, at 10:57 a.m., he initiated a traffic stop on a red minivan for driving over the posted speed limit. At the time, the weather was clear. The minivan stopped in the East Coloma school parking lot. Upon approach, Allspaugh observed five individuals seated in the minivan and radioed for a backup officer due to officer's safety concerns. Approximately five minutes after he initiated the stop, Officer Greyson Scott arrived. Before Scott arrived, Allspaugh retrieved the driver's information and began preparing a citation for speeding.
¶ 5 When Scott arrived, Allspaugh transferred the citation preparation duties to Scott and conducted a free-air sniff with his canine unit. Approximately 10 minutes into the stop, the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics at the rear of the minivan. Allspaugh radioed for additional backup officers and directed the occupants to exit the minivan. Allspaugh and Scott searched each of the occupants as they exited the vehicle. The officers did not ask for consent to search. Allspaugh said the scope of the search was more than a pat-down and included searching inside the occupants' pockets, waistbands, hats, socks, and shoes. Allspaugh also asked each occupant for identification and radioed dispatch to conduct a warrant check. None of the occupants possessed contraband on their person or were the subject of an arrest warrant. After this search, Allspaugh directed the five occupants to move to an area near his patrol vehicle. Two uniformed police officers watched the occupants while Allspaugh and Scott conducted a search of the interior of the minivan. None of the occupants were under arrest at this time, the officers did not tell the occupants that they could not leave, none of the occupants were in handcuffs, the officers did not separate the occupants, and the officers did not display their weapons.
¶ 6 During the vehicle search, Allspaugh found a backpack in the trunk area. Inside of the backpack, Allspaugh saw what appeared to be illicit substances and pipes used to consume narcotics. Postarrest analysis indicated that the backpack contained 13.8 grams of marijuana and 1.8 grams of cocaine. Following his discovery, Allspaugh removed the suspected contraband from the backpack, concluded the search of the minivan, and approached the occupants. Allspaugh asked the occupants who owned the backpack. At the time, none of the occupants had received Miranda warnings and at least two additional plain clothed police detectives had arrived at the scene for a total police presence of six officers. In response to Allspaugh's question, defendant indicated that he owned the backpack. Allspaugh placed defendant in handcuffs and then asked defendant "what that white powder substance was." Defendant said the powder was cocaine.
¶ 7 In the court's ruling, it initially noted that once "somebody is in custody for Miranda purposes that any questioning is prohibited or any statements in response to questioning is subject to suppression." The court then focused its ruling on whether defendant was in custody at the time Allspaugh asked about the ownership of the backpack and the white substance. The court found that when Allspaugh asked about the ownership of the backpack, six officers were on the scene. Four of the officers were in full uniform, and two of the officers were dressed in plain clothes with their badges visible. Each officer's firearm was visible during their encounter with defendant. At the time of Allspaugh's questions, defendant did not know that Allspaugh had discovered contraband. The court found an officer told defendant to exit the minivan, the officer conducted a search upon defendant's exiting the vehicle that was more like a search subsequent to arrest than a Terry stop pat-down, and the officer directed defendant to a location away from the minivan. The court further found that the restraint imposed upon defendant was comparable to a formal arrest. The court concluded that "not only would a reasonable person believe they were not free to leave, I also find that there—that the restraint imposed upon the subjects were comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." The court granted defendant's motion to suppress defendant's answers to the questions "whose bag is this?" and "what is this white powder?"
¶ 8 Following the court's grant of defendant's motion, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and a notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 10 The State argues that the circuit court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress statements because defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation that would require the issuance of Miranda warnings. We disagree and find the court did not err as defendant was in custody and was asked two interrogatory questions without prior Miranda warnings.
¶ 11 At the outset, we note that defendant did not file a responsive brief. However, we elect to decide the case in the absence of an appellee's brief because "the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that [we] can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee's brief." First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. , 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976) ; see also People v. Cosby , 231 Ill. 2d 262, 285, 325 Ill.Dec. 556, 898 N.E.2d 603 (2008) ().
¶ 12 In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court prescribed a set of prophylactic warnings that a police officer must provide to a suspect before conducting a "custodial interrogation." These warnings are intended to protect a suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). Miranda was motivated by concerns "that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 457-58, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). The Miranda warnings assure that any inculpatory statement made by an individual held in custody is not simply the product of " ‘the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.’ " Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 661, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 458, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). Miranda further holds that where an individual is subject to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the prescribed warnings, the prosecution may not use that individual's inculpatory or exculpatory statements at trial. Miranda , 384 U.S. at 492, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
¶ 13 "Custodial interrogation" means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It consists of two elements: (1) whether an individual was subject to interrogation and (2) whether the interrogation occurred in a custodial situation. People v. Tayborn , 2016 IL App (3d) 130594, ¶¶ 18-19, 401 Ill.Dec. 281, 49 N.E.3d 983.
¶ 14 First, we find that Allspaugh's first question—"Whose backpack is this?"—called for an incriminating response because Allspaugh knew that the backpack contained illicit substances and drug paraphernalia. See id. ¶ 18 (). Therefore, Allspaugh's first question, about the ownership of the backpack, was interrogatory. Second, we find that Allspaugh's question about the white powder substance found inside the backpack also was interrogatory. This question also called for an incriminating response—an identification of the contraband that Allspaugh believed to be narcotics. Therefore, both of Allspaugh's questions were interrogatory, and we next must determine whether defendant was in custody at the time that Allspaugh posed these questions.
¶ 15 In reaching the above conclusion, we note that our opinion is not intended to limit the ability of the police to pose sufficiently general questions. With regard to these "[g]eneral, on-the-scene" questions, Miranda explains:
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