People v. Tayborn

• Decision Date: 07 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 3–13–0594.,3–13–0594.
• Citation: 49 N.E.3d 983
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Eugene TAYBORN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

49 N.E.3d 983

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Eugene TAYBORN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 3–13–0594.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

March 7, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier and Steven Varel (argued), both of State Appellate Defender's Office, Ottawa, for appellant.

James Glasgow, State's Attorney, Joliet (Justin A. Nicolosi (argued), of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice CARTER

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Eugene Tayborn, was found guilty of possession of cocaine. On appeal, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress defendant's statement that he was transporting cocaine, which defendant made in response to police questioning without having received Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

. We agree that defendant's counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress defendant's statement and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The State charged defendant by way of a two-count indictment. In count I, defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver 15–100 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A)

(West 2012)). In count II, defendant was charged with possession of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2012)). The case proceeded to a jury trial.

¶ 4 At trial, the evidence for the State established that at 8:40 p.m., on February 16, 2012, Deputy Michael Weder and Officer Dustin Legner performed a traffic stop of a vehicle because it did not have a registration plate light. Weder approached the female driver and Legner approached the male passenger. According to Weder, the female driver seemed nervous. Weder asked the driver for her license and the vehicle's registration. The driver slowly produced the paperwork. The driver kept trying to cover a purse located on the center console with her right hand and refused to move her hands when Weder asked her to place her hands where he could see them. Weder described the driver acting funny about the purse and making furtive movements toward the purse. She also placed papers over the purse. Weder asked the driver to step out of the vehicle. Weder spoke to the driver and then handcuffed her and placed her into his squad car.

¶ 5 Legner conducted an inventory search of the vehicle incident to the driver's arrest. During the inventory search, the defendant, who had been the passenger, was removed from the vehicle and placed in handcuffs for safety reasons. Legner testified that defendant was being detained but was not under arrest during the search. In searching the vehicle, Legner observed a white sock, in plain view, in the purse. Legner opened the sock and discovered a clear baggie with a white rock powder substance that Legner suspected was cocaine. Legner placed the baggie on the hood of the squad car, and Weder took possession of it. As Legner continued the vehicle search, three additional officers arrived in two or three additional squad cars. Legner heard defendant tell Deputy Matthew McKee that he was transporting the cocaine from Chicago to someone in Iowa.

¶ 6 McKee testified that he was called to the scene of the traffic stop. When McKee arrived on scene he parked behind Weder's vehicle and saw Legner speaking with defendant. As McKee walked toward Legner, he heard Legner ask defendant to get out of the vehicle so that Legner could conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. McKee walked defendant toward the shoulder of the highway. McKee and defendant began casually conversing. McKee testified that defendant was not in handcuffs. McKee heard Legner indicate to Weder that he discovered what he suspected was cocaine in the vehicle. McKee asked defendant about the cocaine. Specifically, McKee testified as follows:

“[Officer McKee]: I overheard Officer Legner tell Deputy Weder he found suspect cocaine in the vehicle.

BY [PROSECUTOR]:

Q. Did you then ask the defendant about that?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. What was his response?

A. He admitted that he had gotten it from an acquaintance in Chicago and he was bringing it to Iowa.

Q. Did he say who he was bringing it to Iowa to [sic ]?

A. No, he did not.

Q. At that point what did you do?

A. I took [defendant] into custody, placed him in my vehicle.”

Thus, in response to McKee's question, defendant had indicated that he received the cocaine from an acquaintance in Chicago and was bringing it to somebody in Iowa. At that point, McKee took defendant into custody and placed defendant into his vehicle.¹ The cocaine-like substance was subsequently tested and determined to be 58.89 grams of cocaine. At the close of the State's case, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

¶ 7 The jury found the defendant guilty on count II—possession of cocaine—and could not reach a verdict on count I for possession with intent to deliver 15–100 grams of cocaine. A mistrial was declared on count I, which proceeded to a bench trial, with the parties stipulating to the evidence that had been presented at the jury trial. The trial court found that defendant was in constructive possession of the cocaine because he was aware of the cocaine in the vehicle and admitted that he was going to deliver the cocaine. However, the trial court found that although defendant knew there was cocaine in the vehicle, there was insufficient evidence to indicate that defendant was aware of the amount of cocaine. The trial court noted that “the police officer, after the defendant was arrested” placed the cocaine on the hood of the car, exposing the amount of cocaine to defendant but defendant's knowledge of the amount of the cocaine at that point could not be considered because defendant had already been arrested. Because the State failed to prove that defendant knew of the amount of cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court acquitted defendant on count I—possession with intent to deliver 15–100 grams of cocaine.

¶ 8 On July 29, 2013, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months in prison on Count II. On August 14, 2013, defense counsel orally motioned the trial court to reconsider defendant's sentence, which the trial court denied. Also, on August 14, 2013, defendant was released from prison, having served his 30–month prison sentence. Defendant appeals his conviction.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his incriminating admission that he made in response to police questioning without defendant having first received Miranda warnings. See People v. Hunt, 2012 IL 111089, ¶ 25, 360 Ill.Dec. 774, 969 N.E.2d 819

; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that the prosecution may not use statements from a custodial interrogation unless procedural safeguards that secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination are demonstrated, which require that a defendant be warned of his right to remain silent, any statement made may be used as evidence against him, and of his right to an attorney). The State argues that the record is insufficient to determine whether defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court. Alternatively, the State argues that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress where the motion would not have been successful. The State claims that the motion would not have been granted because defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation at the time he made the admission that he was transporting cocaine.

¶ 11 I. Direct Appeal of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

¶ 12 Initially, we address the State's claim that a direct appeal is not the proper forum for defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the trial record is inadequate for the purpose of analyzing counsel's performance. See People v. Durgan, 346 Ill.App.3d 1121, 282 Ill.Dec. 645, 806 N.E.2d 1233 (2004)

(only the trial record is available on direct appeal and the trial record is often inadequate or incomplete for the purpose of analyzing counsel's performance). The State argues that the issue of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress was not raised in the trial court so that “the record does not contain a thorough discussion on its merits.” According to the State, a collateral review of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the more appropriate forum to address defendant's claim.

¶ 13 We disagree that this direct appeal is not an appropriate forum for defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this case. First, we note that collateral relief of a postconviction petition is not available to the defendant in this case because defendant has completed his sentence and term of mandatory supervised release. See 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq.

(West 2014) (Post–Conviction Hearing Act is available to “[a]ny person imprisoned in the penitentiary”); People v. Carrera, 239 Ill.2d 241, 257, 346 Ill.Dec. 507, 940 N.E.2d 1111 (2010) (a postconviction remedy is available to those being deprived of their liberty, and not to those who have served their sentences and might wish to purge their records of past convictions); People v. Martin–Trigona, 111 Ill.2d 295, 299, 95 Ill.Dec. 492, 489 N.E.2d 1356 (1986)

(a defendant who completed his sentence may not use the Post–Conviction Hearing Act simply to purge his criminal record). Second, a meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a substantial impairment of a fundamental right that can be addressed by a reviewing court, even if the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court. See...