People v. Gaworecki
| Decision Date | 07 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 40,40 |
| Citation | 175 N.E.3d 915,154 N.Y.S.3d 33,37 N.Y.3d 225 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Richard B. GAWORECKI, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Veronica M. Gorman, Gorman Law, PLLC, Binghamton, for appellant.
Michael A. Korchak, District Attorney, Binghamton (Rita M. Basile of counsel), for respondent.
In this case, we are concerned with two culpable mental states defined in the Penal Law: recklessness and criminal negligence (see Penal Law § 15.05 ). Recklessness is the mens rea necessary for manslaughter in the second degree (see Penal Law § 125.15[1] ). Criminal negligence is the mental state necessary to support a charge of criminally negligent homicide (see id. § 125.10). "It is undisputed here that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree" ( People v. Heide, 84 N.Y.2d 943, 944, 620 N.Y.S.2d 814, 644 N.E.2d 1370 [1994] ).
Here, the evidence presented to the grand jury established that defendant sold the decedent five bags of heroin on July 20, 2017 and that the decedent died of a heroin overdose on July 22, 2017. The bags were blue with no markings. Shortly after the sale on July 20, defendant sent the decedent a text message in which defendant told the decedent to "be careful." Later in the day, the decedent gave one of the blue bags of heroin that he purchased from defendant to his ex-girlfriend, who consumed some of it shortly thereafter and opined that it was "really strong and potent." She did not communicate any of this information to defendant. The decedent also used some of the heroin he purchased from defendant on July 20. The decedent's ex-girlfriend testified that she was with the decedent on July 21 until approximately 8:30 p.m., during which time he was alive and well, and that she did not see him consume any drugs on July 21. At approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 22, police were called to the decedent's home and found him unresponsive. The coroner who was present at the autopsy testified that the decedent was pronounced dead at the scene and that the cause of death was acute heroin toxicity. The toxicology report indicated that in addition to opiates, codeine and benzodiazepines were found in the decedent's blood. The coroner testified that, although the other drugs could contribute to respiratory depression, their presence did not change the cause of death.
Empty green and blue glassine bags of unspecified quantity were found in the trash can of the decedent's bedroom at the time he died. Approximately one month later, another two empty blue bags were found on a nightstand in the decedent's bedroom. Empty blue glassine bags with no markings were recovered from defendant's vehicle, and residue from one of those bags tested positive for heroin and fentanyl. Residue from one of the empty blue bags taken from the decedent's nightstand tested positive for heroin, but not fentanyl. There was no evidence presented to the grand jury tying defendant to the green bags, nor any proof that defendant was the decedent's only heroin supplier.
Another person who purchased heroin from defendant on July 14, also in blue bags, testified that defendant warned him that the heroin was strong. That individual consumed some of the heroin on July 14 and had a typical reaction. On July 16, however, he had a strongly negative reaction when he consumed some of the same heroin. That individual later told defendant on July 21 that the heroin had "almost killed" him, but this was after defendant's sale of heroin to the decedent on July 20. Police later met with defendant, who acknowledged being a fellow drug user. Defendant admitted to police that he had sold the decedent five bags of heroin for $100 and had told decedent to be careful.
Defendant was indicted on charges of manslaughter in the second degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and criminal possession of a hypodermic instrument.* Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient. County Court granted defendant's motion in part, dismissing that count of the indictment charging defendant with manslaughter in the second degree. On the People's appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and denied defendant's motion in its entirety, with two Justices dissenting ( People v. Gaworecki, 174 A.D.3d 1143, 104 N.Y.S.3d 418 [3d Dept. 2019] ). A dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court ( 34 N.Y.3d 940, 109 N.Y.S.3d 758, 133 N.E.3d 465 [2019] ). We now reverse.
"To dismiss [or reduce] an indictment on the basis of insufficient evidence before a Grand Jury, a reviewing court must consider whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a petit jury" ( People v. Grant, 17 N.Y.3d 613, 616, 935 N.Y.S.2d 542, 959 N.E.2d 479 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The standard, while deferential, is not meaningless. "The Legislature has defined legally sufficient evidence as ‘competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged’ " ( id., quoting CPL 70.10[1] ). Upon review, we must determine "whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" ( id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).
With respect to manslaughter in the second degree, the People were required to present competent evidence establishing that defendant "recklessly cause[d] the death" of the decedent ( Penal Law § 125.15[1] ). A defendant acts recklessly in this context if the defendant "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that death will result ( Penal Law § 15.05[3] ; see People v. Li, 34 N.Y.3d 357, 368, 117 N.Y.S.3d 642, 140 N.E.3d 965 [2019] ). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" ( Penal Law § 15.05[3] ). With respect to the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, the People must demonstrate that defendant, acting with "criminal negligence," caused the decedent's death ( Penal Law § 125.10 ). A defendant acts with criminal negligence in this context when the defendant "fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that death will result ( id. § 15.05[4] ). Criminal negligence also requires the defendant's conduct to be "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" (id. ).
Both recklessness and criminal negligence "require that there be a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that death or injury will occur; that the defendant engage in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk; and that the defendant's conduct amount to a ‘gross deviation’ from how a reasonable person would act" ( People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677, 684, 976 N.Y.S.2d 10, 998 N.E.2d 810 [2013], quoting Penal Law § 15.05 ). "The only distinction between the two mental states is that recklessness requires that the defendant be ‘aware of’ and ‘consciously disregard’ the risk while criminal negligence is met when the defendant negligently fails to perceive the risk" ( id. ). As we have recognized, the underlying conduct for both offenses is the same and involves some degree of risk creation (see People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692, 696, 556 N.Y.S.2d 1, 555 N.E.2d 253 [1990] ). In this regard, we have observed that the " ‘nonperception’ of a risk, even if death results, is not enough"—rather, the defendant must have "engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death" ( id. ).
Our case law involving criminal liability for overdose deaths informs the application of these standards. We have explained that a person who, "with the requisite mens rea, engages in conduct through the sale or provision of dangerous drugs that directly causes the death of a person" may be prosecuted for manslaughter in the second degree or criminally negligent homicide ( Li, 34 N.Y.3d at 363, 117 N.Y.S.3d 642, 140 N.E.3d 965 ). For example, in People v. Cruciani, 36 N.Y.2d 304, 367 N.Y.S.2d 758, 327 N.E.2d 803 (1975), we affirmed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, concluding that he "recklessly" caused the death of the victim (see id. at 305, 367 N.Y.S.2d 758, 327 N.E.2d 803 ). There, the defendant injected the decedent with heroin when he knew that she was already "completely bombed out" and had "lost the capacity to walk or talk straight," and he had admitted his awareness that there was a "substantial possibility" that the heroin with which he injected her would cause her to "fall out" (that is, die) ( id. at 305, 367 N.Y.S.2d 758, 327 N.E.2d 803 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see...
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