People v. Gaworecki

Decision Date18 July 2019
Docket Number110055
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Richard B. GAWORECKI, Respondent.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Egan Jr., J.P. Appeal from an order of the County Court of Broome County (Dooley, J.), entered December 19, 2017, which partially granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

Defendant was charged in a four-count indictment with the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument. With respect to the manslaughter count, the People alleged that defendant sold the victim heroin, which resulted in his subsequent overdose and death. Defendant thereafter filed an omnibus motion seeking to, among other things, dismiss the indictment, alleging that the evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the charged offenses or any lesser included offenses and that the grand jury instructions were improper. County Court partially granted defendant's motion by dismissing the count of manslaughter in the second degree. The People appeal.

In determining whether dismissal of a count or counts of an indictment is warranted on legal sufficiency grounds, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and assess whether the facts presented to the grand jury, if accepted as true, along with the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom, are legally sufficient to establish each and every element of the offense or offenses charged (see CPL 70.10[1] ; 210.20[1][b]; People v. Grant, 17 N.Y.3d 613, 616, 935 N.Y.S.2d 542, 959 N.E.2d 479 [2011] ; People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976, 978, 516 N.Y.S.2d 651, 509 N.E.2d 345 [1987] ; People v. Carlin, 173 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 103 N.Y.S.3d 624, 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 04788, *1 [2019] ). "In the context of grand jury proceedings, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v. Mills, 1 N.Y.3d 269, 274, 772 N.Y.S.2d 228, 804 N.E.2d 392 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d 725, 730, 622 N.Y.S.2d 472, 646 N.E.2d 774 [1995] ; People v. Park, 163 A.D.3d 1060, 1061–1062, 81 N.Y.S.3d 321 [2018] ). Thus, "if the [People have] established a prima facie case, the evidence is legally sufficient even though its quality or weight may be so dubious as to preclude indictment or conviction pursuant to other requirements" ( People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S.2d 652, 504 N.E.2d 1079 [1986] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d at 979, 516 N.Y.S.2d 651, 509 N.E.2d 345 ; People v. Waite, 108 A.D.3d 985, 985, 969 N.Y.S.2d 624 [2013] ; People v. Raymond, 56 A.D.3d 1306, 1307, 867 N.Y.S.2d 643 [2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 820, 881 N.Y.S.2d 28, 908 N.E.2d 936 [2009] ).

As relevant here, in order to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter in the second degree, the People are required to show that he or she "recklessly cause[d] the death of another person" ( Penal Law § 125.15[1] ). "A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance ... when he [or she] is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists" ( Penal Law § 15.05[3] ). The testimony before the grand jury established that defendant sold the victim five blue packets of heroin on July 20, 2017. Less than an hour after the sale, defendant sent a text message to the victim stating, "I told you bro. I hooked you up. Just be careful." Later that afternoon, the victim's ex-girlfriend snorted half of one of the blue packets of heroin but found it to be "really strong and potent" and flushed the rest down the toilet.1 Another of defendant's customers purchased two blue packets of heroin from defendant, but subsequently refused to purchase any additional heroin from him, specifically informing defendant that the heroin in the blue packets was "strong and it almost killed [him]." The very next morning – less than two days after purchasing the blue packets of heroin from defendant – the victim was found dead. Police searching the victim's bedroom found empty blue and green packets of heroin, and an autopsy performed on the victim revealed the presence of "lethal" levels of morphine

, the compound that is produced when the body metabolizes heroin, and 6–Monoacetylmorphine, a chemical byproduct that is specific to heroin, in the victim's blood. The coroner determined that the cause of the victim's death was "heroin toxicity acute." Following the victim's death, defendant told police officers that he had warned the victim "to be wicked careful." Upon his arrest, defendant was found to be in possession of blue packets containing both heroin and fentanyl.

Although the People have the burden of proving at trial that a defendant is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, "legal sufficiency in the context of the grand jury proceeding does not require such a high standard of proof" ( People v. Waite, 108 A.D.3d at 987, 969 N.Y.S.2d 624 ; see People v. Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d at 732, 622 N.Y.S.2d 472, 646 N.E.2d 774 ; People v. Spratley, 152 A.D.3d 195, 197, 59 N.Y.S.3d 495 [2017] ; People v. Roth, 141 A.D.3d 1090, 1091, 34 N.Y.S.3d 838 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 936, 40 N.Y.S.3d 364, 63 N.E.3d 84 [2016] ). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, we find that the testimony before the grand jury with respect to defendant's conduct, the surrounding circumstances and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom provided sufficient factual support for each and every element of the charge of manslaughter in the second degree (see People v. Galle, 77 N.Y.2d 953, 955–956, 570 N.Y.S.2d 481, 573 N.E.2d 569 [1991] ; People v. Waite, 108 A.D.3d at 987, 969 N.Y.S.2d 624 ). Given defendant's knowledge of the potency of the drugs that he was distributing and their potential lethality, it is evident that the nature of the risk involved was of such degree "that defendant's failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" and that his actions were a sufficiently direct cause of the victim's death for him to face the judgment of a jury ( People v. Galle, 77 N.Y.2d at 955–956, 570 N.Y.S.2d 481, 573 N.E.2d 569 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v. Cruciani, 36 N.Y.2d 304, 305–306, 367 N.Y.S.2d 758, 327 N.E.2d 803 [1975] ; People v. Stan XuHui Li, 155 A.D.3d 571, 574–577, 67 N.Y.S.3d 1 [2017], lv granted 31 N.Y.3d 1119, 81 N.Y.S.3d 378, 106 N.E.3d 761 [2018] ; People v. Roth, 141 A.D.3d at 1091, 34 N.Y.S.3d 838 ; compare People v. Bianco, 67 A.D.3d 1417, 1418–1419, 890 N.Y.S.2d 751 [2009], lv denied 14 N.Y.3d 797, 899 N.Y.S.2d 131, 925 N.E.2d 935 [2010] ; People v. Pinckney, 38 A.D.2d 217, 218, 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 [1972], affd 32 N.Y.2d 749, 344 N.Y.S.2d 643, 297 N.E.2d 523 [1973] ).

Lynch and Pritzker, JJ., concur.

Mulvey, J. (dissenting).

Because the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient to support the count of manslaughter in the second degree or the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, County Court properly dismissed that count. "To dismiss an indictment or counts thereof on the basis of insufficient evidence before a grand jury, a reviewing court must consider whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant conviction by a [trial] jury" ( People v. Park, 163 A.D.3d 1060, 1061, 81 N.Y.S.3d 321 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). "In the context of grand jury proceedings, ‘legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ " ( People v. Mills, 1 N.Y.3d 269, 274, 772 N.Y.S.2d 228, 804 N.E.2d 392 [2003], quoting People v. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d 523, 526, 683 N.Y.S.2d 168, 705 N.E.2d 1209 [1998] ; see People v. Park, 163 A.D.3d at 1061, 81 N.Y.S.3d 321 ; People v. Roth, 141 A.D.3d 1090, 1090, 34 N.Y.S.3d 838 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 936, 40 N.Y.S.3d 364, 63 N.E.3d 84 [2016] ; People v. Waite, 108 A.D.3d 985, 985, 969 N.Y.S.2d 624 [2013] ). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the [g]rand [j]ury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" ( People v. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526, 683 N.Y.S.2d 168, 705 N.E.2d 1209 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord People v. Park, 163 A.D.3d at 1061, 81 N.Y.S.3d 321 ).

Pursuant to Penal Law § 125.15(1), "[a] person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when ... [h]e [or she] recklessly causes the death of another person." "A person acts recklessly with respect to a result ... described by a statute defining an offense when he [or she] is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur .... The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" ( Penal Law § 15.05[3] ; see People v. Li, 155 A.D.3d 571, 574, 67 N.Y.S.3d 1 [2017], lv granted 31 N.Y.3d 1119, 81 N.Y.S.3d 378, 106 N.E.3d 761 [2018] ). Thus, to establish that a defendant is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree, the People must prove "the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk; an awareness and disregard of the risk on the part of [the] defendant; and a resulting death" ( People v. Licitra, 47 N.Y.2d 554, 558, 419 N.Y.S.2d...

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    ...Division reversed and denied defendant's motion in its entirety, with two Justices dissenting 37 N.Y.3d 230 ( People v. Gaworecki, 174 A.D.3d 1143, 104 N.Y.S.3d 418 [3d Dept. 2019] ). A dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court ( 34 N.Y.3d 940, 109 N.Y.S.3d 758, 133......
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    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • October 7, 2021
    ...Division reversed and denied defendant's motion in its entirety, with two Justices dissenting 37 N.Y.3d 230 ( People v. Gaworecki, 174 A.D.3d 1143, 104 N.Y.S.3d 418 [3d Dept. 2019] ). A dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court ( 34 N.Y.3d 940, 109 N.Y.S.3d 758, 133......
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    ...appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and denied defendant's motion in its entirety, with two Justices dissenting (People v Gaworecki, 174 A.D.3d 1143 [3d Dept 2019]). A dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court (34 N.Y.3d 940 [2019]). We now reverse. II. A. "To d......
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