People v. Gaytan

• Decision Date: 21 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 4–12–0217.,4–12–0217.
• Citation: 2013 IL App (4th) 120217,992 N.E.2d 17,372 Ill.Dec. 478
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jose GAYTAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2013 IL App (4th) 120217
992 N.E.2d 17
372 Ill.Dec. 478

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Jose GAYTAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 4–12–0217.

Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fourth District.

May 21, 2013.

[992 N.E.2d 18]

Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, Colleen Morgan, State Appellate Defender's Office, Springfield, for appellant.

Ronald C. Dozier, State's Attorney, Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman, Thomas R. Dodegge, State's Attorneys Appellante Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION
Justice KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[372 Ill.Dec. 479]¶ 1 In September 2010, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant, Jose Gaytan, for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing the police officers did not have articulable suspicion a crime had been committed or was being committed when they stopped defendant for an obstructed license plate. In October 2011, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and found defendant guilty. The court sentenced defendant to 30 months' probation, including a condition that he serve 120 days in the county jail.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts section 3–413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/3–413(b) (West 2010)) only prohibits materials physically attached to the registration plate itself and not obstructions, such as a trailer hitch, not attached to the registration plate. We agree and reverse.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In September 2010, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). These charges resulted from a traffic stop and a search of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger.

¶ 5 In November 2010, defendant filed a motion “to quash arrest and suppress evidence” arguing the traffic stop resulting in his arrest was improper. (We note the proper title for such a motion is “motion to suppress evidence.” See People v. Hansen, 2012 IL App (4th) 110603, ¶¶ 61–63, 360 Ill.Dec. 85, 968 N.E.2d 164.) In January 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. Officers Karl Ladtkow and Dan Crowley of the Chenoa police department were running stationary radar detection on Interstate 55. Ladtkow's attention was drawn to a purple Lincoln Mark V because of “the color of the vehicle and the big tires on the vehicle.” As the vehicle passed, Ladtkow observed “the vehicle had a trailer hitch on the back and there was a ball on the back that obscured the license plate” and the trailer hitch “was covering up the bottom of the plate.” Ladtkow testified the hitch was covering some of the numbers on the plate and the plate was obstructed when he was following behind the vehicle. On cross-examination, Ladtkow explained he was not able to see all of the numbers on the plate “unless I got right up on to the bumper of the vehicle and be able to look over that and see, you know, what number that was.” Ladtkow admitted once he stopped the vehicle and walked up to it, he was able to [372 Ill.Dec. 480]

[992 N.E.2d 19]

clearly see the license plate despite the trailer hitch.

¶ 6 Defendant submitted into evidence a photograph of the Lincoln taken from an angle directly behind the vehicle and from a height approximately above the rear bumper. The trial court observed “the ball hitch in the photograph is not obstructing any of the numbers” but “the photo is also obviously taken by someone who is standing right at the rear of the vehicle, and certainly the officer testified that he was further back and that the angle, therefore, was different and the ball was obstructing one of the numbers.” The court denied defendant's motion to suppress because the hitch obstructed the license plate.

¶ 7 In April 2011, defendant filed a motion to reopen evidence to permit introduction of a video recording of the traffic stop. By written order, the trial court granted defendant's motion to reopen evidence and permitted introduction of the video recording.

¶ 8 In July 2011, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant argued the statute “impl[ies] a cover, something attached to the plate.” A tow hitch “is something that's not on the plate. It's in front of it as you're going down the road,” but if the plate is covered by that particular angle, “all you had to do is just move over a little bit to the left or the right and the letter is clearly discernible.” In making its ruling, the trial court explained the videotape “really doesn't clear up for me one way or the other whether this thing blocked part of the letters or not. It does appear that maybe it blocks a little piece of one of them on the video, but I can't tell if it really does or it's just grainy from the video itself.” The court denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 9 In October 2011, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The court sentenced defendant as stated.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress evidence. Defendant asserts (1) based on its statutory language and the doctrine of ejusdem generis, section 3–413(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3–413(b) (West 2010)) only “prohibits materials which physically obscure the registration plate itself and is not so expansive as to include legal use of trailer hitches and other similar vehicle accessories”; (2) the statute does not extend the requirement that the registration plate be “clearly visible” to momentary obstructions, such as properly installed trailer hitches; and (3) the police officers had no reason to believe a crime had been committed “by having a standard-issue trailer hitch which made it difficult to view the registration plate from certain positions.” Defendant asserts no Illinois case has directly construed the statutory language of section 3–314(b) and cites several out-of-state cases in support of his argument.

¶ 13 The State concedes the issue presented in this case is not controlled by Illinois precedent and argues (1) section 3–413(b)'s use of the terms “clearly visible” and “clearly legible” require “that a registration plate must not be obstructed and must be fully readable,” and (2) “a registration plate that is fastened in a place that results in it being partially obscured by a trailer hitch” violates section 3–413(b), because the plate is not “clearly visible.” The State cites People v. White, 93 Cal.App.4th 1022, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 (2001), and [372 Ill.Dec. 481]

[992 N.E.2d 20]

Parks v. State, 2011 WY 19, 247 P.3d 857 (Wyo.2011), for the proposition “a majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have concluded that a trailer ball so positioned so as to partially obstruct a license plate constitutes a traffic violation.”

¶ 14 A. Standard of Review

¶ 15 In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court applies a two-part standard of review: we will reverse factual findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, de novo review applies to the trial court's ultimate ruling of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists and whether suppression is warranted. People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 12, 368 Ill.Dec. 205, 983 N.E.2d 1009;People v. Mott, 389 Ill.App.3d 539, 542, 329 Ill.Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009).

¶ 16 B. Fourth Amendment Traffic Stops

¶ 17 Generally, under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV), a police officer may lawfully stop a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See also 725 ILCS 5/107–14 (West 2010) (statutory codification of Terry standard).

¶ 18 “Vehicle stops are subject to the fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement.” People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20, 361 Ill.Dec. 536, 971 N.E.2d 1058. An investigatory stop must be justified at its inception. People v. Close, 238 Ill.2d 497, 505, 345 Ill.Dec. 620, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010). “A police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20, 361 Ill.Dec. 536, 971 N.E.2d 1058. A police officer may stop a vehicle where he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe the driver is violating the Vehicle Code. Mott, 389 Ill.App.3d at 544, 329 Ill.Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d at 164. “In judging the police officer's conduct, we apply an objective standard: ‘would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure * * * “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate?’ ” Close, 238 Ill.2d at 505, 345 Ill.Dec. 620, 939 N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868). A police officer conducting a traffic stop need not always be correct but must be reasonable, and an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of fact rarely violates the fourth amendment. People v. Cole, 369 Ill.App.3d 960, 967–68, 314 Ill.Dec. 171, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2007). “However, a police officer who mistakenly believes a violation occurred when the acts in question are not prohibited by law is not acting reasonably.” Cole, 369 Ill.App.3d at 968, 314 Ill.Dec. 171, 874 N.E.2d at 88. See also Mott, 389 Ill.App.3d at 543, 329 Ill.Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d at 164 (“Where a traffic stop is based upon a...