People v. George

• Decision Date: 15 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95SA391,95SA391
• Citation: 914 P.2d 367
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa Michelle GEORGE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 367

914 P.2d 367

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa Michelle GEORGE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95SA391.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

April 15, 1996.

Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, James C. Sell, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Englewood, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Kimberly Karn, Deputy State Public Defender, Englewood, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal filed pursuant to C.A.R. 3 and 4.1, the People seek review of a ruling by the Douglas County District Court suppressing evidence seized by two Castle Rock, Colorado, police officers after they stopped a van driven by the defendant, Lisa Michelle George. The trial court determined that, at the time they stopped the van, the officers did not possess sufficient specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred was occurring, or was about to occur. We affirm the trial court's ruling.

I

On December 17, 1994, at approximately 11:45 p.m., an anonymous person telephoned the Castle Rock Police Department to report a possible altercation "between two vehicles" in the parking lot of a Castle Rock tire store located one-half block from the police station. The caller stated that one of the vehicles had followed the other one into the parking lot and that one of the vehicles was a van. The caller did not report that any altercation had occurred or was occurring.

Officer Patricia Lisk, accompanied by Officer Clifford Archambo, drove a patrol car to the parking lot. When they arrived at the scene, approximately thirty seconds to one minute after the telephone call was received, they observed a van moving toward them. Officer Lisk testified that she thought the van was trying to leave the parking lot and that she saw "nothing suspicious about that." She also stated that she had the impression that the other vehicle reportedly at the scene had departed.

When Officer Lisk blocked the exit and activated the patrol car's overhead lights, the driver, George, stopped the van. Officer Archambo initially spoke to George and told Officer Lisk that an odor of alcoholic beverage was noticeable on George's breath. Officer Lisk then approached George, observed that George's eyes were watery and bloodshot, and directed George to perform certain preliminary roadside tests. When George refused to take a requested preliminary breath test and became uncooperative, Officer Lisk arrested George for driving under the influence of alcohol, placed her in the patrol car, and returned to the van to obtain the vehicle registration.

As she approached the van, Officer Lisk was informed by another officer that a small envelope was located on a step just inside the driver's side of the van. Officer Lisk opened the envelope and discovered a white powdery substance later determined to be methamphetamine. George was ultimately charged with the offenses of unlawful possession of a controlled substance pursuant to sections 18-18-204 and -405(1)(a), (2)(a)(I), 8B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.); driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to section 42-4-1202(1)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1986); ¹ and resisting arrest pursuant to section 18-8-103(1)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

Prior to trial, George filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop of her van, arguing that the investigating officers did not have a reasonable and articulable basis in fact to believe that she was engaged in any criminal activity at the time she stopped the vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.

II

The People argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Officers Lisk and Archambo had no reasonable suspicion to justify their stop of George's van. We disagree.

A police official may stop and question a driver of a motor vehicle if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; if the purpose of the detention is reasonable; and if the character and scope of the detention is reasonable when considered in light of its purpose. People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Colo.1994); Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 509, 485 P.2d 495, 497 (1971). A police official's suspicion is "reasonable" when it has an " 'articulable and specific basis in fact.' " People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190, 192 (Colo.1990) (quoting People v. Savage, 698 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Colo.1985)). The relevant inquiry is whether the "specific and articulable facts known to the officer" as well as the "rational inferences from these facts" would support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so as "justify intrusion into the defendant's personal security." Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192.

The information known to Officers Lisk and Archambo when they stopped George's van consisted entirely of information supplied by an anonymous telephone caller. Because information supplied by an anonymous source may often be unreliable, that information may warrant an investigatory stop only if it is verified by sufficient independent corroborating evidence of criminal activity. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192. When a tipster's information has been sufficiently corroborated, that information together with all other facts known to the investigating officer must be evaluated as a whole to determine whether sufficient reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop. People v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo.1989).

The trial court applied these standards in determining that at the time they stopped the van driven by George Officers Lisk and Archambo lacked the reasonable suspicion of past, present, or future criminal conduct required to justify an investigatory stop of a moving motor vehicle. The trial court found as matters of historical fact that when the officers initially entered the parking lot they knew only that a van and another vehicle had lawfully entered the lot and that the caller had expressed concern about a possible altercation "between [the] two vehicles." They noticed nothing suspicious about the way the van was being driven, had no information regarding its color or license plate, and did not see any other occupied vehicle. The only fact they corroborated was the fact that a van had lawfully entered the parking lot. Thus at 11:46 p.m. on December 17, 1994, the officers knew no specific and articulable facts to support a suspicion that the occupants of the van had engaged in, were engaging in, or were about to engage in criminal conduct.

The trial court's conclusion is supported by our decision in People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190 (Colo.1990), wherein we affirmed a trial court's order suppressing seized evidence. In that case the anonymous informant told police officials the defendant's name, that the defendant would be leaving an apartment located "in the 300 block of Chipeta" at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day, that the defendant would drive away from that location in a vehicle parked in a nearby alley, and that the vehicle was a brown Toyota or station wagon. The tipster also reported the license plate number of the vehicle and stated that approximately half an ounce of cocaine would be located under the hood of the car.

Police officials proceeded to the 300 block of Chipeta and observed a brown station wagon in a nearby alley displaying license plates matching the numbers provided by the informant. At approximately 1:10 p.m., the officers observed the defendant and a woman enter the vehicle and drive down the alley. The officers intercepted the defendant's vehicle, questioned the defendant, requested and received permission to search the car, and found approximately one-half ounce of cocaine under the hood of the car.

We concluded, as had the trial court, that the officers lacked an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting criminal conduct. We first noted that the information provided by the informant was "not very specific or complete" because the informant did not provide an exact address, a description of the defendant, or the destination of the defendant. Garcia, 789 P.2d at 192-93. Additionally, we observed that the informant had not told police officials how long the cocaine had been in the vehicle or how he knew of its presence in the vehicle and that the "credibility of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge were unknown." Id. at 193. We noted that while the description of the car parked in an alley near the 300 block of Chipeta and the statement that a person would enter that car at approximately 1:00 p.m. were corroborated by the police officials' observations, "[o]nly the corroboration of one instance of commonplace activity suggested that the tip was reliable." Id. While we recognized that in some circumstances "verification of seemingly innocent details contained in a tip from an anonymous informant can be sufficient to supply the requisite corroboration," we held that under the totality of the circumstances the officers "lacked an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity was afoot." Id. at 192. As in Garcia, the only fact verified here was the commonplace fact that a van had entered the parking lot.

Our conclusion in this case that the officers lacked a specific and articulable basis in fact to reasonably suspect past, present, or future criminal conduct when they stopped the van driven by George is also supported by Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). In White, the United States Supreme Court carefully reiterated the specificity of information that must be provided by an anonymous informant and the degree of corroboration of such information necessary to justify reliance upon an anonymous tip. In that case, a police...