People v. Ghunaim
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 359167 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAHER MOHAMMAD GHUNAIM, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Eaton Circuit Court LC No. 21-020223-FC
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and LETICA and RICK, JJ.
Defendant appeals by leave granted[1] the circuit court's order denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police while in the hospital. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.
Defendant Maher Mohammad Ghunaim, is a Jordanian citizen whose primary language is Arabic, with English as a second language. On October 15, 2020, defendant's brother took him to McLaren Hospital in Lansing, Michigan, after an alleged suicide attempt. Defendant was subsequently transferred to Samaritan Center in Detroit two days later, and then to Ascension St John Hospital in Detroit on October 21, 2020, after he complained of chest pains.
On October 22, 2020, defendant was interviewed by Eaton County Sheriff's Department Detective Heather Stefan and Child Protective Services worker LeeAnn Kinsey inside his hospital room at Ascension St. John Hospital. Det. Stefan was investigating an August 18, 2020 complaint of sexual abuse from defendant's stepdaughter, who identified defendant as the perpetrator. The interview between Det. Stefan and defendant was video recorded.
During the majority of the interview, Det. Stefan sat next to defendant, who was in his hospital bed. Although defendant had an intravenous tube in his arm, he was upright and alert. During the interview, defendant made numerous incriminating statements to Det. Stefan admitting his involvement in the sexual abuse. The video recording also depicts instances in which Det. Stefan closed the door to defendant's hospital room, asked an individual who was in the room when she and Kinsey arrived if the individual needed to stay, and asked another individual who later came into defendant's hospital room if that individual could return later.
Defendant was subsequently charged with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), (2)(b) (sexual penetration by defendant over 17 against victim under 13), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), (2)(b) (sexual contact by defendant over 17 against victim under 13). On the basis of defendant's motion, the district court suppressed the statements made during the hospital interview but bound defendant over to circuit court for trial. In the circuit court, defendant renewed his motion to suppress, which the court denied, concluding that defendant was not in custody during the interview and that his statements were made voluntarily. This appeal followed.
"Whether a person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda warnings requirement is a mixed question of law and fact that must be answered independently after a review of the record de novo." People v Cortez, 299 Mich.App. 679, 691; 832 N.W.2d 1 (2013). And "[w]hen reviewing a trial court's determination of the voluntariness of inculpatory statements, this Court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination, but will not disturb the trial court's factual findings absent clear error." People v Shipley, 256 Mich.App. 367, 372-373; 662 N.W.2d 856 (2003). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." People v Barritt, 325 Mich.App. 556, 561; 926 N.W.2d 811 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Lastly, "[w]e review de novo a trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress." People v Mazzie, 326 Mich.App. 279, 289; 926 N.W.2d 359 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
On appeal, defendant argues the circuit court erred when it determined that he was not in custody at the time of the questioning and when it found his statements were voluntary. We will address each in turn.
First, defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because he was not advised of his Miranda[2] rights before he made the incriminating statements to Det. Stefan. Defendant claims the statements were made in the context of a custodial interrogation, thus triggering the Miranda requirement. We disagree.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions protect a criminal defendant from the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L Ed2d 694 (1966), "the police must warn a defendant of his or her constitutional rights if the defendant is taken into custody for interrogation." Barritt, 325 Mich.App. at 562.
Interrogation "refers to express questioning or its functional equivalent." People v Anderson, 209 Mich.App. 527, 532; 531 N.W.2d 780 (1995). "In other words, interrogation refers to express questioning and to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 532-533. Although the circuit court did not explicitly address the issue, there is little doubt that the questioning that took place was an "interrogation" for purposes of the Miranda requirement. Det. Stefan explicitly asked defendant to tell her what happened with the victim as it related to the sexual assault. Thus, the core issue on appeal with respect to Miranda is whether defendant was in custody at the time he was interrogated.
"Custody must be determined on the basis of how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his or her circumstances and whether the reasonable person would believe that he or she was free to leave." People v Roberts, 292 Mich.App. 492, 504; 808 N.W.2d 290 (2011). As relevant here, if the individual cannot leave for reasons unrelated to police conduct, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436; 111 S.Ct. 2382; 115 L Ed2d 389 (1991). Relevant factors in this analysis include: "(1) the location of the questioning, (2) the duration of the questioning, (3) statements made during the interview, (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and (5) the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Barritt, 325 Mich.App. at 562-563 (citations omitted). "Whether an individual is effectively 'in custody' is based on the totality of the circumstances." Roberts, 292 Mich.App. at 505.
That defendant was interviewed in his hospital room weighs against finding that he was in custody, because a hospital room does not present the same coercive atmosphere as a police station or other environment where control by the police is evident. See People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich.App. 8, 25; 620 N.W.2d 537 (2000) (). The interview with Det. Stefan lasted approximately 40 minutes, which is not oppressive or otherwise indicative of a custodial atmosphere. See United States v Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 285 (Ca 7, 2020) ().[3]In addition, there was no evidence that Det. Stefan used defendant's condition or hospitalization as a tool to obtain his statements. See Wolfrath v Lavellee, 576 F.2d 965, 973 (CA 2, 1978) ("[B]ecause there was no element of improper police tactics, because the evidence was uncontradicted that Wolfrath's condition, though perhaps weakened by his ordeal, was nonetheless strong and that he was alert and responsive, we hold that Wolfrath failed to substantiate his claim that the admission into evidence of his St. Vincent's [Hospital] confession denied him due process of law.").
It is true that defendant's freedom of movement was limited by the medical treatment he was receiving, particularly the intravenous fluids. However, defendant was not formally restrained by law enforcement. See Stansbury v California, 511 U.S. 318, 322; 114 S.Ct. 1526; 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (). And while the door to the hallway was closed, it was not locked. Indeed, an individual entered the room during the interview, demonstrating that defendant was not restrained to the confines of the hospital room. Moreover, closing the door could be viewed as a considerate gesture given the nature of the subject matter discussed. And the fact that Det. Stefan was armed during the interview does not change our conclusion. At no point during the interview did Det. Stefan touch her service weapon, which was holstered on her right side and slightly behind her, obscured from defendant's view, who was in front of her and to her left.
Defendant claims that as a Jordanian, he had little experience with law enforcement in the United States, which put him in a disadvantaged position during the encounter. However, we fail to see how this fact has any relevance to whether defendant was in custody when he was questioned. The appropriate question is whether "a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436. Det Stefan asked defendant if he was willing to speak with her, implying that defendant could refuse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to decline Det....
To continue reading
Request your trial