People v. Gonzalez, 2018–06239
| Decision Date | 06 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2018–06239,Ind. No. 2242/16 |
| Citation | 183 A.D.3d 663,121 N.Y.S.3d 625 (Mem) |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Andrew A. GONZALEZ, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (Samuel Barr of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, and Christopher J. Blira–Koessler of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the conviction of attempted escape in the second degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony as the fruit of an unlawful detention is without merit (see People v. Parker , 32 N.Y.3d 49, 56, 84 N.Y.S.3d 838, 109 N.E.3d 1138 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him (see id. at 56, 84 N.Y.S.3d 838, 109 N.E.3d 1138 ; People v. De Bour , 40 N.Y.2d 210, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562 ). Further, contrary to the defendant's contention, the on-the-scene show-up identification by the complainant in close temporal and spacial proximity to the location of the crime scene was not unduly suggestive (see People v. Baez , 175 A.D.3d 553, 107 N.Y.S.3d 385 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of attempted burglary in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.50[2] ; People v. Hawkins , 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; People v. Hewitt , 82 A.D.3d 1119, 1121, 919 N.Y.S.2d 204 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes , 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of attempted burglary in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo , 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the fact that the jury acquitted him of burglary in the second degree does not undermine the weight of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict convicting him of attempted burglary in the second degree (see People v. Choi , 137 A.D.3d 808, 809, 26 N.Y.S.3d 333 ). An intermediate appellate court conducting a weight of the evidence review of a mixed jury verdict may take into account "the possibility that the jury has not necessarily acted irrationally, but instead has exercised mercy, and is not required to assume the basis for any implied inconsistencies in such mixed verdicts" ( id. at 809, 26 N.Y.S.3d 333 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted] ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to attempted burglary in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero , 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of attempted escape in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.50[2] ; People v. Hawkins , 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; People v. Hewitt, 82 A.D.3d at 1121, 919 N.Y.S.2d 204 ). Nonetheless, we reach the issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction (see CPL 470.15[3][c] ). The defendant was charged with committing the offense of attempted escape in the second degree pursuant to Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 205.10(2). Penal Law § 205.10(2) provides that "[a] person is guilty of escape in the second degree when [h]aving been arrested for, charged with or convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony, he [or she] escapes from custody." As relevant here, custody is defined as "restraint by a public servant pursuant to an authorized arrest" ( Penal Law § 205.00[2] ). Here, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant was under arrest at the time he allegedly attempted to open the door of the police car in which he was being detained. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction of attempted escape in the second degree must be vacated, and that count of the indictment must be dismissed.
The defendant's contention that his due process right to a fair trial was violated by alleged prosecutorial misconduct during summation is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] )....
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