People v. Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 29 August 1986
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Juan GONZALEZ, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 276

506 N.Y.S.2d 276

132 Misc.2d 1004

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Juan GONZALEZ, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term,

Richmond County.

Aug. 29, 1986.

William L. Murphy, Dist. Atty., Richmond County (Michael J. Bousquet, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for the People.

Russo, Fusco, Scano, Scamardella & Fredreck, P.C., Staten Island (William M. Fredreck, of counsel), for defendant.

NORMAN J. FELIG, Justice.

The defendant in this case, Juan Gonzalez, was arrested on July 7, 1986, in connection, inter alia, with the stabbing deaths of two individuals aboard the Staten Island Ferryboat Newhouse. Later that same day, the defendant was arraigned on the above matter in the Criminal Court, Richmond County, at which time an order was signed by the judge presiding (McBrien J.) directing the Director of Kings County Hospital to designate two qualified psychiatrists to examine the defendant in accordance with article 730 of the CPL to determine his fitness to proceed.

Subsequently, and on July 31, 1986, the defendant was indicted, inter alia, on two counts of murder in the second degree by the Grand Jury of Richmond County, and was arraigned in this court on August 5, 1986. At that time, the court had before it the psychiatric reports of the two designated psychiatrists who had examined the defendant in accordance with Judge McBrien's order, both of whom concluded that the defendant was an incapacitated person and was not fit to proceed. At this point the prosecution moved to controvert the examination reports, and requested a hearing in accordance with CPL 730.30(3). It is in this connection the People have now moved for an order designating two named psychiatrists to examine the defendant for the purpose of assisting them in the presentation of psychiatric evidence at the requested hearing to determine the defendant's fitness to proceed. This case is one of apparent first impression.

The motion is granted.

Notwithstanding the defendant's cogent arguments to the contrary, it appears from the recent decision of the Court of Appeals in People v. Christopher, 65 N.Y.2d 417, 492 N.Y.S.2d 566, 482 N.E.2d 45, rearg. den. 65 N.Y.2d 1054, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 484 N.E.2d 1055, that CPL 730.30 can no longer be validly construed as limiting the evidence admissible at a hearing to determine a defendant's fitness to proceed to the direct and cross examination of the psychiatric examiners designated by the director of the appropriate state or municipal hospital (see, CPL 730.20). This is so because the Court in that case squarely held that the defendant in any such proceeding has a statutory right to oppose the testimony of the designated psychiatrists with expert psychiatric testimony of his own (People v. Christopher, supra, at 424, 425, 492 N.Y.S.2d 566, 482 N.E.2d 45). In so concluding, the court relied, in part, upon the language of the statute, which requires a court to conduct such a hearing upon the timely request of either defendant or ... the district attorney" (CPL 730.30 [2]; [3] ), and concluded, inter alia, that a rule of law which would ensure that a defendant's right to a hearing to contest the psychiatric determination of the director's designees but would deny him the right to present his own psychiatric testimony would be "a contradiction in terms" (People v. Christopher, supra, at 424, 492 N.Y.S.2d 566, 482 N.E.2d 45). In addition, the court observed that the foregoing construction would be substantially inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying the enactment of a 1981 bill which amended CPL 730.60(2) to incorporate therein the procedural safeguards set forth in CPL 730.30(2) (L.1981, ch. 791). As set forth...