People v. Goodman

• Decision Date: 24 February 1977
• Citation: 362 N.E.2d 615,393 N.Y.S.2d 985,41 N.Y.2d 888
• Parties: , 362 N.E.2d 615 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ernest L. GOODMAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 985

393 N.Y.S.2d 985

41 N.Y.2d 888, 362 N.E.2d 615

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Ernest L. GOODMAN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 24, 1977.

Douglas P. Rutnik, Public Defender (Joseph M. Brennan, Albany, of counsel), for appellant.

Sol Greenberg, Dist. Atty. (Lois A. White, Troy, of counsel), for respondent.

MEMORANDUM.

The trial court has found, and the Appellate Division affirmed the finding, 46 A.D.2d 938, 363 N.Y.S.2d 319 that the victim of the assault was unavailable to testify against the defendant for a substantial period of time following the assault as a result of the injuries that she sustained. CPL 30.30 (subd. 4, par. (g)) allows exceptional circumstances to justify periods of delay not expressly covered by the statute, even in the absence of a formal continuance. The unavailability of a principal prosecution witness, for medical reasons, is a sufficient exceptional circumstance to warrant the exclusion of the period of delay. (See People v. Gordon, 47 A.D.2d 775, 365 N.Y.S.2d 269.) With the period of medical unavailability excluded, the People were prepared for trial within six months of the commencement of the action and dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 (subd. 1, par. (a)) was not required.

We also find no error in the transfer of the case from Family Court to the criminal courts. From the seriousness of the assault, the injuries sustained, and the request for a protective order, the Family Court could properly conclude, as it did, that it would be inappropriate to apply the processes of the Family Court to this case. (Family Ct. Act, § 816, subd. (a); cf. Matter of Appell v. Appell, 37 A.D.2d 966, 327 N.Y.S.2d 190, affd. 30 N.Y.2d 800, 334 N.Y.S.2d 900, 286 N.E.2d 276.) Similarly, neither the statute nor constitutional principle mandates that, in all cases, a hearing be held prior to effecting such a transfer. (People v. Gemmill, 34 A.D.2d 177, 180, 310 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247.) Moreover, defendant never appealed from the order of transfer, which is a final, appealable order (Family Ct. Act, § 1112; People v. Isaacs, 43 A.D.2d 656, 349 N.Y.S.2d 844), nor did he seek an order rescinding the transfer (Family Ct. Act, § 816, subd. (b)). Under such circumstances, defendant may not collaterally attack the transfer order on appeal from his criminal conviction.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

FUCHSBERG, Judge (dissenting).

The main issue on this appeal is whether the People violated the obligation imposed upon them by CPL 30.30 (subd. 1, par. (a)) to be ready for trial within six months after the commencement of a criminal action in which one of the charges is a felony.

The facts are not disputed. On June 27, 1972, Leola Goodman filed a complaint against her husband, Ernest Goodman, for assault in the second degree, a class D felony, as a result of acts committed during a domestic quarrel on June 18, 1972. However, he was not indicted until February 1, 1973, more than seven months later. Having been held in jail by then without being brought to trial for a period in excess of six months, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment because of the People's failure to prosecute within the time limited by the statute. The motion was denied. On March 5, 1973, still confined, he elected to plead guilty and thereafter appealed.

On the initial appeal, the Appellate Division, by a vote of 3 to 2, remitted for a hearing by the Albany County Court to determine whether any periods of the delay that had ensued between the time of the filing of the complaint and the time when he took the plea should be excluded from the period within which the People were required to be ready for trial (44 A.D.2d 862, 355 N.Y.S.2d 217). Justices Kane and Main, who dissented, would have dismissed the indictment at that juncture.

Testimony at the hearing established that the wife had been hospitalized for approximately five weeks for treatment of her injuries and that she had thereafter continued under a physician's care for approximately an additional month. However, her hospitalization had not prevented her from leaving the hospital as early as June 27, 1972 to 'go down to issue a warrant for what happened'; she also left the hospital at times to go home and check on their children. During the month after she left the hospital and was still under the doctor's care, the record shows she would go out to her sister-in-law's house for dinner. Both at the hospital and afterwards, there was no time, according to her own testimony, when she was completely incapacitated or when she was unable to walk around or function normally. Nevertheless, the County Court went on to find 'as a fact that the victim was unavailable to the People as a witness during such period of time, i.e., nine weeks, and that such period of delay is to be excluded from the time within which the People should have been ready for trial.' The Appellate Division affirmed that determination.

CPL 30.30 is the culmination of a great deal of legislative and judicial concern with delay in dispositions of criminal cases. Prior to its enactment, the statutory provisions dealing with the speedy trial problem were to be found in section 12 of the Civil Rights Law and in section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ¹ While they guaranteed every defendant the right to 'a speedy trial', they did not define that phrase in terms of specific time periods or guidelines. 'Undue delay' was, therefore, held to depend "upon the circumstances of each particular case" (Peole v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 357, 130 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Fuld, J.); accord People v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.2d 633, 636; 382 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 345 N.E.2d 544, 545; People v. Imbesi, 38 N.Y.2d 629, 631; 381 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863, 345 N.E.2d 333, 335; People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81, 335 N.E.2d 303, 305; cf. People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d 525). And 'good cause' for delay was held to exist when delay, though extensive, was not 'chargeable to the prosecutor and * * * occurred for reasons beyond his control or the control of the court' (People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484, 487, 267 N.E.2d 263, 265).

Students of these standards and of similar ones employed in some of our sister States concluded that they were too imprecise to insure speedy trial (see, e.g., President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 155 (recommending that the period from arrest to trial of felony cases not be more than four months); ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to a Speedy Trial, § 2.1, pp. 14--15, and commentary thereunder). Based in part on such studies CPL 30.30, which flowed from a confluence of legislative and judicial thinking, established the concept of fixed periods of time within which criminal actions must be brought to trial (see Denzer, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. CPL 30.30 (1976--1977 Supp.), p. 37; People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 502, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606, 294 N.E.2d 199, 201). ² To achieve its purpose, it provides, in no uncertain terms, that a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground of denial of a speedy trial must be granted if the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a felony (CPL 30.30, subd. 3). The only exceptions are for the circumstances enumerated in CPL 30.30 (subd. 4) (see People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625, 627, 381 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861, 345 N.E.2d 331, 332).

We turn then to the case at hand. Measured, as the time must be, from the filing of the complaint to the date of the plea, eight months and six days elapsed. The delay therefore exceeded the permissible perimeter of six months by two months and six days. In the face of those figures, the District Attorney argues that the...