People v. Imbesi
| Decision Date | 24 February 1976 |
| Citation | 38 N.Y.2d 629,345 N.E.2d 333,381 N.Y.S.2d 862 |
| Parties | , 345 N.E.2d 333 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Anthony IMBESI, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Arthur T. Cambouris and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Henry J. Steinglass, Peter L. Zimroth and Robert M. Pitler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
The sole item for review on this appeal from an order of affirmance of a judgment of conviction for attempted rape in the first degree is defendant's claimed denial of a speedy trial.
In early August, 1968, defendant, a shipping clerk for a dress company, made the acquaintance of an airline stewardess, by posing as the designer of the garment she was wearing as she strolled through a New York City hotel lobby. He sold her two dresses for $5 apiece and, upon mention that he had others for sale, secured the young woman's name and phone number. During the next few weeks he called her apartment at divers times and finally persuaded her to join him for dinner on the evening of August 23, 1968. After dining and attending a night club, he lured her to his hotel room, where, with an admixture of brutality, threats and passion, he persisted in attempting to rape her during the early hours of the next day.
After having been arrested on August 24, 1968, released bail three days later and indicted on September 16, 1968, defendant's jury trial began on January 3, 1972, some 40 months after commencement of the criminal proceeding. In October, 1971, upon defendant's motion for dismissal for failure to prosecute, the District Attorney was directed to try the case no later than by the end of the January 1972 Term and it was decided that, if it was not so tried through no fault of defendant, the application was to be granted.
Conceding that the delay up to September, 1969 was attributable primarily to defendant's operation and ensuing convalescence and that it is unclear who requested adjournments from that month to the following January, when the court ordered a prepleading probation report returnable March 30, 1970, defendant bottoms his denial of speedy trial attack on the subsequent 21-month period leading up to trial. Testing this claim involves a sensitive weighing of a variety of factors, including: '(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether or not there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay' (People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306). No one of these elements or partial combination thereof is determinative, as all having applicability must be considered carefully (People v. Taranovich, supra, p. 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d p. 81, 335 N.E.2d p. 305).
CPL 30.30 aside (see L.1972, ch. 184, §§ 2, 5, applicable to criminal actions commenced on or after May 1, 1972), we have refused to establish any rigid yardstick, calibrated as to time lapse, which would yield a ready answer as to whether a given case should be dismissed because of failure to prosecute within a specified time. While delays for longer than the 21 months at issue here have been justified (e.g., People v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.2d 633, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1, 345 N.E.2d 544 (27 months); People v. Barber, 30 N.Y.2d 626, 331 N.Y.S.2d 440, 282 N.E.2d 329 (22 months); People v. Rainey, 28 N.Y.2d 863, 322 N.Y.S.2d 255, 271 N.E.2d 231 (28 months)); likewise, those for shorter periods have been found to be inexcusable (People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d 525 (18 months); People v. Wallace, 26 N.Y.2d 371, 310 N.Y.S.2d 484, 258 N.E.2d 904 (11 months)), each case being determined on its own facts. Reflected in these results is the threefold purpose of the speedy trial guarantee--protection against prolonged imprisonment, relief from anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation and prevention of loss of the means to prove innocence (People v. Johnson,supra; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891), it...
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People v. Anderson
... ... Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 276, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d 525; People v. Imbesi, 38 N.Y.2d 629, 631, 381 N.Y.S.2d 862, 345 ... N.E.2d 333; People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891). It also serves the interests of society in seeing that those accused of crime are swiftly brought to justice (People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d, at p. 276, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 342 N.E.2d ... ...
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...during that period do not in and of themselves entitle defendant to dismissal of the indictments (see, People v. Imbesi, 38 N.Y.2d 629, 631, 381 N.Y.S.2d 862, 345 N.E.2d 333). This delay was occasioned by defendant's efforts to arrange a plea bargain (see, People v. Jenner, 37 A.D.2d 786, 3......
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...the indictment should not be dismissed are People v. Perez, 42 N.Y.2d 971, 398 N.Y.S.2d 269, 367 N.E.2d 867; People v. Imbesi, 38 N.Y.2d 629, 381 N.Y.S.2d 862, 345 N.E.2d 333 and People v. Kelly, 38 N.Y.2d 633, 382 N.Y.S.2d 1, 345 N.E.2d 544. In Perez, the defendant was confined throughout ......
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