People v. Goodwin
| Decision Date | 08 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. B110092,B110092 |
| Citation | 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 576,59 Cal.App.4th 1084 |
| Parties | , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9204, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,807, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,939 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Byron GOODWIN, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert F. Katz, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and
David Andrew Eldridge, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Byron Goodwin was convicted by a jury of commercial burglary (Pen.Code, § 459) and petty theft with a prior (Pen.Code, § 666), with findings that he had suffered two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies (two burglaries) within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served four prior prison terms (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life.
On August 4, 1996, a Sears store security agent observed appellant take a pair of pants from a rack inside the store and conceal them under his clothing. Appellant left the store without paying for the pants. He then put the pants inside a bag, reentered the store, and attempted to get a refund for them. The store security agent arrested appellant, who thereafter admitted taking the pants.
In his defense at trial, appellant denied stealing the pants and claimed he found them outside the store. According to appellant, he entered the store to get a refund for the pants so he could use the money to buy a car seat for his child.
Appellant contends he was denied the right to a public jury trial because he was tried by jurors whose names were kept secret and who were referred to only by assigned juror identification numbers. We find that, although the jurors' names were not stated aloud in court and thus not transcribed into the record, the court and counsel had available to them a list with the prospective jurors' names and corresponding identification numbers, and that the procedure employed did not violate any legislative proscription, nor deny appellant his constitutional right to a public trial.
The use in court of juror identification numbers, rather than names, arose as a result of Code of Civil Procedure section 237, as implemented by an appellate court order 1 and a Los Angeles Superior Court administrative memorandum. 2 Code of Civil Procedure section 237 (as amended by Stats.1996, Section 237, subdivision (a)(1), of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The names of qualified jurors drawn from the qualified juror list for the superior court shall be made available to the public upon request unless the court determines that a compelling interest ... requires that this information should be kept confidential or its use limited in whole or in part." Subdivision (a)(2) of Code of Civil Procedure section 237 reveals legislative "concern for the protection of jurors in criminal trials from postverdict harassment." (Erickson v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 755, 758, fn. 2, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230.) Subdivision (a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Upon the recording of a jury's verdict in a criminal jury proceeding, the court's record of personal juror identifying information of trial jurors, ... consisting of names, addresses, and telephone numbers, shall be sealed until further order of the court as provided by this section." The term "sealed" means "extracting or otherwise removing the personal juror identifying information from the court record." (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(3).)
ch. 636, § 2 addresses access to juror personal, [59 Cal.App.4th 1088] identifying information and the sealing of records regarding such identifying information. The purpose of the legislation was to give "the court a measure of control over juror information, [creating] a mechanism for sealing the information and for prohibiting future access [, and making] it a separate misdemeanor to improperly obtain or release sealed juror information." (People v. Granish (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 [] ).)
Subdivision (f) of Code of Civil Procedure section 206 () provides: Subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of Code of Civil Procedure section 237 address the procedure for obtaining the personal juror identifying information sealed after return of the jury verdict.
The trial court referred to and followed the procedure strongly encouraged in the Klausner-Munoz- Consistent with the county-wide procedure noted in the Klausner-Munoz Memorandum, the court and counsel in the present case had available a copy of a case information sheet which accompanied the jury panel into the courtroom and which had the prospective jurors' names and corresponding juror identification numbers. Indeed, after establishing that juror numbers and not names would be used, the court confirmed with counsel that "You do have a copy [of the case information sheet] so you know who we're calling." It is thus apparent that the jurors' names were only withheld from the transcribed record, not from the court and counsel.
"Munoz Memorandum. As indicated by the trial court, for the convenience of the court reporter, who would have to redact juror names from the transcript after the jury's verdict to implement the applicable statutory provision (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(2)), the jurors were referred to, not by name, but by the last four digits of their juror identification number on their juror badges.
Appellant contends that the local court practice of referring to jurors by the last four digits of their juror identification number, as described in the Klausner-Munoz Memorandum, is invalid because it amounts to an unauthorized and premature sealing of juror identification. Relying upon Erickson v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th 755, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, appellant urges that since Code of Civil Procedure section 237 does not authorize sealing of personal juror identifying information at any stage prior to return of the jury verdict, the local practice in Los Angeles County is inconsistent with the statute and thus invalid and unenforceable. Appellant's reliance upon Erickson is misplaced.
In Erickson v. Superior Court, supra, the Court of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Placer County Superior Court from implementing its local policy, which purported to extend the sealing of juror identifying information throughout all civil and criminal proceedings. The court found the policy conflicted with Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivision (a), in two regards: (1) the policy limited access to juror identifying information not only in criminal cases, but in civil cases as well; and (2) the policy resulted in sealing prior to the return of a jury verdict. As those two aspects of the local superior court policy were "inconsistent with [the] statute" (Erickson v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 758, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230), the policy was deemed "invalid and unenforceable." (Id. at p. 759, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230.)
In contrast to the situation in Erickson, the local jury selection practice here entailed the use of a list of juror names and corresponding identification numbers not in both civil and criminal cases, but only in criminal cases. However, the most significant distinction between the present case and Erickson is that in Erickson the jury selection process was in a context in which the "court unequivocally bars parties, counsel and others from access to juror identifying information, absent granting of a petition for access to that information." (Id. at p. 757, fn. 1, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 230.) Erickson thus noted that it was "mystified" by the suggestion that the court policy " 'does not mandate juror anonymity ... but merely controls some of the procedures and paper trail with respect to the court's jury selection system.' " (Ibid.)
In the present case, on the other hand, the court and counsel were not barred from access to juror identifying information. As previously emphasized, the procedure established for every trial in Los Angeles County, as indicated in the Klausner-Munoz Memorandum, provides for the court and counsel to have a copy of a case information sheet which accompanies the jury panel into the courtroom and which has the prospective jurors' names and corresponding juror identification numbers. The trial court here confirmed with counsel that the pertinent document was available "so you know who we're calling." The names of the jurors were not recorded in...
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...41 [25- to-life for grand theft and residential burglary with prior residential burglary convictions]; People v. Goodwin (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1084, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 [25-to-life for commercial burglary and petty theft with a prior with priors for burglary and substance offenses]; People v......
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Recorder v. Commission on Judicial Performance
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