People v. Goree

• Decision Date: 20 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-592,81-592
• Citation: 450 N.E.2d 342,115 Ill.App.3d 157,70 Ill.Dec. 869
• Parties: , 70 Ill.Dec. 869 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee Roy GOREE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 342

450 N.E.2d 342

115 Ill.App.3d 157, 70 Ill.Dec. 869

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee Roy GOREE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 81-592.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

April 20, 1983.

Randy E. Blue, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Mount Vernon, Patrick J. Hughes, Legal Director, Springfield, and Donald L. Woods, Student Intern, Southern Illinois University School of Law, for defendant-appellant.

Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, and Frank J. Bieszczat, Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Mount Vernon, John Baricevic, State's Atty., Belleville, for plaintiff-appellee.

WELCH, Justice:

The defendant, Lee Roy Goree, Jr., was convicted in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County of murder and was sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. He appeals from his conviction and sentence, and argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a confession given by the defendant after he had been held in custody for three days without being charged with a crime or presented to a judicial officer. He also contends that the court relied on untrustworthy evidence introduced in aggravation at the sentencing hearing. In the late afternoon or early evening of March 29, 1981, the defendant was arrested by Washington Park police officers. He was kept in custody and was not formally charged with a crime or presented to a judicial officer until April 1, 1981. In the interim, the defendant gave two inculpatory statements, the first of which, on March 30, 1981, was transcribed, and the second of which, on March 31, 1981, was tape recorded. The later statement contained a slightly different version of the offense than the earlier statement. It is only the second, tape recorded statement which the defendant contends should have been suppressed, because the first statement was never introduced into evidence at the defendant's trial.

After the defendant's arrest, he was taken to the Washington Park police station, where he was detained overnight. On March 30, he was transported to the St. Clair County jail at approximately 9 a.m. He participated in several lineups and was returned to the Washington Park facilities at 3 p.m. Later that afternoon, the defendant was interviewed at the Washington Park police station by Agents Thomas O'Connor and Jimmy Bivens of the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. O'Connor and Bivens testified that the defendant was given Miranda warnings before he gave the statement, and no threats or promises were made to him. Both agents stated that during the interview, the defendant seemed cooperative, alert and coherent. This testimony was corroborated by Washington Park police Sergeant Phillip Delaney, who was present during that questioning.

Following the interview, the defendant indicated that he would accompany the officers to the house of his aunt, Helen Phillips Shanklin, to recover several items which had been used in the robbery during which the murder was committed. At approximately 8 p.m., the defendant, accompanied by O'Connor, Bivens, Sergeant Delaney and Agent Terrence Delaney of the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, arrived at the house of the defendant's aunt. Ms. Shanklin executed a consent to search form, and the officers recovered a .22 caliber weapon and army fatigues from the basement. Before the defendant was taken back to the Washington Park police department, his aunt gave him a beverage, which the officers thought was a soft drink. The officers and the defendant remained at the Shanklin residence for nearly 30 minutes.

While at the Shanklin house, the defendant showed no signs of illness or other disturbance. However, at about 10:30 p.m. or 11 p.m., at the Washington Park police department, the defendant appeared to be in "somewhat of a stupor." To the officers, he seemed incoherent, slurred his speech, and had difficulty standing and walking. The defendant was transported by ambulance to St. Mary's Hospital in East St. Louis, where he was admitted shortly after midnight. He was given an agent to induce vomiting and was kept at the hospital overnight. The defendant was discharged at 9:15 the following morning and was returned to Washington Park by Patrolman Frank Franklin. According to Franklin, the defendant appeared and acted coherent and even refused to use a wheelchair which was offered him upon his discharge.

Shortly after the defendant arrived at the Washington Park police department, he was transferred to the Fairview Heights facilities of the Department of Law Enforcement by Agents Bivens and O'Connor. At about noon, the defendant gave a statement which was tape recorded by O'Connor, and which would have been videotaped by State Trooper James Gallo, but the equipment did not function. Both O'Connor and Bivens testified that prior to giving the statement, the defendant was given Miranda warnings. They recalled that he seemed coherent throughout the interview, that no threats or promises were made to him and that he told them that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

The defendant testified that in the afternoon of March 30, at the Washington Park police department, Agent O'Connor pushed his head against a concrete wall, following which, the defendant stated, he did not remember anything, including the first statement, until he was discharged from the hospital. According to the defendant, Agent O'Connor told him at Fairview Heights that if he did not give a statement, "what happened to him last night could be permanent." O'Connor denied striking the defendant, and Agent Bivens testified that he did not observe any physical contact between the defendant and O'Connor. The defendant claimed to have developed a knot on the back of his head from the blow, but on cross-examination, he admitted that he did not tell the doctors at St. Mary's Hospital that he was hit on the head. He did state that he told the nurses at the St. Clair County jail about the incident.

The defendant does not argue that his confession was involuntary, but instead, he insists that his detention for three days before being charged with an offense violated his constitutional (Gerstein v. Pugh (1974), 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54) and statutory (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 109-1) rights to prompt presentment to a judicial officer for a determination of the probable cause for detention. He notes that where an individual is arrested without probable cause, a confession which is the product of that illegal arrest is not admissible solely because it is voluntary for purposes of the fifth amendment. (Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416; Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824.) In such circumstances, the fourth amendment, as applied to the States through the fourteenth amendment, requires the State to show that the confession was "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint" of the illegal arrest. Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416-417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 454.

The United States Supreme Court has mandated use of this stringent test to determine the admissibility of a confession obtained after an arrest (Brown v. Illinois; Dunaway v. New York ) or search and seizure (Wong Sun v. United States) made in violation of the fourth amendment. The defendant asserts that this standard should also be applied to a confession allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's prompt presentment requirement as enunciated in Gerstein v. Pugh. Initially, we question the defendant's preservation of this fourth amendment argument for purposes of this appeal, because the delay in presenting the defendant to a magistrate was not specified as a ground for suppression in the suppression motion, at the hearing on the motion, or in the post-trial motion. A specific objection to the admission of evidence waives all grounds not specified (People v. Curry (1973), 56 Ill.2d 162, 306 N.E.2d 292), and even a constitutional question not properly presented at trial will not normally be considered on appeal. (People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill.2d 196, 279 N.E.2d 353.) Nonetheless, even upon consideration of the defendant's fourth amendment claim, we find it to be meritless.

While the Federal courts have used a higher standard of proof to admit a confession obtained following a violation of a Federal statutory right to prompt presentment (Mallory v. United States (1957), 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479; McNabb v. United States (1943), 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819), this rule has not been applied to the States through the fourteenth amendment (See Culombe v. Connecticut (1961), 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951)), and the defendant does not suggest otherwise. In Illinois, the reported decisions uphold the principle that violation of the constitutional or statutory right to a prompt determination of probable cause for detention does not require exclusion of a confession obtained during that detention, but is instead a factor to be considered in determining whether the confession was voluntary. (People v. Lucas (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 942, 948-949, 43 Ill.Dec. 907, 911-12, 410 N.E.2d 1040, 1044-1045; People v. Dees (1981), 85 Ill.2d 233, 237-238, 52 Ill.Dec....