People v. Cipriano

• Decision Date: 01 June 1987
• Docket Number: 78035 and 78446,Docket Nos. 77682,77683
• Citation: 429 N.W.2d 781,431 Mich. 315
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Giovani CIPRIANO, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan DEAN, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight Anthony HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 781

429 N.W.2d 781

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Giovani CIPRIANO, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathan DEAN, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight Anthony HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 77682, 77683, 78035 and 78446, June Term, 1987.

Calendar Nos. 2-4.

431 Mich. 315, 429 N.W.2d 781

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued June 2, 1987.

Decided Sept. 16, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1988.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Norman R. Hayes, Pros. Atty., Thomas C. Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys. Appellate Service, Lansing, John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, Larry L. Roberts, Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for the People.

William R. Stackpoole, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in Nos. 77682, 77683.

Hoffa, Chodak & Robiner by Norman R. Robiner, Robert F. Harrington, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 78035.

State Appellate Defender Office by Susan M. Meinberg, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 78446.

GRIFFIN, Justice.

Michigan statutory law requires that an arrested person be brought before a magistrate for arraignment "without unnecessary delay." M.C.L. Secs. 764.13, 764.26; M.S.A. Secs. 28.871(1), 28.885. ¹ In each of these three cases, consolidated on appeal, we must determine the effect of this statutory requirement upon the admissibility of a confession obtained during a period of prearraignment delay. We hold that "unnecessary delay" prior to arraignment is only one factor to be taken into account in evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. If the totality of the surrounding circumstances indicates that a confession was voluntarily given, it shall not be excluded from evidence solely because of prearraignment delay.

I

More than three decades ago, the United States Supreme Court addressed the evidentiary consequences of illegal prearraignment detention in two landmark cases, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), reh. den. 319 U.S. 784, 63 S.Ct. 1322, 87 L.Ed. 1727 (1943), andMallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). In those cases, the Court determined that the right of a suspect to prompt arraignment should be enforced by automatically excluding from evidence any incriminating statement obtained during a period of "unnecessary delay," even though the confession was not the result of physical or psychological coercion. This rule of exclusion became known as the "McNabb-Mallory rule." ²

The McNabb-Mallory rule was not applied with enthusiasm by all of the federal courts, ³ and it became the subject of much criticism in Congress. ⁴ Finally, in 1968, Congress took aim at the McNabb-Mallory rule, along with other concerns, when it enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501. ⁵ The act reflected a strong reaction on the part of Congress to what it regarded as "illogical and unrealistic court decisions resulting from the application" of the McNabb-Mallory rule. ⁶ 90th Cong. (2d Sess.), 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2124.

Since then, most federal courts have interpreted Sec. 3501 as allowing the admission of a voluntary confession even though it is given during a period of prearraignment delay--in effect, overruling McNabb-Mallory. A majority of federal courts have followed the route taken by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231 (CA9, 1970), wherein it explained,

"[I]t is obvious that the prime purpose of Congress in the enaction of Sec. 3501 was to ameliorate the effect of the decision in Mallory v United States (1957), 354 US 449, 77 SCt 1356; 1 LEd2d 1479, to remove delay alone as a cause for rejecting admission into evidence of a confession and to make the voluntary character of the confession, the real test of its admissibility." ⁷

The Halbert court quoted from the legislative history of Sec. 3501, which reflected overwhelming congressional opinion that the admissibility of a confession should turn on its voluntariness:

" 'This title would restore the test for the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases to that time-tested and well-founded standard of voluntariness. It would avoid the inflexible rule of excluding such statements solely on technical grounds such as delay or failure to warn the accused as to his rights to silence or to counsel. We have not nullified, however, the rights of defendants to the safeguards of federal law or the Constitution. On the contrary, we have provided a more reasonable rule in that the judge shall consider all the defendant's rights (speedy arraignment, silence, counsel, knowledge of offense charged) and their possible violation in deciding as to the voluntariness of the confession and thus its admissibility.' " ⁸ Id., p 1236, n 6, quoting from 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2282.

The McNabb-Mallory rule was formulated by the United States Supreme Court "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts...." McNabb, supra, 318 U.S. at 341, 63 S.Ct. at 613. Because it was not constitutionally mandated, the rule was never applicable to criminal proceedings in state courts. ⁹ However, as is true in Michigan, most states require by statute that an arrested person must be arraigned "without unnecessary delay." ¹⁰ In interpreting such statutes, the "vast majority of state courts [like their federal counterparts] have rejected McNabb-Mallory outright, opting instead for a traditional due process voluntariness test of the admissibility of confessions." Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 324, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). Under the view adopted in most states, a confession obtained from a suspect in violation of his statutory right to prompt arraignment is not ipso facto inadmissible; rather, arraignment delay is taken into account as one relevant factor in evaluating the overall voluntariness of the confession. ¹¹ See, for example, State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (ND, 1987); Ferry v. State, 453 N.E.2d 207 (Ind, 1983); People v. Goree, 115 Ill.App.3d 157, 70 Ill.Dec. 869, 450 N.E.2d 342 (1983); People v. Harris, 28 Cal.3d 935; 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240 (1981); State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388 (Minn, 1980); State v. Wyman, 97 Idaho 486, 547 P.2d 531 (1976), overruled on other grounds State v. McCurdy, 100 Idaho 683, 603 P.2d 1017 (1979). ¹²

By contrast, in People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960), Michigan, in 1960, became the first state to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule. ¹³ However, a split on the issue appeared within the Court in People v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d 669 (1965). Although the Court unanimously condemned the use at trial of confessions coerced through delays in arraignments, only half of the Ubbes Court would have held the confession, obtained after a delay of sixteen and one-half hours, inadmissible on the ground that "confessions however obtained during such periods of illegal detention must be excluded from evidence in courts of law." Id., pp. 586-587, 132 N.W.2d 669 (opinion of Souris, J.). The remainder of the Court, while noting that "[m]ere lapse of time, without arraignment, can render a confession obtained during such detention illegally obtained and hence inadmissible," id., p. 577, 132 N.W.2d 669 (emphasis in original), concluded nonetheless that the proper question is one, not of delay, but of coercion:

"Time of detention alone, without arraignment, is not the test. If for the same 16 1/2 hours defendant had been held without appearance before a magistrate and he had been 'sweated,' i.e., questioned unremittingly for the purpose of extracting a confession, we would not hesitate to strike down the practice and withhold from jury consideration his alleged confession. Here the totality of the circumstance indicates bona fide questioning to determine the issue of release, or complaint, and complaint for what offense. We believe this is the meaning of the rule announced in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410 ." Id., 374 Mich. at p. 576, 132 N.W.2d 669 (opinion of O'Hara, J.).

In People v. Farmer, 380 Mich. 198, 156 N.W.2d 504 (1968), this Court focused on a lack of coercive circumstances in holding that a seventy-two hour prearraignment delay did not render a confession inadmissible.

Then, in People v. White, 392 Mich. 404, 221 N.W.2d 357 (1974), cert. den. 420 U.S. 912, 95 S.Ct. 835, 42 L.Ed.2d 843 (1975), this Court unanimously ruled that a confession was admissible even though it had been obtained after a thirty-four hour prearraignment delay. The Court found that the most damaging statement made by the defendant was "not the product of a police interrogation," and held the exclusionary rule to be applicable "[o]nly when the delay has been employed as a tool to extract a statement...." Id., p. 424, 221 N.W.2d 357. The White Court took note of the fact that the defendant had been repeatedly warned of his constitutional rights and also had an opportunity to consult with his lawyer.

Thereafter, at least for a period of time, the Court of Appeals interpreted Hamilton and White to mean that "the question is not one of delay, but of whether the statement was voluntary or coerced." People v. Antonio Johnson, 85 Mich.App. 247, 251, 271 N.W.2d 177 (1978). See also People v. Wallach, 110 Mich.App. 37, 59, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds 417 Mich. 937, 331 N.W.2d 730 (1983); People v. Dean, 110 Mich.App. 751, 755, 313 N.W.2d 100 (1981).

However, in the 1984 decision of People v. Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984), aff'd. sub. nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), this Court divided four to three...