People v. Grady

• Decision Date: 30 April 1986
• Citation: 506 N.Y.S.2d 922,133 Misc.2d 211
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Nathaniel GRADY, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 922

506 N.Y.S.2d 922

133 Misc.2d 211

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Nathaniel GRADY, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Bronx County,

Part 24.

April 30, 1986.

Mario Merola, District Atty., Bronx Co. by Peter D. Coddington, Eric Warner, and Deborah E. Seidenberg, New York City, for the People.

Arnold D. Roseman and Juris G. Cederbaums, New York City, for defendant.

FRIED, Judge:

Defendant, Nathaniel T. Grady, following a jury verdict finding him guilty of nineteen counts of various sex offenses, ¹ at a Day Care Center situated in a Church, where he was the Minister, moves to set aside the verdict (CPL § 330.30) and renews his motion for a trial order of dismissal, on which decision has been reserved (CPL § 290.10). Defendant's main contention is that the in-court identifications were unreliable, and resulted in the conviction of an innocent person.

Mindful that a mistaken identification "probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor--perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined", United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), I am satisfied, having presided over this thirteen week trial, that there has not been the conviction of an innocent man as a result of a mistaken identification. Rather, when all the evidence is considered, the defendant's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.

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With regard to the identifications, I was persuaded at trial, and am not persuaded otherwise now, that the testimony of each child who identified the defendant, in its entirety and without undue regard for occasional digressions and inconsistencies, was valid and reliable. While, arguably, all in-court identifications are inherently suggestive, this does not render them necessarily unreliable. What is required is that the in-court identification must be conducted in a fair manner. As will be seen, that is what was done here. Moreover, the inconsistencies and confusion complained of by defendant can be attributed to the ages of the six victims and the nature of the crimes to which they were subjected. See Johnson v. State, 265 Ind. 689, 359 N.E.2d 525, 532 (Sup.Ct.1977). When this testimony is considered in the context of the "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome," it appears of even greater reliability.

The "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" should be considered together with other syndromes, such as, e.g. "Rape Trauma Syndrome," ³ "Battered Child Syndrome," ⁴ and "Battered Wife Syndrome", ⁵ that explain the behavior of a crime victim, which does not appear ordinary or normative. Expert evidence concerning these syndromes, which are analogous to the Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome, generally has been admitted as reliable and helpful to the fact-finder. ⁶ Such evidence, of course, "is not expert psychological testimony about the victim's credibility, though it, like any other evidence, may affect the jury's assessment of her credibility." ⁷ For example, expert testimony describing the victim's psychological response to rape, has been allowed to include evidence pertaining to the personality changes that the victim has undergone, ⁸ which is deemed relevant, as explained by the Syndrome, on the issue of consent. E.g. People v. Reid, 123 Misc.2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Kings Cty.Sup.Ct.1984).

The "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome" is likewise particularly helpful in explaining the reaction of a young victim when subjected to various forms of sexual abuse, c.f., People v. Benjamin R., 103 A.D.2d 663, 669, 481 N.Y.S. 827 (4th Dept.1984). The evidence is not admissible to bolster the testimony of the young victim, ⁹ but rather to understand the psychological aftermath occasioned by the trauma, such as false recantations and feelings of guilt and apprehension about the trial. People v. Reid, supra 123 Misc.2d at p. 1085, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Rape Trauma Syndrome--11 year old child). Evidence as to this Syndrome which was received during the trial, was also especially helpful in allowing the jury to assess and evaluate the in-court identifications that were made by the various children. ¹⁰

Ms. Eileen Treacy, a psychologist, who has specialized in child sexual abuse, was called by the prosecutor and testified concerning the "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome". ¹¹ According to Ms. Treacy, the "Syndrome" has five distinct phases that are associated with it, as well as symptoms or behavioral manifestations and coping mechanisms that have been observed in sexually abused children.

The first phase, the "engagement phase," is when the offender seeks out friendly contact with the child, which can include various kinds of "affectional behavior" such as allowing the child to sit in the offender's lap. It is during the second phase, the "sexual interaction phase," that the sexual abuse actually occurs. This "sexual interaction phase", often overlaps in part, the third, or "secrecy" phase, in which the offender seeks to prevent the child from disclosing the sexual abuse. During this phase the level of threats against the child begins to increase. Such threats may include direct threats against a member of the child's family, or a threat that the child will get in "trouble", or actual violence directed against the child. Following the "secrecy" phase is the "disclosure" phase. It is characterized either as "purposeful disclosure," which is relatively rare and which occurs when the child intentionally relates the sexual offense to someone else, or "accidental disclosure" which usually occurs when someone notices a change in the child's behavior, leading to questions which prompt the child to disclose the sexual offense. Apparently, "accidental disclosure" is the most common revelation of child sexual abuse.

Finally, after disclosure, the child enters the "suppression" phase. It is at this time that the psychological defenses become operative. In this regard, as Ms. Treacy testified in explaining that children often suppress information about sexual abuse: "one needs to understand that once a child sex abuse case is disclosed, all of a sudden, all kinds of adults are marching into the life of a child. You have the police, you have the District Attorney, you have Family Court personnel, you have family members who are very upset, you have school people, you have a whole bunch of folks now asking this youngster what happened. ... Families are usually under a great deal of strife when this secret has been broken, so that in a suppression phase, very often you will see a child holding back, the child will decide I am not going to talk about this, this is too much pressure ... or you sometimes get recantation ... Sometimes that is an intellectual strategy on the part of the child, to send all these people away ... it is too much stress for them to have to deal with all of these people now in their lives." This phase is often characterized by denial, or in other words, "suppression basically means shutting down, trying to keep things back". Sexually abused children also undergo a wide variety of symptoms: regressive behavior; bed wetting; bowel movements in their pants, although previously toilet-trained; regression to infantile separation anxieties; a new inability to cope with previously achieved self-help skills, with the result that the child requires the mother's help again. These children also begin displaying other previously unexperienced behavior: temper tantrums beyond what had been normal; hyperactivity or withdrawal; exaggerated fear levels, such as fear of men or fear of locations where the sexual offense took place; inappropriate sexual play with peers, toys, or dolls, including touching themselves or other children in an inappropriate manner; sexually oriented conversation; detailed, and inappropriate--for their age--sexual knowledge; eating disorders; sleeping disorders, or a fear of sleeping alone; nightmares; flashbacks, crying spells, resulting from lowered frustration thresholds. Furthermore, since a child of young age is unlikely to possess detailed sexual knowledge, his or her description of sexual intercourse, or oral or anal sodomy, is usually evidence that the child had, somehow, viewed explicit sexual activity or materials, or, more likely, was sexually abused.

Dr. Heacock, the defense child psychiatrist, agreed that children who have been sexually abused will tend to deny the abuse, although the child would be more likely to discuss abuse which has occurred outside the family. He pointed out that the abused child "will tend to deny that this occurred and this is ... a normal protective defensive reaction". Dr. Heacock acknowledged, in response to a hypothetical question, that when called to the witness stand in the courtroom, the conduct of a child in initially denying that a defendant, also present in the courtroom, was the molester, could be consiste with the Syndrome. It was his opinion that the children could deny both the sexual abuse as well as the identity of the abuser. This opinion reinforced the testimony by Ms. Treacy that a child's first reaction on confronting his or her molester, in court, may very well be denial or evasion. Dr. Heacock also agreed, with respect to the child sexual abuse, that "false denials are common but that false disclosures are rare."

With this discussion of the "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome", which explains the psychological context and setting in which the in-court identifications were made, I now turn to the testimony of the children, themselves, together with other relevant evidence. In considering the testimony of the children, it is useful to keep in mind the statement of Dr. Jon. L. Regier, Executive Director, New York State Council of Churches, Inc., that in court proceedings, the "child becomes confused and/or intimidated and their witness is less than accurate and, at other times, completely blocked". ¹²

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Harold O.:

The first child called to testify was Harold O.,...